REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

NORAH McCANN KING, Magistrate Judge.

This is an action instituted under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 14)("Motion for Judgment") and Memorandum in Support (Doc. No. 15), Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 16), and the administrative record (Doc. No. 11).1 For the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Judgment be DENIED, that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED, that this action be DISMISSED, and that final judgment be entered pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Introduction

Plaintiff filed his application for benefits in December 2013, alleging that he has been disabled since August 1, 2012, as a result of irritable bowel syndrome ("IBS"), PTSD, sleep apnea/insomnia, and traumatic brain injury. Tr. 146, 212. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration and Plaintiff requested a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). On January 12, 2016, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at that hearing, as did Ernest W. Brewer, Ph.D., who testified as a vocational expert. Tr. 32-56.

In a decision dated February 5, 2016, the ALJ held that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from his alleged date of onset through the date of the administrative decision. That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council declined review on May 5, 2016.

This action was thereafter timely filed. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The Findings and Conclusions of the ALJ

In her decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Tr. 14, 16, 25.

Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff asserts the following claims:

Standard of Review

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence and employed the proper legal standards. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2003). This Court does not try the case de novo, nor does it resolve conflicts in the evidence or questions of credibility. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).

In determining the existence of substantial evidence, this Court must examine the administrative record as a whole. Kirk v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524, 536 (6th Cir. 1982). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if this Court would decide the matter differently, Tyra v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 896 F.2d 1024, 1028 (6th Cir. 1990)(citing Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983)), and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. Longworth v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005)(citing Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)).

Summary and ALJ's Evaluation of Relevant Evidence

At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified to a number of medical conditions. He first experienced fatigue in 2009 and the condition has worsened over time. He cannot sleep, and suffers memory loss and mood swings. Tr. 38-39. Medication has not alleviated the condition. Tr. 39. He also suffers from PTSD, which makes it difficult for him to trust people. Tr. 40. He is angry, depressed and suicidal. Id. His attention span is very short. Id. Despite medication for the condition, he still has nightmares and hears voices. Tr. 43. His PTSD caused him to lose his last two jobs. Tr. 41. See also Tr. 44 ("I was terminated."). He cannot see out of his right eye, Tr. 41, and can "barely" read with his left eye, even with glasses. Tr. 47. He would not be able to see an open door without having "to go real up close to it." Tr. 49. He has difficulty hearing because of constant ringing in his ears. Tr. 42. He also has IBS, which requires that he use a toilet "all the time." Tr. 42. On a "good day," he must use the bathroom nine (9) times; on a "bad day," he must use a bathroom 13 to 15 times. Tr. 42-43. He also suffers from sleep apnea, which prevents him from getting rest. Tr. 43. He sometimes goes 72 hours without sleep. Id. Plaintiff also testified that he drives, can attend church for more than an hour at a time twice per month, Tr. 45, and does his own house cleaning and grocery shopping. Id.

Plaintiff is a military veteran, having served as a cook and a boxer from 1983 to 1991, including in Desert Storm. Tr. 37, 218. Most of the evidence in the record reflects Plaintiff's treatment by the Veteran's Administration ("VA"). The VA has adjudicated Plaintiff to be 100 percent disabled as a result of chronic fatigue syndrome, PTSD, irritable colon, eczema, and fibromyalgia. Tr. 662. The ALJ noted that adjudication, but also noted that "the [VA] rates disability under a different system than that of the Social Security Administration." Tr. 17.

The ALJ went on to consider, comprehensively and in detail, the medical record, which the ALJ fairly characterized as "extensive [but containing] hundreds of pages of duplicates of rather unremarkable evidence." Tr. 17-22. The ALJ noted, in particular, the June 2014 evaluation by Kimberly C. Marsham, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist. Tr. 20-21. Dr. Marsham attempted to administer a "battery" of neuropsychological tests, but that effort was "abbreviated due to [Plaintiff's] intentional negative skewing of the cognitive test results (i.e., performance significantly worse than chance)." Tr. 454. Dr. Marsham's lengthy report, Tr. 454-59, reflects a comprehensive review of Plaintiff's psychiatric history and diagnoses, mental status examination, and test results, which Dr. Marsham characterized as "uniformly invalid." Tr. 457. Dr. Marsham summarized her findings and opinions as follows:

Tr. 420-21, 458 (emphasis in the original).

In light of the medical evidence, including Dr. Marsham's report, the ALJ looked askance at the VA's award of benefits and found that Plaintiff "is simply not credible." Tr. 23. For example, the ALJ noted, Tr. 16, that Plaintiff's gastroenterologist concluded that Plaintiff could not have taken his medication for IBS as prescribed, despite Plaintiff's statement that he had done so. See Tr. 319. The ALJ also noted, Tr. 17, that Plaintiff had reported to his gastroenterologist in January 2014 that he was "laid off" from his last job, Tr. 281, but had reported to the Social Security Administration that his job ended because of his medical conditions, Tr. 212.

Tr. 23-25 (citations to record omitted).

Discussion

1. Veteran's Administration Disability Award

The VA determined that Plaintiff is entitled to a finding of "individual unemployability" by reason of Plaintiff's PTSD and depressive disorder. See Tr. 132. Plaintiff contends that, because the VA's standard for individual unemployability is "strikingly close" to the disability standards of the Social Security Administration, the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff is not disabled. See Memorandum in Support (Doc. No. 15, PageID# 1590).

The Commissioner's regulations make clear that another agency's disability determination is not determinative to the Social Security disability determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 ("A decision by . . . any other governmental agency about whether [a plaintiff is] . . . disabled . . . is based on its rules and is not our decision. . . . Therefore, a determination made by another agency that [a plaintiff is]. . . disabled . . . is not binding on us."). Although a VA disability rating "is entitled to consideration," Ritchie v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 540 F. App'x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2013), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not specified the precise weight such a rating should receive when an ALJ makes a Social Security disability determination. Id. at 511 ("We have held that a disability rating from the Veterans Administration is entitled to consideration, but we have not specified the weight such a determination should carry when determining social security eligibility.")(citing Stewart v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1065, 1068 (6th Cir. 1984)). See also LaRiccia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. App'x 377, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2013). Rather, such a determination is but one factor to be considered in the Social Security context; "the relative weight to be given this type of evidence will vary depending upon the factual circumstances of each case." Ritchie, 540 F. App'x. at 511. See also Litteral v. Colvin, No. 3:13-00561, 2014 WL 6997889, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:13-CV-00561, 2014 WL 7404056 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 2014). "ALJs need not give `great weight' to a VA disability determination if they adequately explain the valid reasons for not doing so." King v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 779 F.Supp.2d 721, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (citing Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2001)).

In the case presently before the Court, the ALJ acknowledged the VA determination, properly recognized that it was not binding, and proceeded to consider the entire record, including the VA's own medical records, in determining that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The ALJ's failure to give greater weight to the VA determination applied the proper standard and enjoys substantial support in the record.

2. ALJ's Credibility Assessment

The ALJ found that Plaintiff "is simply not credible." Tr. 23. Plaintiff complains that, in making this credibility determination, the ALJ "erroneously relied solely on statements contained in [Dr. Marsham's report] and then moved on from there to make generalized, sweeping statements concerning [Plaintiff's] lack of credibility." Memorandum in Support (Doc. No. 15, PageID# 1591).

In evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints, an ALJ must determine whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. Stanley v. Sec' of Health & Human Servs., 39 F.3d 115, 117 (6th Cir. 1994). If so, then the ALJ must determine (1) whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the complaint arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively established medical condition is of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged complaint. Id.; Duncan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986). An ALJ's credibility determination is accorded great weight and deference because of the ALJ's unique opportunity to observe a witness's demeanor while testifying. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gaffney v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 98, 973 (6th Cir. 1987)). However, credibility determinations must be clearly explained. See Auer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 830 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1987). If the ALJ's credibility determinations are explained and enjoy substantial support in the record, a court is without authority to revisit those determinations. See Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994); Beavers v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 386-87 (6th Cir. 1978). "As long as the ALJ cited substantial, legitimate evidence to support h[er] factual conclusions, we are not to second-guess," and reversal is not "warranted even if substantial evidence would support an opposite conclusion." Ulman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff's complaint that the ALJ based her credibility determination exclusively on Dr. Marsham's report and diagnosis of malingering is unfounded. A fair reading of the ALJ's comprehensive and detailed decision makes clear that the ALJ based her decision on the totality of the medical evidence and on internal inconsistencies in Plaintiff's testimony and reports to the Social Security Administration and to various medical providers. The ALJ clearly articulated her findings, which are amply supported by substantial evidence in the record. Under these circumstances, this Court is without authority to disturb those findings.

Recommendation

In light of the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Judgment (Doc. No. 14) be DENIED, that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED, that this action be DISMISSED, and that final judgment be entered pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Procedure on Objections

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this report and recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the report and recommendation, specifically designating the part thereof in question, as well as the basis for the objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days thereafter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the report and recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat'l Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007). Filing only "vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object." Drew v. Tessmer, 36 F. App'x 561, 561 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)).