ORDER AMENDING THE COURT'S PRIOR ORDER (Doc. 20)

TIMOTHY S. BLACK, District Judge.

On the suggestion of counsel, the Court sua sponte revisited its Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Doc. 20). The Court amends its Order (Doc. 20) as follows.

A. Citations

The Court amends the reference to "¶ 31" on page 2 of its Order to "¶¶ 33, 36." The Court replaces the phrase "filled with" on page 3 of its Order with the phrase "which transport."1

B. Official-Capacity Claims2

The Court further amends its Order to include the following analysis of the claims brought against Defendant Guliano in her official capacity.

An official-capacity suit generally represents "`only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). An official-capacity claim brought against an officer or employee of a governmental entity in his or her official capacity is treated as a claim against the governmental entity. See id. at 166. Accordingly, when a complaint asserts a claim against an officer or employee of a governmental entity, in his or her official capacity, and against the governmental entity itself, a district court may dismiss the official-capacity claim. See Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66) (affirming a district court's dismissal of official-capacity claims against school officials "because a suit against an official of the state is treated as a suit against the municipality."); see also Brunson v. City of Dayton, 163 F.Supp.2d 919, 927 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (dismissing official capacity claims against individual defendants because their public employer was also a defendant); E.J. v. Hamilton Cnty., 707 F.Supp. 314, 318-19 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (dismissing official capacity claims against county commissioners because the county was a defendant).

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Guliano has the sole authority to compel employees to be tested and to discipline non-complying employees and exclusively possesses the "appointing authority power." Plaintiffs argue that an injunction ordering the Board to reinstate an employee or to provide back pay would be ineffective because only Defendant Guliano could carry out such an order. Plaintiffs rely on Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1985), for the proposition that Defendant Guliano is properly sued in her official capacity because Defendants BCDD and Guliano each have ultimate authority in their respective spheres and because the relationship between the two is sufficiently close.

In that case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict against both the Wayne County sheriff, in his official capacity, and Wayne County. The sheriff, elected to serve as the law enforcement officer for the county, was tasked with making policy in police matters. Marchese, 758 F.2d at 188. The Court held the county liable, too, because "the relationship between the County and the Sheriff's Department is so close as to make the County liable for the Sheriff's failure to train and discipline his officers and his ratification of the use of wanton brutality by members of his force[.]" Id.3

Here, Defendant Guliano's employing entity—BCDD—is also a defendant. Further, Defendant Guliano was not the ultimate decision maker with regard to the policy at issue. Defendant BCDD adopted the policy at issue. (Doc. 10 at ¶ 50). Defendant Guliano could not have enacted the policy because she lacks voting privileges on the board. See R.C. § 5126.0219(A).

Pursuant to Ohio law, the superintendent administers the work of the Board subject to the Board's rules, and the Board exercises supervisory and managerial control over the superintendent. (Doc. 10 ¶¶ 22, 25). See also R.C. §§ 5126.0219, 51260220. Plaintiffs have not supplied authority for their contention that an injunction ordering the Board to reinstate an employee or provide back pay would be ineffective. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, claims brought against Defendant Guliano in her official capacity are DISMISSED.

CONCLUSION

The Court's Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) is AMENDED, as set forth herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.