DAVID N. HURD, United States District Judge.
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ... 409
I. INTRODUCTION ... 409
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ... 410
A. Federal Program ... 410
B. New York State's Implementation ... 411
C. Named Plaintiffs ... 413
D. Recent Document Revisions ... 414
III. DISCUSSION ... 415
A. Class Certification ... 415
B. Preliminary Injunction ... 421
C. Failure to Name a Necessary Party ... 433
D. Failure to State a Claim ... 434
IV. CONCLUSION ... 436
V. ORDER ... 437
VI. ADDENDUM ... 437
ABAWD: Able Bodied Adults Without Dependents
DSS: Department(s) of Social Services
FNS: Food and Nutrition Service
NOAA: Notice of Adverse Action
OTDA: New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance
SNAP: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
SNAP Act: Food and Nutrition Act of 2008
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture
The named plaintiffs Derrick Brooks ("Brooks"), Clifton DeMeco ("DeMeco"), and Brian Blowers ("Blowers") (collectively "plaintiffs") seek relief on behalf of themselves and a putative class of fellow New York State residents receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits, commonly referred to as food stamps, who have had, are now having, or will have their benefits terminated.
Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint ("Complaint") alleges declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is necessary to enjoin defendant from terminating or continuing to terminate the SNAP benefits of plaintiffs and the proposed class and subclasses, a practice which allegedly violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
The parties have filed three motions: (1) plaintiffs have moved for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23 and (2) a preliminary injunction under Rule 65, while defendant has moved for (3) dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety under Rule 12 on the basis that plaintiffs fail to name a necessary party and fail to state valid causes of action for due process and statutory violations. The three motions were fully briefed, with supplemental briefing on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Oral argument was heard on November 30, 2016 in Utica, New York, where decision on all three motions was reserved.
Congress established the federally funded, state-administered food stamp program in 1964. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036(c); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271-285. Food stamp applicants are entitled to food stamps under federal law subject to satisfying certain objective criteria for eligibility, such as employment requirements and household income. In 2008, the federal food stamp program was renamed SNAP, and the Food Stamp Act was renamed the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (hereinafter the "SNAP Act"). The head of the USDA, the Secretary of Agriculture, is charged with promulgating implementing regulations for the food stamp program. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c); 7 C.F.R. § 273.
At the federal level, SNAP is administered by the USDA FNS. The federal government provides complete funding to states for all benefits and provides fifty percent of the administrative costs. Each state must designate an agency responsible for administering SNAP and ensuring federal compliance; in New York this is the OTDA. As Commissioner of the OTDA, defendant is responsible for the operation of the SNAP program in New York, as carried out by the 58 social services districts.
The OTDA determines the eligibility of applicant households and certifies and recertifies their eligibility in accordance with rules set forth by the federal SNAP Act. The OTDA certifies eligible households for a specified period of time, called a certification period. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(4); 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f). Households must then apply to renew their eligibility, a process called recertification. 7 C.F.R. § 273.14. As part of the eligibility determination, applicants must have an interview with a SNAP worker (through the local county Departments of Social Services (the "DSS")).
In addition to meeting income requirements, work requirements are also in place for certain adults known as able bodied adults without dependents, or ABAWDs. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o). An ABAWD is an individual between the ages of 18 and 50 who is not disabled and does not have a dependent under the age of 18. ABAWDs must satisfy work requirements to maintain eligibility for SNAP benefits. ABAWDs who are not working at least 80 hours per month (paid or unpaid), participating in an employment and training program at least 80 hours per month, or complying with a designated work program, cannot receive SNAP benefits for more than three
Federal law provides certain conditions under which ABAWDs may be exempt from the work rules and thus able to receive benefits in excess of three months within a 36 month period. These circumstances include if the ABAWD is receiving temporary or permanent disability benefits, responsible for the care of a child or incapacitated household member, pregnant, or already exempt on another basis, such as those receiving unemployment compensation for example, or meet certain other criteria (the "exemptions").
In November 2015, the FNS issued a guidance document to states advising that they must screen ABAWDs for exemptions from the work rules and connect ABAWDs with information to maintain eligibility. Compl. ¶ 44. States are also responsible for assessing an individual's fitness for work. The mandatory SNAP interview conducted by the DSS is critical in doing so.
Federal law requires that when a state or the DSS determines that a recipient's benefits should be terminated because of non-compliance with a program rule, such as the ABAWD work rules, a notice of adverse action must be sent to the recipient no later than 10 days before the effective date of the termination or reduction of benefits. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10); 7 C.F.R. § 273.13(a)(1). For the notice to be legally adequate, it must explain in easily understandable language, the proposed action and the reason for the proposed action. 7 C.F.R. § 273.13(a)(2). The regulations dictate that the notice must include the household's right to request a fair hearing, the telephone number of the food stamp office, (and if possible, the name of the person to contact for additional information); the availability of continued benefits; and the liability of the household for any overissuances received while awaiting a fair hearing if the hearing official's decision is adverse.
Due to high unemployment from 2009 to 2015, New York had a statewide waiver of the ABAWD work rules, meaning that they were not being enforced. Due to improved economic conditions, the waiver was set to expire at the end of calendar year 2015. Accordingly, the three month within 36 month time limit was set to be reincorporated into SNAP eligibility requirements in New York starting January 1, 2016. On January 1, 2016, the expiration of the waiver became effective in 33 counties of New York's 62 counties.
On or about December 3, 2015, the OTDA mailed out a one page letter to certain SNAP households believed to contain at least one ABAWD living within counties where the waiver was set to expire. Akhtar Decl., Ex. 3, ECF No. 9-4 (the "Notice of ABAWD Status"). According to defendant, it was mailed to the head of the SNAP household and was generated from information in the OTDA's information management system. In order to receive the Notice of ABAWD Status, the household had to have an open SNAP case in October 2015 when the letter was generated, and meet the ABAWD criteria in the computer system for the letter to be generated, thereby missing some ABAWDs. For example, the Notice of ABAWD Status was not provided to ABAWDs whose case was not open as of October 2015 or whose household composition may have changed to include an ABAWD after October 2015. Further, it was only sent to those in counties where the waiver was known to be expiring. As a result, some ABAWDs whose benefits were later terminated, never received information about the ending of the waiver, the reintroduction of the three month out of 36 month time limit, or the work rules with which they were expected to comply.
The letter advised that the recipient was receiving it because "you or someone in your household has been determined to be an ... ABAWD." Notice of ABAWD Status. It did not identify specifically who was the ABAWD in the household. It explained what an ABAWD is and what one must do in order to maintain SNAP eligibility (comply with work rules) and that failure to comply with the work rules without good cause would result in the termination of benefits. The Notice of ABAWD Status advised the recipient to contact the DSS if the ABAWD is in fact meeting the work rules or to discuss how to meet them. It did not inform the recipient that they could request a fair hearing to dispute their ABAWD status. It noted that if SNAP eligibility is lost, it may be regained again but did not indicate how. It also advised to contact the DSS "if you believe that everyone in your SNAP household should be exempt from these requirements because each adult individual meets one or more of the conditions listed."
At the time the Notice of ABAWD Status was disseminated, the OTDA contacted all the DSS to provide them with guidance on enforcing the work rules. The Notice of ABAWD Status was a one time mailing by the OTDA and defendant left additional notification of ABAWD status to the DSS offices. The DSS were advised but not required to provide the same Notice of ABAWD Status in the application and recertification
According to plaintiffs, though the OTDA is the state agency charged with operating SNAP in New York, it fails to mandate a specific process or requirement that the DSS employees (who actually see the SNAP clients) inform the applicant or recipient of their status as an ABAWD, what the work rules are, what the time limits are, what the exemptions are, or how good cause may be claimed.
In February 2016, the OTDA advised the DSS not to discontinue benefits for ABAWDs failing to meet the work rules until after the completion of the third full month of benefits. The OTDA provides to the DSS the form notice for terminating benefits. This Notice of Adverse Action is computer generated using the OTDA's information management system. Beginning on April 1, 2016, the DSS began notifying SNAP households with ABAWDs not in compliance with the work rules that their benefits would be reduced or discontinued.
The Notice of Adverse Action states that benefits will be discontinued as of a set date because the recipient is an ABAWD not meeting the work rules (therein defined).
After the termination of benefits to ABAWDs, the OTDA often assesses an overpayment for benefits issued between the end of the third countable month and the actual termination of benefits. Plaintiffs contend that because the overpayment results from the same inadequate process that results in the defective and unlawful ABAWD terminations, these overpayment rescissions are also unlawful.
Plaintiff Brooks resides in Schenectady, New York in the County of Schenectady.
Plaintiff DeMeco lives in Floral Park, New York in the County of Nassau. The County of Nassau's waiver expired January 1, 2016. DeMeco had been receiving SNAP benefits for several years but did not receive the Notice of ABAWD Status mailed in December 2015 advising him of the impending ABAWD work rules. He received a NOAA on June 24, 2016 with a mailing and effective date of June 17, 2016. DeMeco Decl., Ex. 2, ECF No. 9-13. He spends many hours each week caring for his ill father but was unaware he could be exempted from ABAWD work rules because he did not receive the Notice of ABAWD Status prior to the expiration of the waiver in his county, and the NOAA he received did not mention an exemption or good cause exception for those who act as the primary caretaker of an incapacitated person.
Plaintiff Blowers resides in West Sand Lake, New York in the County of Rensselaer. The County of Rensselaer's waiver expired January 1, 2016. Blowers had been receiving SNAP benefits since 2015 and did receive the Notice of ABAWD Status mailed in December 2015 advising him of the impending ABAWD work rules. Blowers Decl., Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-15. Although he cannot work 80 hours a month because of his health problems, he did not seek an exemption or good cause exception because the Notice of ABAWD Status left him confused and unsure of whom to contact to do so. In July 2016 he recertified for benefits, and during the recertification interview, the DSS worker told him he was assumed to be able bodied. In August 2016 he received a NOAA that his benefits would be discontinued in September 2016 and he needed to repay the $970 he received as an non-compliant ABAWD from April through August 2016. Blowers Decl., Ex. 2, ECF No. 9-16.
After the completion of briefing on the instant motions, defendant advised the undersigned that the OTDA had been in the process of revising the notices provided to SNAP applicants and recipients and revision was complete. ECF No. 33. The revisions were finalized and took effect on October 23, 2016. Various changes were made to the NOAA and to the decision letters received by new SNAP applicants approved for benefits and by recipients recertified as eligible for continued benefits. Guinn Decl., Exs. A ("Revised NOAA"), B ("Revised Application Decision"), C ("Revised Recertification Decision"), ECF Nos. 37-2-37-4. The revised notices however do not replace in full the prior documents that are the subject of plaintiffs' motions for class certification and preliminary injunction and defendant's motion to dismiss. Only discontinuances of benefits for a recipient's failure to comply with the work rules after October 23, 2016 are accomplished using the Revised NOAA. Similarly, only notifications of benefits approvals and recertifications after October 23, 2016 are accomplished using
Specifically, the Revised NOAA contains a detailed explanation of ABAWD qualifications, exemptions, and includes a section entitled "Good Cause." It provides information concerning the immediate restoration of benefits if the termination was improperly taken, a detailed description of how to challenge the agency's decision, an explanation on how to regain eligibility following benefit termination, and advice on what a recipient could do to continue receiving benefits beyond the three month time limit.
The OTDA also made similar alterations to its SNAP Opening Letter which is issued to all newly eligible SNAP households and its SNAP Recertification Letter which is issued to all SNAP households found eligible upon periodic recertification. The Revised Opening Letter and the Revised Recertification Letter now each include two pages of detailed information regarding who constitutes an ABAWD, explanation of the work rules, and a description of the exemptions and good cause exceptions.
Notably, plaintiffs do not have a class representative who received the Revised Opening Letter or Revised Recertification Letter, or who were notified by the Revised NOAA that their benefits were reduced or terminated.
A district court enjoys broad discretion when it comes to resolving questions of class certification because it "is often in the best position to assess the propriety of the class and has the ability,... to alter or modify the class, create subclasses, and decertify the class whenever warranted."
However, because the class action device is "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only,"
Accordingly, "the district court is required to make a `definitive assessment of Rule 23 requirements, notwithstanding their overlap with merits issues,' and must resolve material factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement."
First, Rule 23 requires a party seeking certification to demonstrate that:
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
Second, the Rule requires a party to satisfy at least one of three additional requirements:
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
Finally, courts have written a third, "implied requirement" into the Rule: a party seeking certification must demonstrate that the proposed class is "ascertainable."
In sum, "[c]lass certification is appropriate where the proposed class meets, by a preponderance of the evidence following a court's `rigorous analysis,' the requirements of Rule 23(a) and the proposed class constitutes one of the types of classes enumerated in Rule 23(b)."
Plaintiffs seek to certify:
Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.
Plaintiffs contend that courts in this Circuit routinely certify classes of public benefits applicants and recipients in similar cases challenging a policy or practice relating to the administration of public benefits.
The first element requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
This inquiry is "not strictly mathematical" but rather requires a court to "take into account the context of the particular case, in particular whether a class is superior to joinder based on other relevant factors including: (I) judicial economy, (ii) geographic dispersion, (iii) the financial resources of class members, (iv) their ability to sue separately, and (v) request for injunctive relief that would involve future class members."
Plaintiffs have clearly carried their burden on this element. As an initial matter, the proposed class exceeds forty members.
With respect to the subclasses, plaintiffs have not provided estimates of purported members and maintain that such information is within defendant's possession, specifically attainable through defendant's computer program for tracking SNAP applicants and recipients, the Welfare Management System. However, the burden rests on plaintiffs to affirmatively show numerosity at this stage of the proceedings, and plaintiffs have not done so with respect to the subclasses. The class certification inquiry need not go any further with respect to the subclasses.
The contextual factors also weigh in favor of certification of the class. For instance, plaintiffs' class includes low income residents spread across New York, the sort of population that makes joinder of individual members a difficult proposition
Finally, litigating such a suit as a class action would promote judicial economy, since it avoids multiple individual suits that raise the same issues and seek the same relief — stopping defendant from terminating benefits for members of the class without complying with due process and federal laws.
Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable.
This element requires plaintiffs to demonstrate there "are questions of law or fact common to the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
Importantly, this "does not require all questions of law or fact to be common," and "even a single common question will suffice."
"The common question must lend itself to `classwide resolution' such that `determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.'"
Plaintiffs have met their burden on this element as well. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that the OTDA has applied a common course of unlawful conduct to the members of the class, in that the proposed class has or will suffer from the same harm, namely, the deprivation of SNAP benefits without adequate notice of their status as an ABAWD, without adequate notice of the work rules, and without fair process to evaluate ABAWDs for an exemption or good cause exception from the work rules.
The common answers to these questions will drive the resolution of the litigation — whether defendant's conduct violates the Constitution or federal law, and whether defendant should therefore be enjoined from engaging in that course of conduct. Admittedly, there are a variety of mechanisms by which applicants and recipients are informed of the ABAWD work rules and notified of adverse determinations. Initial SNAP applicants approved for benefits receive the Revised Opening Letter which now includes two pages of detailed information regarding who constitutes an ABAWD, explanation of the work rules, and a description of the exemptions and good cause exceptions. SNAP recipients are subject to periodic recertification by the DSS, during which time individuals are again informed of the work rules, exemptions, and good cause exceptions. Following their interview with DSS, approved SNAP recipients receive the Revised Recertification Letter which again includes the aforementioned information over two pages. Further, information concerning
While the manner in which a putative class member receives allegedly deficient notice regarding ABAWD status and the work rules may differ, factual differences in the claims do not preclude a finding of commonality.
In sum, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that there are questions of law or fact common to the class.
This requirement is satisfied if "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
"Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied when each class member's claim arises from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar arguments to prove the defendant's liability."
Plaintiffs have carried their burden on this element for substantially the same reasons as set forth above — the members of the class share the same legal arguments because their claims are based on the common application of certain challenged actions.
Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class.
This requirement is satisfied if "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
"[T]he adequacy requirement is twofold: the proposed class representative must have an interest in vigorously pursing the claims of the class, and must have no interests antagonistic to the interests of other class members."
This inquiry "serves to uncover conflicts of interest between the parties and the class they seek to represent."
"In order to defeat class certification, there must be a showing of a genuine conflict between the proposed class representative's interests and those of the other members of the class, and only a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status."
Plaintiffs have carried their burden on this element. As discussed above, the representatives of the class have had their SNAP benefits terminated on the basis of failing to comply with the work rules and received the same or similar allegedly defective notice informing them of such termination. Each named plaintiff has expressed a clear desire to seek prospective injunctive relief from the application of the current notices and the lack of notice regarding ABAWD status, a benefit that will inure to low income New York residents applying for and receiving SNAP benefits in the future.
Further, class counsel have litigation experience in the class action context in federal courts in this Circuit, including matters relating to SNAP assistance. Between the Empire Justice Center and the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, Inc., class counsel contends they have successfully litigated jointly or separately more than one dozen class actions, including cases involving enforcement of SNAP program statutes and regulations.
Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Plaintiffs rely on Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
"The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted — the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them."
First, they must demonstrate the class is "cohesive."
Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate class certification is necessary. "Because
Accordingly, plaintiffs have not met their burden on this element.
There is no need to evaluate whether the class is sufficiently ascertainable, as plaintiffs cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(2) inquiry. In sum, plaintiffs have not affirmatively demonstrated their compliance with the requirements and their motion for class certification will be denied.
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from terminating the benefits of SNAP recipients and recent applicants on the basis of the three month time limit, unless and until such time as he can demonstrate that the OTDA can implement the work rules consistent with the requirements of due process and federal law by providing: (1) adequate and timely pre-termination notices to recipients, and (2) adequate initial notices of the new work rules to recipients when defendant first determines they are subject to the work rules. Plaintiffs also seek a mandatory preliminary injunction directing the OTDA to resume the issuance of benefits to plaintiffs whose benefits were already terminated for failure to comply with the work rules. Finally, the requested preliminary injunction would also instruct the OTDA to take corrective action on behalf of plaintiffs who are subsequently made known to the OTDA. Plaintiffs request this relief without the posting of a security bond. Defendant contends the revised documents, including the Revised NOAA, render the request for preliminary injunctive relief moot.
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right."
As a general matter, the party seeking preliminary relief must show: "(1) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions as to the merits plus a balance of hardships that tips decidedly in their favor; (3) that the balance of hardships tips in their favor regardless of the likelihood of success; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest."
However, in cases like this one, where the movant is not only seeking to restore the status quo ante but also requesting an order that commands an affirmative act or mandates a specific course of conduct, a heightened standard applies: this type of preliminary injunction should issue only "upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief."
Moreover, "[e]ven greater caution is appropriate where a federal court is asked to interfere by means of injunctive relief with a state's executive functions, a sphere in which states typically are afforded latitude."
Finally, in contrast to the standard applicable to pleadings on a motion to dismiss, the court need not accept all of a plaintiffs' assertions on a motion for preliminary injunction as true.
Plaintiffs' causes of action can be easily categorized into two types of claims: (1) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, and (2) statutory violations (of the SNAP Act and implementing regulations). Plaintiffs assert defendant has failed to
As to how these claims and determinations relate to the two documents at issue here — the Notice of ABAWD Status and the NOAA — with regards to the first scenario, plaintiffs contend the December 2015 Notice of ABAWD Status was inadequate to notify alleged ABAWDs of their impending work requirements and further, some never received the Notice of ABAWD Status or any written notice of their ABAWD status and corresponding work rules. With respect to the second scenario described, plaintiffs contend the NOAA used by defendant was inadequate to alert allegedly non-compliant ABAWDs of their upcoming termination of benefits and further, some NOAAs were untimely in addition to being inadequate.
Plaintiffs assert the following specific claims:
Turning to the first category of claims, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. "In a § 1983 suit brought to enforce procedural due process rights, a court must determine (1) whether a property interest is implicated, and, if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest."
"An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property `be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'"
Plaintiffs assert a constitutionally protected property interest in the continued receipt of SNAP benefits under the SNAP Act. They contend they were deprived of this property interest without adequate due process when the waiver was set to expire, an initial status determination was made by defendant that they were ABAWDs subject to the work rules (which in turn began the three month ABAWD time clock), and they were not provided adequate notice of such. Specifically, plaintiffs Brooks and DeMeco never received the Notice of ABAWD Status which they claim would have informed them of the work rules and relevant information regarding exemptions and exceptions. Plaintiff Blowers received the Notice of ABAWD Status but contends it failed to provide adequate notice of the work rules and time limits and failed to provide an opportunity for a fair process to make an individual assessment of his status and/or challenge that determination. Defendant contends plaintiffs have no protected property interest in an initial status determination notice because there is no agency action and therefore a Fourteenth Amendment claim must fail.
Plaintiffs assert they were also deprived of a protected property interest without adequate due process when they were notified of their impending benefit termination via the allegedly defective NOAA. Further, plaintiff DeMeco received not only an inadequate NOAA, but one that was untimely as well. Defendant responds that plaintiffs, who were determined to be ABAWDs non-compliant with
The Supreme Court has "long held that procedural due process protections `attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits.'"
Thus, to the extent that state or federal law "meaningfully channels" the discretion of state or local officials by mandating an award of SNAP benefits to applicants who satisfy prescribed eligibility criteria, plaintiffs possess a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, it is well-settled that plaintiffs have a protected property interest in the continued receipt of their SNAP benefits. The Supreme Court has held:
As plaintiffs have a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued receipt of SNAP benefits and therefore a protected property interest entitling them to pre-termination process, the analysis turns to what process is due before plaintiffs can be deprived of that interest.
"Governmental action may be challenged as a violation of due process only when it may be shown that it deprives a litigant of a property or a liberty interest."
Because there was no deprivation when plaintiffs were determined by defendant to be ABAWDs or upon receipt of the Notice of ABAWD Status in December 2015, plaintiffs have not established that they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of the due process violations alleged in the
On the other hand, the NOAA sent alerting plaintiffs of their impending loss of benefits is exactly the type of deprivation of a property interest entitled to due process. As noted, plaintiffs have a protected property interest in their continued receipt of SNAP benefits. The question turns to what notice and opportunity were due and whether the NOAA complied with required standards. Plaintiffs contend the NOAA lacked the requisite due process, but had it not, they would have had the information necessary to comprehend the predicate facts and reasons for defendant's decision to terminate their benefits, thus enabling them to meaningfully exercise their right to a fair hearing.
"In order to be constitutionally adequate, notice of benefits determinations must provide claimants with enough information to understand the reasons for the agency's action."
However, "the specific type of notice required will vary depending on the circumstances of each given case."
Under the
The NOAA explains that benefits will be terminated due to the recipient's identification as an ABAWD and their failure to meet the listed ABAWD work rules. It does not identify which specific work-related requirement the recipient has allegedly failed to complete, e.g., failing to work 80 hours per month, even though plaintiffs contend defendant has the capability to provide such individualized information by way of their computer system. Due process requires that the reason for the deprivation be identified such that a claimant may challenge the action. The NOAA does not state the specific reason for discontinuing benefits. Without the specific reason included, a claimant is left guessing as to what evidence can or should be submitted in response to challenge the determination. While due process does not require that every conceivable exception or exemption to a deprivation be contained in a notice, the notice must provide enough information sufficient to avail him or her of the opportunity to defend the impending termination of benefits.
Plaintiffs have alleged facts which, accepted as true, establish that the NOAA does not state in plain, understandable language the specific reason for discontinuing benefits; fails to inform the recipient of applicable exemptions; and fails to provide information about the good cause provision and therefore does not provide to plaintiffs the notice required by the Due Process Clause.
The opportunity to be heard "must be at a meaningful time and [conducted] in a meaningful manner."
Plaintiffs contend the NOAA did not provide any information on which to base a challenge to the adverse action. To the contrary, on the first page of the NOAA is stated: "IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH ANY DECISION EXPLAINED IN THIS NOTICE, YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO ASK US FOR A CONFERENCE AND/OR ASK THE STATE FOR A FAIR HEARING. READ
However, being heard at a meaningful time means nothing if the opportunity to be heard is not conducted in a meaningful manner. For example, if the claimant has no knowledge of what to base his or her objections on given that the exemptions and good cause exceptions are not detailed in the NOAA. Further, plaintiff DeMeco received his NOAA after the effective date of the termination of his benefits. Receiving notice of a deprivation, even adequate notice, after the time has passed to be heard, would not comply with due process. Plaintiffs have alleged facts which, accepted as true, establish that the NOAA fails to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard following the deprivation of a protected property interest.
Taking into consideration the
Turning to the second category of claims, plaintiffs bring these claims against defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce multiple provisions of the SNAP Act and its implementing regulations.
Specifically, plaintiff Blowers asserts that the Notice of ABAWD Status he received violates the SNAP Act and regulations because it failed to notify him that he had been individually assessed and determined to be subject to ABAWD work rules, apprise him of the requirements of the work rules, including how he could demonstrate compliance, inform him about
First, 7 U.S.C. § 2015 (o)(2) explicitly limits assessment of status determination to each individual. The statute provides that an "individual as a member of [a] household" is ineligible for SNAP only where the individual is non-exempt and does not meet statutorily prescribed work rules. 7 U.S.C. § 2015 (o)(2). Plaintiffs allege that the Notice of ABAWD Status fails to meet this requirement because it asserts "that everyone in [a] SNAP household [must] be exempt from [work] requirements" in order to claim an exemption.
Second, 7 U.S.C. § 2015 (o)(5) expressly allows a recipient to regain eligibility "if, during a 30-day period," he or she meets prescribed work requirements. Plaintiffs allege that the Notice of ABAWD Status states that the recipient "
Third, 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(f) affords the benefit recipient the right to "express to the [defendant his] disagree[ment] with its [determination]" that he is an ABAWD subject to work rules. Plaintiffs assert that defendant's failure to identify the facts upon which he based his ABAWD or non-exempt status determination contravenes the right conferred in the statute. Similarly, those plaintiffs who wholly failed to receive any notice were also deprived of this right.
Fourth, 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (e)(10) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(a) require that the recipient be notified of his or her right to request a fair hearing to grieve an "action of the State agency which affects [his] participation in the Program." According to plaintiffs, the Notice of ABAWD Status fails to include this required notification, and the plaintiffs who received no notice at all were not appraised of this right.
While plaintiffs may not be able to establish a likelihood of success on their claims that the Notice of ABAWD Status violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights, they fare better pursuing violations of federal statutory law.
Accordingly, plaintiffs have established that they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of the statutory violations alleged in the
Plaintiffs argue the inadequate NOAA deprived them of the rights and protections guaranteed to them by the SNAP Act and regulations. They contend the NOAA violates federal law because it is a boiler plate, non-specific NOAA that fails to explain the reasons for denial or termination of benefits and what recipients must do to lift disqualification. Further, the NOAA sent to at least one plaintiff was
According to plaintiffs, the boiler-plate NOAA, in lieu of specific information targeted to the intended recipient, is insufficient because it states only that: "[Y]our SNAP benefits will be DISCONTINUED.... This is because you are an able bodied adult ("ABAWD") who is not in a Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program household containing a member under 18 years of age and may only receive SNAP benefits for three months in a 36 month period...." Brooks Decl., ¶ 12; Brooks Decl., Ex. 1 (emphasis in original).
First, 7 C.F.R. § 273.13 (a)(2) provides:
According to plaintiffs, the NOAA fails to state in plain language the specific reason for discontinuing a recipient's benefits. Instead, the NOAA catalogues five work related requirements, all or any of which it purports that the recipient did not satisfy. Thus, the NOAA does not inform the recipient whether he or she failed to work 80 hours per month, participate in an employment training program, or engage in permissible volunteer work to meet the work hours mandated under 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(2).
Further, 7 C.F.R. § 273.7(f)(1)(ii) requires that:
Plaintiffs allege the failure to explicitly identify the work requirement with which the recipient did not comply also infringes on the recipient's ability to rebut or cure the alleged noncompliance. Moreover, the NOAA compounds the failure to identify the specific violation by stating "the action [that the plaintiffs] can take to avoid [discontinuation]" of benefits.
Second, 7 U.S.C. § 2015 (o)(3) lists the following individuals as excepted from the
The time limit does not apply to an individual if he or she is:
According to plaintiffs, the NOAA fails to identify the applicable exemptions, how to qualify for them, and the process by which they can be claimed. They contend that had they been advised of this information, plaintiff Blowers who suffers from a sleep condition and other health problems that cause him extreme fatigue and severe headaches which render him physically unfit for work, could have availed himself of the unfit for work exemption. Blowers Decl., ¶ 4. Similarly, plaintiff Brooks, also a person with limited ability to work in light of his medical condition, could have claimed the unfit for work exemption. Brooks Decl., ¶ 10.
Third, 7 C.F.R. § 273.24 (b)(2) provides the good cause exceptions:
Plaintiffs assert that the NOAA fails to inform them that they may claim "good cause" for temporary noncompliance with the work rules. For example, the NOAA does not indicate to the recipient that he or she may be excused from work activities for an illness or illness of another
Fourth, 7 C.F.R. § 273.13 (a)(1) requires timely notice of a NOAA. Specifically:
Plaintiff DeMeco's NOAA was not sent at least 10 days prior to the effective date of his termination of benefits; instead it is dated the same day it became effective — June 17, 2016. DeMeco Decl., ¶ 17. Moreover, 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(k)(1) mandates the continuation of benefits:
Plaintiff DeMeco contends that because he did not receive the NOAA at least 10 days before the effective date, he was denied the opportunity for his benefits to continue pending an appeal.
For these reasons, plaintiffs have established that they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of the statutory violations alleged in the
Plaintiffs contend they suffer irreparable harm when they are unlawfully deprived of SNAP benefits. They argue that without benefits, they are unable to purchase food for themselves and their families, threatening their safety and well-being.
"The showing of irreparable harm is perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction."
The alleged violation of a constitutional right may alone satisfy a plaintiff's burden to demonstrate irreparable harm.
First, to the extent plaintiffs' alleged harm is any discontinuance of benefits due to an ABAWD's actual failure to comply with the work rules, that is a challenge appropriately directed to the USDA, the agency that promulgates the regulations under the SNAP Act. With respect to the alleged harm flowing from the lack of due process and statutory protections, any harm to recipients whose benefits are discontinued based on being a non-compliant ABAWD is cut by the fact that they can immediately reestablish eligibility by reapplying for benefits and complying with work rules.
Plaintiffs have not established that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the grant of a preliminary junction.
Accordingly, this element weighs against granting a preliminary injunction.
As plaintiffs cannot show irreparable harm, there is no need to consider whether the public interest supports the granting of preliminary injunction or whether a balance of hardships tips in plaintiffs' favor.
For these reasons, plaintiffs have failed to establish they are entitled to a preliminary injunction granting the requested relief and therefore their motion for such will be denied.
Rule 12(b)(7) provides a mechanism for dismissal where the plaintiff has failed to join a party required by Rule 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(7). Under Rule 19, a court determining whether dismissal is warranted must first examine whether the absent party is required in the suit. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). A person is "required" under Rule 19 if:
FED R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1).
If the absent party meets one or more of these requirements but cannot
Defendant argues the USDA is a required party because the complete relief requested by plaintiffs requires the addition of the federal agency that administers and fully funds the SNAP program in New York, and to leave it out would dangerously prejudice its rights. According to defendant, if plaintiffs' requested relief is granted, it would compel the OTDA to cease enforcing federal SNAP laws and authorize federal SNAP benefits to individuals who are, by definition, ineligible. Therefore, defendant contends the USDA is the only entity authorized to grant the relief plaintiffs seek and are thus a required party.
This argument is without merit. The USDA is not a necessary party because plaintiffs are not challenging any actions or policies of the USDA. Plaintiffs are not contesting the ABAWD eligibility criteria established by the USDA or the rules for states to implement them; instead they contend the OTDA is not following the existing rules and federal statutes. To address defendant's concern that the OTDA may issue benefits to ineligible recipients while a preliminary injunction is in place, the remedy would be to recover benefits improperly issued. Therefore, it is possible to award all of the relief sought by plaintiffs without joining the USDA.
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss on this basis is rejected.
"To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the `[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'"
"When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor."
However, in some cases, "a document not expressly incorporated by reference in
As explained above in determining whether plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, to plausibly allege a due process violation, plaintiffs must assert that they were deprived of a protected property interest without sufficient process.
Plaintiff Blowers cannot state a claim that his due process rights were violated when he received the allegedly defective Notice of ABAWD Status in December 2015 because even taking all of plaintiffs' allegations as true and drawing every reasonable inference in their favor at this early stage, he was not deprived of any protected property interest at that time. Therefore, the due process claim asserted in the
Accordingly, those portions of the
Again, to assert a procedural due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must allege that they were deprived, by defendant, of a protected property interest without due process.
As detailed in the preliminary injunction discussion, plaintiffs have alleged facts which, accepted as true, demonstrate they possessed a protected property interest in their SNAP benefits and were entitled to procedural due process before they were deprived of those benefits by defendant. They have plausibly alleged that they were provided insufficient process when they received an inadequate NOAA which did not contain the necessary information to serve as a proper notice. The facts paint a picture of confusion as to why their benefits were being terminated and a further lack of understanding regarding how to change that outcome, whether by claiming an exemption, a temporary good cause exception, requesting a hearing or conference, or reapplying for benefits. They have alleged facts regarding the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard which raise their right to relief above a speculative level. Further, plaintiff DeMeco has alleged that the NOAA he received was not only inadequate but also untimely, and
Accordingly, those portions of the
As detailed above, plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood that they will succeed on their claims that the Notice of ABAWD Status and failure of any written notice to some plaintiffs violated the SNAP Act and accompanying regulations. As the motion to dismiss standard is even less demanding on plaintiffs, and they need only make a claim of plausibility, they have sufficiently stated statutory violates based on the Notice of ABAWD Status.
Accordingly, those portions of the
Finally, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged violations of the SNAP Act and implementing regulations based on the NOAAs they received. According to plaintiffs, they did not understand in plain language why their benefits were being terminated or how to proceed. Further, they contend the NOAAs failed to include all of the information required by statute. Additionally, plaintiff DeMeco has certainly stated a claim that his NOAA was untimely, in direct violation of federal law.
Therefore, those portions of the
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiffs have failed to affirmatively demonstrated compliance with Rule 23's requirements and therefore their motion for class certification will be denied.
As plaintiffs can show no irreparable harm that would result from the denial of their request for a preliminary injunction, the motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied.
Further, defendant has failed to show that the USDA is a necessary party and thus his motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party will be denied.
Finally, plaintiffs cannot plausibly state a claim that their due process rights were violation when defendant classified them as ABAWDs, issued the allegedly defective Notice of ABAWD Status to plaintiff Blowers, failed to notify plaintiffs Brooks and DeMeco in writing of their classification, or failed to provide an individualized inquiry whereby plaintiffs would be screened for an exemption. This is so because plaintiffs were not deprived of any protected property interest at that time. Therefore, the due process claims asserted in the
Plaintiffs have however, asserted sufficient facts to proceed with the
Therefore, it is
1. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is DENIED;
2. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED;
3. Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) is DENIED;
4. Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
5. Those portions of the
6. Defendant is directed to file an answer to the remaining claims within twenty (20) days of the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Due to the denial of class certification, the following claims remain on behalf of the individual plaintiffs:
(1) Did defendant violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) and its implementing regulation 7 C.F.R. § 273.13(a)(2), and 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) when he failed to provide adequate pre-notice termination of benefits to plaintiffs?
(2) Did defendant violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) and its implementing regulation 7 C.F.R. § 273.13(a)(1)-(2), and 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) when he failed to provide timely pre-notice termination of benefits to plaintiff DeMeco?
(3) Did defendant violate 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) and its implementing regulation 7 C.F.R. § 273.13(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(3) and its implementing regulation 7 C.F.R. § 273.24(b)(2), and 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) when he failed to provide adequate notice of ABAWD work rules and time limits, available exemptions, and good cause provisions to plaintiff Blowers upon expiration of the waiver on January 1, 2016 or when defendant first determined plaintiff Blowers subject to the new rules?
(4) Did defendant violate 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) and its implementing regulation 7 C.F.R. § 273.13(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(3) and its implementing regulation 7 C.F.R. § 273.24(b)(2), and 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) when he failed to provide any initial written notice to plaintiffs Brooks and DeMeco when they were first determined to be subject to the ABAWD rules and time limits, including information about the rules and time limits, available exemptions, and good cause provisions?
(5) Did defendant violate 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) and its implementing regulation 7 C.F.R. § 273.24, and 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) when he terminated plaintiffs' benefits without providing a fair process to individually assess and determine whether they qualified for an exemption from the work
The appropriate relief, if any, shall be determined by the answers to the above remaining claims.