LAWRENCE E. KAHN, District Judge.
This pro se civil rights action comes before the Court following a Corrected Report-Recommendation filed on March 18, 2014, by the Honorable Thérèse Wiley Dancks, U.S. Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3. Dkt. No. 95 ("Report-Recommendation"). Judge Dancks recommends that this action be dismissed with prejudice based on Plaintiff Gregory Harvey's ("Plaintiff") failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Report-Rec. at 21. For the following reasons, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety.
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by a large group of correctional officers during his incarceration at Clinton Correctional Facility ("Clinton") in 2007, and asserts various causes of action related to this incident. Report-Rec. at 2-3. The Court presumes the parties' familiarity with the factual allegations underlying Plaintiff's claims. For a complete statement of Plaintiff's claims and the supporting facts, reference is made to the Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 50 ("Second Amended Complaint").
After Defendants moved for summary judgment, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims except for his excessive force claims against Defendants J. Jabout and K. Reyell. Dkt. No. 69. That decision also recognized that, although Defendants had shown that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, Plaintiff had raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants were estopped from raising the exhaustion defense.
A district court must review de novo any objected-to portions of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation or specific proposed findings or recommendations therein and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b);
If no objections to a report are made, or if an objection is general, conclusory, perfunctory, or a mere reiteration of an argument made to the magistrate judge, a district court need review that aspect of a report-recommendation only for clear error.
Plaintiff raises several objections to the Report-Recommendation. First, Plaintiff appears to argue that Judge Dancks erroneously concluded that Plaintiff could have obtained a writing implement while he was at Clinton and therefore could have written a grievance while there. Objs. at 2. Plaintiff has misread the Report-Recommendation, which states that Plaintiff has not shown that "he had difficulty obtaining materials with which to write a grievance at any time within the 21 days after the assault other than the five days he was at Clinton." Report-Rec. at 13 (emphasis added). In other words, the Report-Recommendation does not state that Plaintiff could have received a writing implement while he was at Clinton.
Second, Plaintiff argues that inmates at Clinton do not go through the same orientation as inmates at Downstate Correctional Facility ("Downstate"). Objs. at 4. However, the Report-Recommendation discusses whether Plaintiff received orientation at Downstate and Sing Sing Correctional Facility ("Sing Sing"), not Clinton. Report-Rec. at 16. This objection is therefore irrelevant.
Third, Plaintiff appears to argue that he could not have learned of the grievance procedure while at Downstate. Objs. at 4-5. Plaintiff states, among other things, that during the entire time he was at Downstate, he required use of a walking cane.
Finally, Plaintiff states that he "was not psychiatrically competent to understand the grievance process until April 16th 2009," and that he can provide documentation of this condition to the Court upon request. Objs. at 7. Plaintiff argues that his mental illnesses—bipolar disorder and paranoid schizophrenia
Accordingly, it is hereby:
Lerome Hilson, Comstock, NY, pro se.
Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Megan M. Brown, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Christina L. Roberts-Ryba, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Albany, NY, for Defendants.
Hon. NORMAN A. MORDUE, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff objects (Dkt.Nos. 31, 32). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court reviews de novo those parts of a report and recommendation to which a party specifically objects. Upon de novo review, the Court accepts the Report and Recommendation's summary of the facts and law and its conclusion that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The Court rejects the Report and Recommendation insofar as it recommends dismissal with prejudice on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires a prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing an action regarding prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA requires "proper exhaustion," which means "compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). The Second Circuit recognizes the following exceptions to the exhaustion requirement: (1) that administrative remedies were not in fact available; (2) that prison officials have forfeited, or are estopped from raising, the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion; or (3) that special circumstances justify the prisoner's failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements. See Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir.2004).
Failure to exhaust "is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and . . . inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Thus, a court may not properly grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on this ground if the failure to exhaust is not apparent from the face of the complaint. See, e.g., Smalls v. Jummonte, 2010 WL 3291587, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2010); Pierce v. Monell, 2007 WL 2847317, *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2007); also see Morris v. Rabsatt, 2010 WL 4668440, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2010) (Lowe, M.J., recommending denial of dismissal motion on ground of non-exhaustion based on "the state of the pleadings, the special solicitude that must be granted to pro se civil rights litigants, and the fact that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that generally cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss"), adopted by district court, 2010 WL 4668328 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010).
In some cases, courts have converted motions to dismiss for non-exhaustion under Rule 12(b)(6) to motions for summary judgment, upon proper notice to the parties. See, e.g., Bennett v. James, 2010 WL 3583410, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2010); Smalls, 2010 WL 3291587 at *3. This Court declines to convert the instant motion to one for summary judgment at this point, because, as Magistrate Judge Baxter notes, the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Construing plaintiffs complaint and other submissions "liberally to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest," Harris v. City of N.Y., 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir.2010), the Court grants plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Plaintiff is advised that, if he submits an amended complaint, it will completely replace and supersede the initial complaint. Thus, he should include in the body of the amended complaint all facts and claims upon which he relies, including those set forth in the initial complaint and in any grievance or other document. The Court suggests that in drafting an amended complaint, plaintiff set forth in separate numbered paragraphs the alleged acts of misconduct; the date on which they occurred; the names of all individuals who participated in the misconduct; and the location where the alleged misconduct occurred.
Accordingly, plaintiff is granted leave to serve an amended complaint. Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 18) is granted to the extent that, if plaintiff fails to serve an amended complaint in accordance with this decision, the action will be dismissed without prejudice; the motion is otherwise denied.
It is therefore
ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 30) is accepted in part and rejected in part; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 18) is granted in part and denied in part; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff is given leave to file an amended complaint in accordance with this Memorandum-Decision and Order on or before March 25, 2011; and it is further
ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint on or before March 25, 2011, the action will be automatically dismissed without prejudice, and the Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing the action without prejudice without further order of the Court; and it is further
IT IS SO ORDERED.
LaCream Newman, Auburn, NY, pro se.
Hon. Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General for the State of New York, Charles J. Quackenbush, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel, Albany, NY, for Defendants.
THOMAS J. McAVOY, Senior United States District Judge.
It is therefore,
(1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 36) is
(2) The complaint is
(3) This action is
DAVID R. HOMER, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff pro se LaCream Newman ("Newman"), an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants, seven DOCS employees, violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The facts are presented in the light most favorable to Newman as the non-moving party. See Ertman v. United States, 165 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir.1999).
On October 23, 2002, Newman was being transferred from Great Meadow Correctional Facility ("Great Meadow") to Fishkill Correctional Facility's ("Fishkill") Special Housing Unit ("SHU").
Newman asserts six causes of action, each alleging that defendants' failure to house Newman in a single occupancy cell constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Defendants seek judgment on all claims.
The party opposing the motion must set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some doubt or speculation as to the true nature of the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). It must be apparent that no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party for a court to grant a motion for summary judgment. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994); Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir.1988). When, as here, a party seeks summary judgment against a pro se litigant, a court must afford the non-movant special solicitude. Id.; see also Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir.2006). However, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U. S. at 247-48.
Defendants contend that Newman has failed to demonstrate any reasonable excuse for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his Eighth Amendment claim. See Defs. Mem. of Law (Docket No. 36) at 6-11. Newman contends that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies after the attempted sexual assaults because (1) he was threatened by John Doe; (2) he was in transit between DOCS facilities; and (3) he was dealing with the mental and emotional effects of the attempted assaults. See PI. Reply Mem. of Law (Docket No. 41) at 1-3.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), subjects suits concerning prison conditions brought under federal law to certain prerequisites. Specifically, the PLRA dictates that a prisoner confined to any jail, prison, or correctional facility must exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to bringing any suit concerning prison life, "`whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.'" Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002)); see also Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 918-19 (2007) ("There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.") (citation omitted)); Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2382-83 (2006). Administrative remedies include all appellate remedies provided within the system, not just those that meet federal standards. Woodford, 126 S.Ct. at 2382-83. However, the Second Circuit has recognized three exceptions to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement:
"The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is designed to `afford [] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.'" Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Porter, 534 U.S. at 524-25)). "[A] grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.'" Id. (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir.2002)). Inmates must provide sufficient information to "allow prison officials to take appropriate responsive measures." Id.
DOCS has established a grievance procedure which includes a three-stage review and appeal process. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 139 (McKinney 2003); N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701.1-.16 (2003);
Here, it is undisputed that Newman's first attempt to file a grievance regarding the alleged sexual assaults did not occur until September 21, 2003, nearly one year after the alleged assaults. See Pl. Reply Statement of Material Facts (Docket No. 41) at Ex. 2; see also Newman Dep. (Ullman Decl. at Ex. 1, Docket No. 36) at 85-87. In his complaint, Newman contends that he failed to file a timely complaint due to "fear." See Pl. Reply Statement of Material Facts at Ex. 2. However, the Inmate Grievance Program ("IGP") supervisor at Clinton rejected Newman's attempt to file his complaint as a grievance because Newman failed to "expand on what/who caused the `fear.'" Id. The IGP supervisor also noted that Newman had been housed at Clinton for the previous nine months and, thus, had "ample opportunity to file [his] complaint before [September 2003]." Id. Newman attempted to file an appeal of the IGP supervisor's decision to the Superintendent, but the supervisor advised Newman "[t]here is no provision to appeal the IGP Supervisors decision (to not accept a grievance) to the Superintendent. You may file a separate grievance on the determination by submitting it to the IGRC office." Id.
In claiming that his non-exhaustion should be excused, Newman makes three arguments. First, he contends that a corrections officer at Fishkill (John Doe) threatened him, warning that if Newman reported the October 29, 2002 sexual assault then he would be placed back in the "same predicament" he was in before. See Newman Dep. at 83. However, Newman was transferred to Clinton in November 2002 and, thus, could have immediately filed a grievance now that he was separated from the officer who threatened him. See Pelc Decl. (Docket No. 36) at Ex. B. Further, Newman testified that he felt "safe" while at Clinton, demonstrating that any fear he may have had surrounding the filing of a grievance was left behind at Fishkill. See Newman Dep. at 66. Moreover, Newman ultimately did file a grievance while at Clinton. See Ullman Decl., Exs. 5 & 6. Thus, Newman's first argument for failure to properly exhaust is not persuasive.
Second, Newman contends that his frequent transfers between DOCS facilities within fourteen days of the sexual assaults prevented him from timely filing a grievance. However, this argument is not persuasive because DOCS regulations state that "[e]ach correctional facility housing a reception/classification/transit inmate population shall insure all inmates access to the IGP." N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit.7, § 701.14. Further, Newman arrived at Clinton on November 15, 2003 and was not moved to another DOCS facility until November 19, 2003, thus affording him nearly a year where he was not "in transit." See Pelc. Decl. at Ex. B.
Third, Newman contends that this Court should apply the "special circumstances" exception under Hemphill because he was dealing with the mental and emotional effects of the sexual assaults, thus preventing his filing of a grievance. See Newman Dep. at 83-84; Pl. Reply Mem. of Law at 2-3; see also Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 686. However, the special circumstances exception under Hemphill concerned an inmate's justifiable confusion regarding the proper DOCS procedure for filing an expedited grievance, not an inmate's mental or emotional condition. See Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 689-91. Thus, absent any documented mental illness that prevented Newman from filing a grievance, his third argument excusing his failure to timely exhaust his administrative remedies is not persuasive.
Newman contends that defendants knew or should have know that he was a homosexual and that his placement in a double occupancy cell "facilitated . . . the cause for the incident of attempted rape/physical assault that occurred to plaintiff therein at Fishkill SHU 200, on or about 10/29/02." Compl. at ¶¶ 15, 17, 19, 21, 23.
Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence by other inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). When asserting a failure to protect claim, an inmate must establish that he was "incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm" and that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety. Id. at 834. Deliberate indifference is established when the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837. However, "the issue is not whether [a plaintiff] identified his enemies by name to prison officials, but whether they were aware of a substantial risk of harm to [him]." Hayes v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 621 (2d Cir.1991).
Here, Newman contends that on two separate occasions, fellow inmates "attempted to rape/physical[ly] assault" him. See Compl. at ¶¶ 7, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23. However, it is undisputed that Newman did not suffer any actual injury
Therefore, in the alternative, it is recommended that defendants' motion on this ground be granted.
Defendants also contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity generally protects governmental officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F.Supp.2d 211, 229 (N.D.N.Y.2002), aff'd, 80 Fed.Appx. 146 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 2003). A court must first determine that if plaintiffs allegations are accepted as true, there would be a constitutional violation. Only if there is a constitutional violation does a court proceed to determine whether the constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Aiken, 236 F.Supp.2d at 230. Here, as discussed supra, accepting all of Newman's allegations as true, he has not shown that defendants violated his constitutional rights.
Newman's complaint asserts a claim against John Doe, a defendant who has neither been identified nor served with the complaint. Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that service of process be effectuated within 120 days of the date of the filing of the complaint. See also N.D.N.Y.L.R. 4.1(b). Because defendant John Doe has not been identified by Newman or timely served with process, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice against this defendant.
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court.
DEBORAH A. BATTS, District Judge.
Judge Francis' January 18, 2008, Report and Recommendation (the "Report") recommends that Petitioner's habeas corpus Petition be denied. (Report at 1.) Specifically, Judge Francis recommends that the Petition be denied because: (1) statements Petitioner made while incarcerated in North Carolina were not made under coercion beyond the mere fact of imprisonment, and the state court's decision to admit those statements was not contrary to, and did not involve the unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law; (2) proper procedure was employed by the state court in overruling defense counsel's preemptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and preemptory challenges guaranteed by New York state law can not be challenged by federal habeas corpus review; and (3) in-court statements challenged by Petitioner were not hearsay because they were admitted to establish the witnesses state of mind, and review of the Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim is barred because of procedural default during the state court proceedings. Petitioner filed untimely objections to Judge Francis' Report, which the Court will nevertheless consider.
For the reasons set forth below, Judge Francis' Report is adopted in its entirety, and Petitioner's Petition for the writ of habeas corpus is HEREBY DENIED.
"Within fourteen days after being served with a copy [of a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation], a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) (2); accord 28 U.S.C. s 636(b)(1)(C). The court may adopt those portions of the Report to which no timely objection has been made, as long as there is no clear error on the face of the record. Wilds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 262 F.Supp.2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y.2003). A district court must review de novo "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
The objections of pro se parties are "generally accorded leniency and should be construed to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Howell v. Port Chester Police Station, 2010 WL 930981, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.15, 2010) (citation omitted)." Nonetheless, even a pro se party's objections to a Report and Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the magistrate's proposal, such that no party be allowed a second bite at the apple by simply relitigating a prior argument." Id. (quoting Pinkney v. Progressive Home Health Servs., 2008 WL 2811816 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2008) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
On April 29, 2008, Petitioner filed untimely objections
Petitioner did not object to Judge Francis' Report on Miranda and Batson claims and, accordingly, the Court will review these issues only for clear error. Indymac Bank, F.S.B., 2008 WL 4810043, at *1. Because Petitioner objected to Judge Francis' recommendation on the Confrontation Clause claim, the Court will review that claim de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1)(C).
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner only if a state court conviction "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,"28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), or if it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d)(2).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); accord Hoi Man Yung v. Walker, 468 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir.2006); Ernst v. Stone, 452 F.3d 186, 193 (2d Cir.2006). The phrase, "clearly established Federal law," limits the law governing a habeas Petitioner's claims "to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 365); accord Hawkins v. Costello, 460 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir.2006).
Moreover, under the AEDPA, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The [Petitioner] shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1); see also Parsad v. Greiner, 37 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir.2003) ("This presumption of correctness is particularly important when reviewing the trial court's assessment of witness credibility."). A state court's findings "will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003).
Judge Francis found that statements Petitioner made while incarcerated in North Carolina were not made under coercion beyond the mere fact of imprisonment, and the state court's decision to admit those statements was not contrary to, and did not involve the unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. After reviewing Judge Francis' findings for clear error on the face of the record, the Court ADOPTS Judge Francis' recommendation that the Petitioner's Petition for the writ of habeas corpus on this claim be DENIED.
Judge Francis found that proper procedure was employed by the state court in overruling defense counsel's preemptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and that peremptory challenges are guaranteed by New York state law, not federal law, and thus cannot be challenged under federal habeas corpus review. After reviewing Judge Francis' findings for clear error on the face of the record, the Court ADOPTS Judge Francis' recommendation that the Petitioner's Petition for the writ of habeas corpus on this claim be DENIED.
Petitioner contends that the admission of Stephanie Arthur's testimony regarding out of court statements identifying Petitioner as the shooter violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.
A procedural default generally bars a federal court from reviewing the merits of a habeas claim. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Federal habeas review is prohibited if a state court rests its judgment on a state law ground that is "independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Cotto v. Hebert, 331 F.3d 217, 238 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). A state procedural bar qualifies as an "`independent and adequate' state law ground where `the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.'" Levine v. Commissioner of Correctional Services, 44 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989)). Here, the Appellate Division found Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim unpreserved because Petitioner's objection to Ms. Arthur's testimony failed to reference any constitutional grounds for the objection. People v. Machicote, 23 A.D.3d at 265, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 78 ("To the extent that defendant is raising a constitutional claim, such claim is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.").
Under New York's contemporaneous objection rule, an issue is properly preserved for appellate review only if the party raised an objection at trial. N.Y. C.P.L. § 470.05(2). Even if there is an objection to the admission of testimony at trial, to preserve a constitutional claim grounded on the Confrontation Clause, New York law demands that counsel specify the constitutional dimension of the objection. E.g., People v. Quails, 55 N.Y.2d 733, 734, 431 N.E.2d 634, 635, 447 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (1981)." If a state appellate court refuses to review the merits of a criminal defendant's claim of constitutional error because of his failure to comply with . . . a * contemporaneous objection' rule, a federal court generally may not consider the merits of the constitutional claim on habeas corpus review." Peterson v. Scully, 896 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir.1990); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82-86, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977); Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 78-79 (2d Cir.1999).
Here, Petitioner's trial counsel objected to Ms. Arthur's testimony at trial, but counsel made no mention of Petitioner's right to confront witnesses, or any constitutional grounds for his objection. Counsel's primary reason for objecting was only that Ms. Arthur could not independently identify Petitioner as the shooter and that her entire testimony should be stricken on that basis. (Tr. at 431-36). Therefore, the Appellate Division's holding that any constitutional claim was not preserved for review is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
If the petitioner is unable to meet the cause and prejudice standard, his claim may still be heard if he can show that failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. However, only in an "extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent," will "a federal habeas court grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default." Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; accord Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir.2000).
Here, Petitioner has not shown that either the "cause and prejudice" or "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exceptions apply. Petitioner cannot meet the cause and prejudice standard because Petitioner has proffered no compelling explanation for counsel's failure to make a constitutional objection to Ms. Arthur's testimony during trial. Nor is this an "extraordinary case" that has clearly "resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. Consequently, Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim is barred
Even if the Petitioner's hearsay objection was sufficient to raise a Confrontation Clause claim, the claim would also fail on the merits. "It has long been the rule that `[s]o long as . . . statements are not presented for the truth of the matter asserted, but only to establish a context . . . the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not transgressed.'" United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1990)); see also Rolland v. Greiner, No. 02 Civ. 8403, 2006 WL 779501, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2006) (no Confrontation Clause violation when court admitted testimony of police detectives about a non-testifying co-defendant's statements inculpating Petitioner for the purpose of explaining what led detectives to interview defendant five years after crime). Since Ms. Arthur's statements were admitted only to show her state of mind and to establish a context for her identification of the Petitioner, there was no violation of the Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not decided whether a district court must consider a new legal argument raised for the first time in objections to a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. One U.S. District Court in Vermont, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Sinnott, 2010 WL 297830, at *2 (D.Vermont), adopts the 11th Circuit's approach to new legal arguments, as described in Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir.2009) (holding that in order to preserve the efficiencies afforded by the Magistrates Act, a district court has discretion to decline to consider a party's argument when that argument was not first presented to the magistrate judge.).
Applying this standard here, the Court finds that it does not need to address Petitioner's new legal argument because: (1) Petitioner did not make an ineffective assistance of counsel argument before Judge Francis when he had the opportunity to do so; (2) the record indicates that Petitioner was satisfied with counsel; (3) Petitioner only attempted to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim after it was suggested in Judge Francis' Report as a possible cure to cure his Confrontation Clause claim's procedural default; (4) the Court is unaware of any intervening case or statute that has changed the state of the law regarding procedural default or ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (5) the resolution of the new legal issue raised here is not open to a serious question of law; and (6) efficiency and fairness lean strongly in favor of not considering Petitioner's new legal argument as it would effectively eliminate any efficiencies gained through the Magistrates Act and would unfairly benefit Petitioner who changed his tactics after issuance of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. See Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990-91 (1st Cir.1988) ("an unsuccessful party is not entitled as of right to de novo review by the judge of an argument never seasonably raised before the magistrate.")
Thus, the Court declines to consider Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time in Petitioner's Objections to Judge Francis' Report.
Having reviewed the January 18, 2008, Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV for clear error on the first two claims, and de novo on the third claim, the Court HEREBY APPROVES, ADOPTS, and RATIFIES the Report in its entirety, and Petitioner's Petition for the writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the docket in this case.
SO ORDERED.