ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Thomas G. Thompson's Motion to Terminate Civil Contempt Sanctions in Accordance with the Provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1826. (Doc. 111.) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Thomas G. Thompson has been held in civil contempt for more than one year for violating a Court order to sit for a debtor's examination and assist the litigants in the civil case No. 06-cv-0292 in identifying and recovering assets, as required by his plea agreement. (Doc. 63 at 5.)1 The Court held Mr. Thompson in contempt pursuant to its "inherent power to enforce compliance with [its] lawful orders." (Dec. 16, 2015 Order, Doc. 63 (quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966)). Despite Mr. Thompson's protestations, the Court also found, as a matter of law, that the plea agreement does not limit Mr. Thompson's required cooperation to participation in a debtor's examination. (Doc. 108 at 2-3.) Specifically, the Court found that paragraph 4(a), which requires Mr. Thompson "to assist the Parties in Case No. 06-CV-0292, and any other party identified by the Court as having an interest, in identifying and recovering assets," contemplated, among other things, the signing of a limited power of attorney that allows the government to probe the contents of the Belizean trust.

In light of the Court's civil contempt finding, the Court tolled Mr. Thompson's pending two-year sentence for criminal contempt, ordering him to be incarcerated and to pay a fine of $1,000 per day until he purged himself of the contempt. (Id. at 6.) The Court stated that it would assess the status of Mr. Thompson's compliance with the Court order every 60 days. (Id. at 5.)

In advance of the June 30, 2017, 60-day hearing, Mr. Thompson filed a Motion to Terminate Civil Contempt Sanctions in Accordance with the Provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (the "Motion"). (Doc. 111.) Both the government and the Dispatch Printing Company (the "Dispatch") filed oppositions (Docs. 112, 118). Mr. Thompson filed a Motion to Strike the Dispatch's opposition (Doc. 117), which the Dispatch and the government both opposed (Docs. 118, 119.)

I. ANALYSIS

The Court will address first the motion to strike, and then the substance of the motion to terminate Mr. Thompson's contempt.

A. Motion to Strike

Mr. Thompson moved to strike the Dispatch's opposition on the grounds that the Dispatch is not: (a) a "victim" as defined by the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"); or (b) an intended third-party beneficiary of Mr. Thompson's plea agreement with the government. (Doc. 117 at 2.) Mr. Thompson cites no case law or other authority in his motion to strike, harkening back instead to arguments he made in previous filings in this case. (Id. at 2-3 (citing Docs. 25, 29).)

The Dispatch and the government oppose, (Doc. 118 at 8; Doc. 119), and the Court has previously rejected Mr. Thompson's argument that the Dispatch is not a "victim," stating that:

(Doc. 31 at 2.) In the absence of any developments in the case law, this Court finds that there is no basis to alter its prior reasoning. The Motion to Strike is therefore DENIED.

B. Motion to Terminate Contempt

Next, Mr. Thompson argues that he is being held in contempt as a recalcitrant witness per 28 U.S.C. § 1826. Section 1826 provides:

28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). Mr. Thompson has been held for over eighteen months. He argues that the Sixth Circuit's holding in United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 385 (6th Cir. 1977) that the statute imposes the 18-month maximum on defendants — as well as non-defendant witnesses — therefore necessitates that this Court release him from contempt. (Doc. 111 at 6.)

The Dispatch Printing Company (the "Dispatch") filed an opposition to Mr. Thompson's motion, arguing: (a) that this Court invoked its inherent authority, not § 1826(a), when holding Mr. Thompson in contempt; and (b) that Mr. Thompson is not a "witness" held in contempt for refusing to provide information at a "proceeding before or ancillary to any court." (Doc. 112.) The plea agreement requires Mr. Thompson not just to provide information, but also to "assist the Parties" in "identifying and recovering assets" and otherwise to comply with the terms of his plea agreement. (Id. at 3 (emphasis added).)

Contrary to Mr. Thompson's arguments, § 1826 does not require his release. First, by its own terms the statute applies only to those witnesses who "refuse without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify or provide other information," 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (emphasis added). It is true that Congress, through § 1826(a), limited the inherent authority of the courts to hold contumacious witnesses in civil contempt for failing to "produce evidence." United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 385 (6th Cir. 1977). But here, the utility of Mr. Thompson's assets as evidence is almost beside the point; it is the economic value of the treasure that the Court seeks. Mr. Thompson was therefore not merely ordered to testify or provide information. Instead, he was ordered to submit to a debtor's examination and to comply with the terms of his plea agreement — terms, it must be noted, that Mr. Thompson bargained for freely. (See Doc. 50).

Mr. Thompson's case is on all fours with Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2006) In Armstrong, the Defendant was arrested for operating a large Ponzi scheme, and the court issued an order requiring the Defendant to turn over corporate records and assets including rare coins, gold bars and bullion, and antiquities totaling approximately $16 million to a court-appointed receiver. Id. at 93. The Defendant refused to do so. Id. Beginning on January 14, 2000, the Defendant was confined at the Metropolitan Correctional Center for disobeying the court's valid order, and was instructed that the confinement would continue "until he either complied with the turnover orders or demonstrated that it would be impossible for him to do so." Id. at 95. In an effort to ensure that the confinement was coercive and not punitive, the district court there, as this Court has done, held periodic hearings to discuss the Defendant's willingness to purge himself of his contempt. Id. In 2004, the Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing among other things that the district court lacked the authority to keep him incarcerated for civil contempt. Id. at 96. The district court eventually denied his petition. Id. In 2005, the Defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id.

Before the Second Circuit, the Defendant argued, as Mr. Thompson does here, that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Mitchell required his release. Id. at 109. The Second Circuit determined that argument was "without merit." Id. In so holding, the court noted that the Mitchell court "concluded that the furnishing of a voice exemplar constituted providing `other information' as specified by [28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)], presumably because the voice exemplars were sought for their informational content and had no other value." Id. at 109-10 (internal citations omitted) (first citing United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1977), then citing Palmer v. United States, 530 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1987)). Unlike the Mitchell Defendant, the court noted, the Defendant in Armstrong refused to obey a command to turn over coins, gold, and antiquities that were "sought not because of any information they might contain, but because they are objects of monetary value that are the property of the corporation in receivership. An order requiring the production of money or valuable property, for the purpose of restoring it to its rightful owner, is not an order to provide `information,' and does not fall under the terms of § 1826(a)." Id. at 110.

When the Second Circuit issued its opinion, the Armstrong Defendant had been held in contempt for nearly seven years. Despite that lengthy period of confinement, the court determined that it would continue indefinitely as long as the Defendant continued to refuse to produce the objects of monetary value covered by the district court's order. This Court agrees, and similarly holds that objects of economic value are not covered by § 1826(a) and are therefore not subject to its eighteen-month limitation.

As ever, Mr. Thompson is not without recourse. The Court has repeatedly noted that, as a civil contemnor who is incarcerated to compel compliance with a court order, Mr. Thompson "holds the key to his prison cell: Where defiance leads to the contemnor's incarceration, compliance is his salvation." Id. at 92. Until Mr. Thompson complies, he will remain in contempt. His Motion to Terminate Civil Contempt is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.