ORDER EXTENDING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

THOMAS M. ROSE, District Judge.

On March 19, 2014, the Court held a telephone conference on the Motion of Petitioner Midmark Corporation ("Midmark") for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to Preserve Status Quo Ante While Court Addresses Complaint To Compel Arbitration ("Motion"). Midmark Corp. v. Janak Healthcare Private Limited, Case No. 3:14-cv-088, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Ohio March 19, 2014) (Doc. No. 9, p. 1). During the March 19 conference, Respondents were represented by Indian counsel who asserted that the Motion should not be granted, as the claims Petitioner seeks to have arbitrated are non-arbitral under Indian law, citing to the Court what appears to be the equivalent of 9 U.S.C. § 207. See also 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, (the "New York Convention"), § V.2.(a)&(b). Id. At the same time, "An action or proceeding falling under the convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States." Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 203). The United States Supreme Court has found that objections akin to those of Respondents are premature; as such objections are properly made when objecting to the enforcement of an arbitration award. Id. (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540, 115 S.Ct. 2322, 2329 (1995)).

This Court found, based upon the verified allegations of the Verified Petition to Compel Arbitration, the exhibits, Declaration and Certification of Counsel submitted, the arguments of counsel, and the Motion and Supporting Memorandum, that irreparable injury may occur and that a temporary restraining order should be granted because Petitioner had shown at this stage a substantial likelihood that it would prevail on the merits of its sole claim, a request to compel arbitration of the dispute among Midmark Corporation, Janak Healthcare Private Limited, its shareholders, and the individual directors who are alleged to be inextricably intertwined with the dispute. Id. at 3. (Doc. No. 9, p. 3). This Court further found that there existed such an exigency that the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order was necessary to preserve the status quo ante and the rights of the parties while the Court considers the claim brought by Midmark. Id. Specifically, absent entry of this temporary restraining order preventing the parties from further advancing litigation in India, the ultimate relief requested in this action — a mandatory federal order under 9 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. compelling arbitration under an International Treaty — would be frustrated and compromised. Id. The Court set the preliminary injunction hearing for April 1, 2014. Id. at 4. (Doc. No. 9, p. 4).

On March 27, 2014, David Fornshell of the Dinsmore law firm entered his appearance on behalf of Apurva Jayantilal Mehta, Hema A. Mehta, Atman A. Mehta, Sibir A. Mehta, Hasmukh Jivraj Mehta, Amit H. Mehta, Vasant H. Mehta, and Raj H. Mehta (the "Mehta Respondents"). Currently, no U.S. attorney has entered an appearance for Janak Healthcare Private Limited (the "Company"); but, Mr. Donnellon represented to the Court that Indian counsel informed him that the Company may accede to this Court's ruling and remain neutral in this proceeding due to the conflict between minority and majority shareholders for the Company manifest in India.

At 9:30 a.m. U.S. Eastern Time on March 27, 2014, this Court held a pre-hearing conference with counsel for all parties who had entered an appearance. During the conference, counsel for the Mehta Respondents advanced the argument that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over his clients. Petitioner Midmark continues to assert that personal jurisdiction is proper asserting that this is provided by the Treaty, without citation to authority for this point in case law or the Treaty text. As noted in this Court's March 19, 2014 Temporary Restraining Order, the Court had questions relating to this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Mehta Respondents and the facts necessary to establish such. The urgency of the matter, and the risk to the Petitioner Midmark, however, warrant extension of the Temporary Restraining Order to allow the Court to consider fully the basis of such jurisdiction as a threshold issue before addressing whether further relief is appropriate. So that the issue of personal jurisdiction can be fully briefed, and evidence presented, prior to this Court's disposition of Midmark's request for a preliminary injunction, this Court sua sponte extended the temporary restraining order for an additional fourteen (14) days in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2) and ordered an expedited briefing schedule on the personal jurisdiction question. Therefore, for good cause shown, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

IT IS SO ORDERED.