MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, Magistrate Judge.
This civil case is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Montgomery County, and individual Defendants Curtis Laravie, Stacey Frisk, Thomas Connor and Jay Vitali (hereinafter referred to as "the individual moving Defendants").
For purposes of this motion to dismiss, the Court must: (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett v. M&G Polymers, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009); Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff David O. Cooper is currently an inmate at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility ("SOCF") in Lucasville, Ohio who suffers from borderline personality disorder ("BIF"). Doc. 74 at PageID 312. Plaintiff was also an inmate at SOCF serving a six-month parole violation in late February 2012, when, on February 29, 2012, he was transferred to the Montgomery County, Ohio Jail and remained detained pending trial on new state charges — presumably the charges for which he is now serving a ten year prison sentence. Id. at PageID 314, 323; see also doc. 1 at PageID 1-2. According to the allegations in his second amended complaint, Plaintiff was detained pretrial in the Montgomery County Jail from February 29, 2012 through at least October 31, 2012. See doc. 74 at PageID 314, 323.
Plaintiff, pro se, commenced this civil action on August 15, 2013 against: (1) the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office; (2) "Barb Doe," an unknown mental health services agent; (3) an unnamed captain within the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office; (4) an unnamed major within the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office; (5) an unnamed second shift lieutenant within the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office; and (6) unnamed deputies within the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office. See doc. 1 at PageID 1. In his original complaint, Plaintiff asserted civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from alleged actions and/or inactions taken by Defendants at the Montgomery County Jail during his detainment in 2012. See id. at
Plaintiff, again pro se, filed his first amended complaint on May 19, 2014 against: (1) the Montgomery County Sheriff's office; (2) Barb Doe; (3) Captain Chuck Crosby; (4) Major Daryl Wilson; (5) the unnamed second shift lieutenant within the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office; and (6) unnamed deputies within the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office. Doc. 27 at PageID 77. In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff again asserted civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at PageID 1-3.
This case is now before the Court on Plaintiff's second amended complaint filed through counsel on August 17, 2015.
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint and permits dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To show grounds for relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that the complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 "does not require `detailed factual allegations' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Pleadings offering mere "`labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In determining a motion to dismiss, "courts `are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Further, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In order "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In addition to well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, the Court may also consider "matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint," as well as documents attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss that are important to the plaintiff's claims or if referred to in the complaint. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); Composite Tech., L.L.C. v. Inoplast Composites S.A. de C.V., 925 F.Supp.2d 868, 873 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
A claim is plausible where "plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility "is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not `show[n]' — `that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Defendants move to dismiss claims asserted against: (A) Montgomery County; and (B) the individual moving Defendants. The undersigned addresses the arguments presented by Defendants in turn.
Defendants first move to dismiss the claims against Montgomery County, arguing: (1) the County is not sui juris; and (2) Plaintiff fails to allege any facts supporting its liability under § 1983 and Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Doc. 84 at PageID 365-66.
The Court first addresses Defendants' contention that the claims against Montgomery County — all of which are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — must be dismissed because it is not sui juris, i.e., not an entity capable of suing or being sued under Ohio law. See doc. 84 at PageID 365-66. In response, Plaintiff cites the case of Stack v. Karnes, 750 F.Supp.2d 892, 897-99 (S.D. Ohio 2010), in which Judge Frost concluded that, despite an Ohio county's lack of capacity to sue or be sued under Ohio law, individuals may properly sue counties under § 1983 for Monell claims. Such holding has been adopted by other Judges in this District. Black v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm'n, No. 1:12-CV-503, 2013 WL 684394, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2013) (Litkovitz, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:12CV503, 2013 WL 1155253 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2013) (Dlott, C.J.) (holding that "a county may be held liable [under §1983] even though it is not sui juris under Ohio law"). Finding authority supporting the contention that Montgomery County may be sued under § 1983 on a Monell theory of liability, the undersigned finds no merit to Defendants' contention in this regard.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to support a claim against it under the authority of Monell. Id. at PageID 366. "A local government is not responsible under § 1983 solely because injuries were inflicted by its employees or agents." Brown v. Cuyahoga Cty., Ohio, 517 F. App'x 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Instead, local governments are liable under § 1983 only "when execution of a government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury. Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, "[a] plaintiff must therefore specify a governmental policy or custom from which his injuries flowed." Id. (citing Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 284 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff contends that he sufficiently pleads facts supporting his Monell claim in paragraph 93 of the second amended complaint, by alleging:
Doc. 88 at PageID 389 (citing doc. 74 at PageID 324). While the allegations set forth in paragraph 93, viewed alone, appear conclusory to the undersigned, in the interests of justice, the Court has carefully reviewed all of the allegations in the second amended complaint, including but not limited to, allegations from which the undersigned can reasonably infer County policies of allegedly causing injury to Plaintiff. Such policies include, inter alia, cell assignments (observation units verses general population), the denial of prescribed medication following incidents of hoarding, and the supervision of mentally ill inmates. See doc. 74 at PageID 315-23. In light of the foregoing, the undersigned finds no merit to Defendants' motion in this regard.
The individual moving Defendants also move to dismiss the claims asserted against them, arguing that: (1) they have not been properly served with process within the timeframe required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); and (2) the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Id. at PageID 366-70. The Court need only address Defendants' second argument.
Specifically, Defendants Laravie, Frisk, Connor and Vitali argue that Plaintiff's causes of action all accrued on or before October 31, 2012, and that he did not file his second amended complaint adding them as parties to this litigation in place of "Doe" or "unknown Defendants" until August 17, 2015, well beyond the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims, see Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 990 (6th Cir. 1989), and even further beyond the one-year limitations period for assault and battery claims under Ohio law, see Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.111(B).
"The Sixth Circuit treats naming a specific individual in place of a John Doe as joinder of a new party[,]" i.e., a change of parties and not a "mere substitution of parties." Wiggins v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 15-5240, ___ F. App'x ____, 2016 WL 537247, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016) (citing Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, "[a]n amendment that has the effect of changing a party is controlled by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C). Erie Indem. Co. v. Keurig, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-02899, 2011 WL 2893013, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2011) (citing Jackson v. Herrington, 393 F. App'x 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2010)). Where, as here, "the amendment is filed after the statute of limitation period has run, it will only relate back to the date of the filing of the initial complaint if three requirements are met[:]"
Id. Defendants, in their motion to dismiss, make no argument regarding the relation back of the second amended complaint and fail to respond to the arguments advanced by Plaintiff in this regard. See doc. 84 at PageID 369-70; doc. 88 at PageID 391-92.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing relation back, and fails to meet the "mistake" requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). DeBois v. Pickoff, No. 3:09CV230, 2011 WL 1233665, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2011). While Plaintiff argues that he attempted to identify the parties involved "as best as [he] could" at the time of his original filing, he never determined their real identities before expiration of the limitations period and continued forward against these unidentified Defendants as "Doe" Defendants. See doc. 1 at PageID 1; doc. 27 at
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) "allows relation back for the mistaken identification of defendants, not for defendants to be named later through `John Doe,' `Unknown Defendants' or other missing appellations." Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App'x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Brown v. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, 517 F. App'x 431, 433-34; Wiggins, 2016 WL 537247, at *4. The record demonstrates here that Plaintiff "did not make a mistake about the identity of the parties he intended to sue" and, instead, "he did not know who they were and apparently did not find out within the two-year limitations period." Id. The Sixth Circuit has made clear that "the relationback protections of Rule 15(c) were not designed to correct that kind of problem." Id. Although the Court recognizes that Plaintiff initiated this case pro se, the Court cannot alter "procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation . . . so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel." McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Laravie, Frisk, Connor and Vitali should be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Based on all of the foregoing, the undersigned R
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within