OPINION & ORDER

[Resolving Doc. 1]

JAMES S. GWIN, District Judge.

In this case, Plaintiff Meghan Hulec sued Defendants J.H. Bennett & Company, Inc. (Bennett) and Stephen Muellauer in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on a variety of grounds. Specifically, she alleged (1) quid pro quo sexual harassment; (2) hostile work environment harassment on the basis of sex, race, national origin, and disability or perceived disability; (3) disability discrimination; (4) national origin discrimination; (5) interference with the exercise of FMLA rights; (6) wrongful retaliatory discharge; (7) wrongful post-employment retaliation; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 Except for the FMLA count, all the claims were based on Ohio law. Hulec's state court complaint also sued Steven Selmants, but he has since been voluntarily dismissed from the suit.2

Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction over the FMLA claim.3 After removal, Defendant Muellauer also brought six counterclaims against Hulec.4 Four of these counterclaims were dismissed, leaving Muellauer's counterclaims for invasion of privacy and tortious interference with business or contractual relations.5

The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Hulec's claims, and Hulec has moved for summary judgment on Muellauer's remaining counterclaims.6 The parties stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of Hulec's national-origin discrimination claim against both Defendants, as well as her wrongful post-employment retaliation claim against Bennett.7 Hulec then moved to dismiss her FMLA claim and the Court dismissed the FMLA claim on September 25, 2014, with prejudice.8

For the reasons stated below, the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and counterclaims. The Court therefore REMANDS the case to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.

I

Supplemental jurisdiction permits a district court to hear claims that are "so related to claims" that provide an independent source of jurisdiction "that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III."9 A district court, however, "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction" if, among other things, it "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."10 "In determining whether to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims, a district court should consider and weigh several factors, including the `values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.'"11 "`When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if the action was removed.'"12

This rule is not absolute. The Sixth Circuit has upheld the discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction after the dismissal of all federal claims in a case where the Plaintiff engaged in forum manipulation, discovery was complete, and summary judgment motions were ripe for decision.13 But the Sixth Circuit has also said that district courts should avoid "needlessly deciding state law issues."14 This consideration is especially weighty where the state law question is "novel or complex."15

In the present case, the Court concludes that the presumption for remand when all federal claims are dismissed prior to trial and the presence of a novel issue of state law join to make remand the proper course. In particular, the parties raise a novel issue of state law on the definition of supervisor under Ohio antidiscrimination law and the possible impact of the United States Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Vance v. Ball State University.16

As Defendants' summary judgment motions point out, Ohio courts generally apply federal case law interpreting Title VII to Ohio Revised Code 4112, the chapter Plaintiff Hulec bases many of her claims on.17 Hulec correctly responds that Ohio courts have departed from federal law to provide more expansive supervisor liability.18 But all of the cases Hulec cites predate the Supreme Court's decision in Vance. Moreover, all of the Ohio state cases and many of the federal cases Hulec cites address the distinct issue of whether supervisors are individually liable under Ohio Revised Code 4112 rather than the definition of supervisor.

Against this backdrop, the Court will not needlessly weigh in on the proper interpretation of Ohio law. Principles of comity dictate that absent particularly weighty contrary factors, novel questions of state law should be decided by state courts rather than by federal courts with only pendent jurisdiction.

It is true that some aspects of this case arguably counsel in favor of the Court retaining jurisdiction. In particular, discovery is advanced and the motions for summary judgment are ripe. However, on the facts of this case, neither judicial economy nor the avoidance of delay outweigh the comity considerations discussed above.

The discovery the parties have taken can be used in state court as well as in federal court, and it seems likely that the summary judgment motions and associated briefing can simply be refiled essentially as-is. Moreover, the summary judgment motions have only been ripe for slightly over two weeks. The Court therefore concludes that the minimal delay associated with remanding this case to state court does not outweigh the avoidance of an unnecessary decision on a novel state law issue.

Finally, as to forum manipulation, the Court notes that this is not a case where the plaintiff first tried to avail herself of a federal forum and then changed her mind and sought a state forum. Rather, Plaintiff Hulec originally filed in Ohio state court.

II

For the foregoing reasons, the Court REMANDS this case to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.

IT IS SO ORDERED.