MICHAEL R. MERZ, Magistrate Judge.
This criminal case is before the Court on Defendant Lonnie Johnson's filing, with the assistance of counsel, a Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 23). On initial review, the Court ordered the United States to answer the Motion (ECF No. 24).
In Beckles v. United States, 616 Fed. Appx. 415 (11
The United States has now moved the Court to hold these proceedings in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles (Motion, ECF No. 26). The Government notes a conflict between the Eighth and Fourth Circuits on applying Johnson retroactively to Guidelines cases and notes that both the Second Circuit and the Northern District of California have stayed cases pending the Beckles decision. Id. at PageID 79-80.
The question whether to stay a case pending a potentially dispositive decision in an appellate court is a pre-trial matter committed to the sound discretion of the District Court. Because it is a non-dispositive issue, it may be decided in the first instance by an assigned Magistrate Judge.
Defendant Johnson opposes the Motion, noting that Judge Beckwith of this Court has denied a stay pending Beckles (ECF No. 27, PageID 82, citing United States v. Fife, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90906 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2016)). He argues his guideline range for sentencing will be 63 to 78 months without the career offender enhancement and that the United States has conceded in other cases that convictions such as his under Ohio's burglary statute do not qualify as predicate offenses under the Career Offender Guidelines. Id. at PageID 83-84. Thus, he says, he is entitled to release. Id. at PageID 84.
The United States in its Reply in support notes that even if Johnson were released on his conviction in this case, he would still have 452 days imprisonment to serve on a supervised release violation in a prior case (ECF No. 28, PageID 91, citing the judgment in United States v. Johnson, Case No. 3:99-cr-92).
The undersigned has already concluded that Johnson applies retroactively to Guidelines career offender cases. Hill v. United States, 2016 US. Dist. LEXIS 91619 (S.D. Ohio, July 14, 2016)(Merz, M.J.), relying on In re Roger Clay Swain, Case No. 15-2040 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 2016)(unreported) which holds, in the context of authorizing a second or successive § 2255 motion, that Johnson states "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." Swain's sentence had been enhanced under Guideline § 4B1.1 rather than the ACCA, but the court held "Johnson is applicable. . . ." Id. at p. 3. Accord, In re Hubbard, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10348 (4th Cir. June 8, 2016). "The right in question here is the right not to have one's federal sentence enhanced by application of unconstitutionally vague language ("otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another") to the characterization of prior convictions." Id. at *5-6. That conclusion is embedded in a report which is not yet ripe for Judge Rice's consideration. It nonetheless embodies this judge's considered conclusion which is not at odds with that of any other judge in the Sixth Circuit whose opinion has been called to my attention.
In Fife Judge Beckwith noted the unfairness of delaying a decision, given that Fife would, if his case were stayed pending Beckles, ending up serving a longer sentence than she was likely to impose on re-sentencing. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90906 at * 6. That consideration does not apply here because, regardless of the outcome of this § 2255 proceeding, Johnson is likely to remain incarcerated through the date of decision in Beckles.
Johnson has generated a veritable flood of § 2255 motions nationwide, certainly more than one hundred in this Court alone. In this judge's experience, most of them are Guidelines cases, rather than Armed Career Criminal Act cases and are thus subject to the statute of limitations argument pending in Beckles.
This Court prefers to manage the congestion now rather than waiting. Accordingly, the Motion to Stay is DENIED.