TIMOTHY S. BLACK, District Judge.
This civil action is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. (Doc. 16). Defendant did not respond.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on September 29, 2014. (Doc. 1). Defendant's registered agent was personally served with the summons and complaint on November 30, 2015. (Doc. 10). Defendant failed to answer or otherwise file a responsive pleading within the time allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, on January 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a request with the Clerk's office seeking an entry of default. (Doc. 12). Default was entered against Defendant on January 13, 2016. (Doc. 13). Now, Plaintiff seeks an award of damages. (Doc. 16).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant infringed several of its trademarks and design patents related to its Fusion® and Mach® lines of shaving products from sales made through
Specifically, Defendant used the Infringed Marks in connection with the sale of razor blade cartridges described as "authentic OEM" Gillette Fusion® and Gillette Mach3® razor blade cartridges. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 31). These products presented the designs of the Infringed Patents, which protect ornamental designs incorporated into Fusion® razor blade cartridges and dispensers ('518 Patent and '684 Patent) and Mach3® razor blade cartridges ('578 Patent, '511 Patent, and '512 Patent). (Id. at ¶¶ 23-26). Defendant offered the infringing products in all fifty states and possibly internationally through
Defendant further violated Plaintiff's rights by illegally obtaining the products. Plaintiff purchased and tested samples of the Fusion® and Mach3® razor blade cartridges sold by Defendant through
Applications for default judgment are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Following the clerk's entry of default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and the party's application for default under rule 55(b), "the complaint's factual allegations regarding liability are taken as true, while allegations regarding the amount of damages must be proven." Morisaki v. Davenport, Allen & Malone, Inc., No. 2:09cv298, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86241, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2010) (citing Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Products, 722 F.2d 1319. 1323 (7th Cir. 1983)).
Although liability may be shown by well-pleaded allegations, this Court is required to "conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty." Osbeck v. Golfside Auto Sales, Inc., No. 07-14004, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62027, at *5 (E.D. Mich. June. 23, 2010). To do so, the civil rules "require that the party moving for a default judgment must present some evidence of its damages." Mill's Pride, L.P. v. W.D. Miller Enter., No. 2:07cv990, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36756, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2010).
Defendant having defaulted, the factual allegations in the complaint are deemed true. Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 110 (6th Cir. 1995). To determine an undefined sum of damages, Rule 55(b)(2) "allows but does not require the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing." Vesligaj v. Peterson, 331 F. App'x 351, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2009). An evidentiary hearing is not required if the Court can determine the amount of damages by computation from the record before it. HICA Educ. Loan Corp. v. Jones, No. 4:12cv962, 2012 U.S Dist. LEXIS 116166, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2012). The Court may rely on affidavits submitted on the issue of damages. Schilling v. Interim Healthcare of Upper Ohio Valley, Inc., No. 206-cv-487, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 16, 2007).
As established by the facts set forth in the complaint as well as Plaintiff's affidavits, Plaintiff is entitled to damages for Defendant's default.
First, Plaintiff requests that the Defendant be permanently enjoined from violating the Infringed Patents during the remainder of each patent's enforceable life, and permanently enjoined from violating the Infringed Marks.
(1) whether the plaintiff suffered an irreparable harm; (2) whether the remedies available at law are inadequate; (3) whether the balance of hardships favors granting an injunction; and (4) whether the public interest would be served in granting an injunction. Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Service Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 608 (6th Cir. 1991).
Courts routinely find irreparable harm when the infringer and patent holder are direct competitors. Bendix Comer. Vehicle, Sys., LLC v. Haldex Brake Prod. Corp., No. 1:09cv176, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 312, at *16 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2011). Here, Plaintiff is Defendant's direct competitor. Plaintiff offers for sale, and sells, replacement razor blade cartridges for use with its reusable razor handles, in direct competition with Defendant's sales of the same, illegally-obtained goods. (Doc. 16 at 11). Also, Defendant uses the Infringed Marks to sell its illegally-obtained goods, without license or permission from the Plaintiff, implying an endorsement of its sales of these goods by Plaintiff. (Id.) These facts show that Plaintiff will likely suffer irreparable harm if Defendant is not legally enjoined from violating the Infringed Patents and Infringed Marks.
By defaulting, Defendant admits that it used the Gillette Marks for the purpose of capitalizing on Plaintiff's goodwill and reputation. Chanel, Inc. v. Huang Cong, No. 10-2086, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141177, at *32 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2011). There are no assurances, absent a permanent injunction, that the Defendant will not sell infringing products again in the future.
Furthermore, the injunction will not unfairly harm Defendant, as it will simply be prohibited from continuing to deliberately infringe Plaintiff's intellectual property. "One who elects to build a business on a product found to infringe cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against continuing infringement destroys the business so elected." Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Finally, there is no harm to the public interest in protecting Plaintiff's ability to prevent Defendant from continued infringement of the Infringed Patents and Infringed Marks. The public has a strong interest in maintaining the integrity of patents by enjoining patent infringement. See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F.Supp.2d 978, 985 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
The four-factor test for granting a permanent injunction weighs heavily in favor of such relief. Accordingly, Defendant is enjoined and restrained from infringing, in any manner, the Infringed Patents and Infringed Marks.
Next, Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant's sales through
When determining the proper amount of statutory damages, courts consider whether the infringement was willful. Specifically: (1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; and (3) the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation. Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Here, the evidence establishes that Plaintiff attempted to negotiate with Defendant by sending a cease and desist letter before initiating the lawsuit and negotiated in good faith with Defendant's counsel during the pendency of this litigation.
Defendant had at least $18,349.14 in sales of infringing products between January 1, 2015 and September 13, 2015. (Doc. 16, Ex. B at 3-36). However, since Defendant also operates a retail location, it is possible that sales are even more significant. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks trebling the damage amount pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284 and 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). Given Defendant's willful infringement, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover three times its conservative estimate of damages, or $55,047.42.
Plaintiff requests that the Court find that this case is "exceptional" and award costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C §1117(a). A trademark infringement case may be found exceptional when, as in this case, the defendant has disregarded the proceedings and the underlying claims of trademark infringement. See, e.g., Lien v. Compusoft of Kalamazoo, Inc., No. 1:89cv104, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3218, at *13 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 1991). Defendant's non-responsiveness and complete failure to address the case in Court renders this case exceptional and merits an award of attorney's fees. Moreover, willful patent infringement also merits an award of fees. See, e.g., Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding of willful infringement is sufficient to find a case exceptional).
The requested award of attorney's fees represents the amount expended on fees to the law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP for work performed in this case. This includes legal work related to investigating the Defendant, drafting a cease and desist letter, drafting the complaint and related documents, serving the complaint and related documents, negotiating with Defendant's counsel, drafting, service of, negotiation, and review of information provided in response to subpoenas to third parties eBay and PayPal, seeking an entry of default, and drafting a motion for default judgment and supporting documents. (Doc. 16, Ex. A at ¶ 9).
Accordingly, in light of Defendant's willful infringement, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees. To date, Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $21,489.45. (Doc. 16, Ex. A at ¶¶ 3-8). This amount represents a reasonable fee in light of the experience of counsel, the nature of the case, and the services provided.
In addition to attorneys' fees and costs, Plaintiff also seeks an award of prejudgment and post-judgment interest. See 28 U.S.C. 1961(a). Here, Plaintiff discovered Defendant's infringement of the Infringed Patents less than one year after Defendant began infringing. Plaintiff sought to protect its rights, first by notifying the Defendant with an infringement letter, and then by filing suit. Accordingly, an award of prejudgment interest from the date of the cease and desist letter, September 10, 2015, through the date of judgment, is appropriate in this case. See Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d 1075, 1086-1087 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (prejudgment interest is ordinarily awarded from the date of the infringement to the date of judgment).
Additionally, an award of post-judgment interest is also appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), since Defendant defaulted and Plaintiff is likely to seek to attach assets or take other steps to secure payment of the judgment, which will likely delay the payment. In calculating pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, the rate of the 52 week Treasury Bill is an appropriate rate pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See also Isaac Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1998). As of April 27, 2016, this rate was 0.60%.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion for default judgment (Doc. 16) is