MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SARA LIOI, District Judge.

Before the Court is the motion of plaintiff Bryan Anthony Reo ("Reo" or "plaintiff") to remand this case to the Lake County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. No. 7, Part 2 ["Mot."].) Defendant Royal Administration Services ("Royal Administration" or "defendant") has filed its opposition (Doc. No. 9 ["Opp'n"]) and Reo has filed a reply (Doc. No. 10 ["Reply"]). For the reasons discussed below, the motion to remand is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Reo, a pro se litigant, initiated this lawsuit in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas on December 30, 2015. (See Complaint, Doc. No. 1-1 ["Compl."].) Reo sued Royal Administration for statutory violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ("TCPA"), the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 1305.01, et seq. ("OCSPA"), and the Ohio Telephone Solicitation Sales Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 4719.01, et seq., and under common law. (Compl. ¶ 1.)

After Royal Administration timely removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, Reo sought and was granted leave, over defendant's opposition, to amend the complaint to remove the sole federal claim. Reo also sought to remand the case to state court and the Court indicated that it would rule on that portion of the motion separately.

II. DISCUSSION

At the time of removal by Royal Administration, there was a federal claim upon which to base this Court's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court assumed supplemental jurisdiction over the state law and common law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Since the Court permitted plaintiff to amend his complaint by removing the sole federal claim, only state law claims now remain. The Court may, in its discretion, either retain jurisdiction over those claims and proceed on the merits, Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639-40, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 173 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2009), or decline jurisdiction and remand the amended complaint to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, "a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity[.]" Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988).

"Comity to state courts is considered a substantial interest; therefore, [the Court] applies a strong presumption against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims have been dismissed—retaining residual jurisdiction `only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh [any] concern over needlessly deciding state law issues.'" Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Columbus, Inc., 423 F. App'x 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (further citation omitted)). "[G]enerally `[w]hen all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if the action was removed.'" Id. at 585 (quoting Musson Theatrical v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1996) (further citations omitted)).

Here, this matter is in a decidedly pre-trial procedural posture. The Court has just permitted Reo to file his amended complaint, retaining only his state law claims and dismissing his sole federal claim. Upon remand, defendant will be in a position to move or otherwise plead in response to the amended complaint. Any arguments on the merits of the state law claims can be timely made in that context, should defendant so choose. Although defendant also suggests that plaintiff has a history of abusing the judicial process by bringing frivolous actions1 and engaging in gamesmanship as a means of extorting settlements,2 that, too, is a matter that can be ably addressed by the state court once it resumes jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's motion to remand his amended complaint (Doc. No. 7, Part 2) is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.