MICHAEL J. McSHANE, District Judge.
Miroslav Fejfar, a citizen of the Czech Republic residing in the United States, brings this petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging Magistrate Judge Papak's certification of an extradition request to send Mr. Fejfar back to the Czech Republic. Because Judge Papak did not err in certifying the request for extradition, and did not err in declining to stay certification, the petition is DENIED.
It is undisputed that in April 2001, despite his claims that law officials framed him, Mr. Fejfar was convicted in a Czech court of extortion and inducement to commit the offense of endangering the safety of the public. On July 31, 2001, the Municipal Court in Prague dismissed Mr. Fejfar's appeal and affirmed his three year sentence. The parties agree that under Czech law, the execution of Mr. Fejfar's sentence had a statute of limitations of five years. It is the tolling of this limitation period that is at the heart of the extradition proceedings challenged by Mr. Fejfar. In September 2001, the Czech trial court issued an order to deliver Mr. Fejfar to prison to enforce the sentence. For reasons unclear—and any possible reasons are immaterial to the issues presented—the Czech police never arrested Mr. Fejfar.
The parties agree that absent any tolling, Mr. Fejfar's April 2001 sentence would lapse in April 2006. The issue of tolling centers on whether a January 2006 order, issued by a clerk in the Czech trial court, "interrupted" (i.e., tolled) the limitations period.
In 2010, the Czech court issued an international arrest warrant for Mr. Fejfar. On June 11, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security initiated a removal proceeding against Mr. Fejfar for overstaying his visa. Two months later, the Czech government formally requested Mr. Fejfar's extradition pursuant to the extradition treaty between it and the United States.
Mr. Fejfar conceded his removability in the immigration proceedings and filed for asylum on January 23, 2013. On March 31, 2016, the United States filed a petition for Mr. Fejfar's arrest with a view towards extradition. On September 22, 2016, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) administratively closed Mr. Fejfar's removal proceeding in the immigration court pending resolution of his extradition proceeding.
On December 5, 2016, Judge Papak presided over a hearing concerning the contested certification for extradition. Mr. Fejfar argued his sentence had lapsed and, in the alternative, that Judge Papak should stay extradition pending the outcome of either: (1) his asylum proceedings; or (2) his ongoing challenge in Czech courts that his sentence had lapsed. Judge Papak rejected Mr. Fejfar's claims and certified the extradition request to the Secretary of State. This petition for writ of habeas corpus followed.
Review of a certification of extradition is only possible through a writ of habeas corpus. Valencia v. Limbs, 655 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1981). The scope of habeas review of an extradition order is very narrow and this Court shall not rehear what the magistrate court has already decided. Fernandez v. Philips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). Rather, the reviewing court inquires only into whether the Judge certifying extradition had jurisdiction over the case and whether the evidence provided created a reasonable inference that the fugitive was guilty of an offense included in the Treaty. Id. When conducting a habeas corpus review for extradition purposes, factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 1001 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Here, it is undisputed that the magistrate judge had jurisdiction over Mr. Fejfar's extradition proceeding and that the convictions are extraditable offenses pursuant to Article II of the Treaty.
The parties agree that if Mr. Fejfar's conviction lapsed, it cannot serve as the basis for extradition under the treaty.
Because the 2006 order was unsealed, Mr. Fejfar takes the position that it was invalid and cannot serve as an "interruption" of the 2001 conviction.
Under Czech law, the statute of limitations is "interrupted . . . if the court takes steps to enforce a sentence to which the limitation period is related[.]" Ex. U at 13. "Interruption of the limitation period starts a new limitation period." Id. The record contains several exchanges regarding the statute of limitations between the United States Department of Justice and the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic.
Ex. U at 12-14.
In briefings before Judge Papak, "Mr. Fejfar argued that the 2006 order was invalid because it was not issued under seal and was signed by a clerk as opposed to a judge. Therefore, the 2006 Order could not have interrupted the statute of limitations, meaning Mr. Fejfar's sentence had expired." Br. in Supp. at 19 (internal citation omitted). In response to this argument, the government asked the Ministry of Justice to provide further guidance regarding the 2006 order. On December 1, 2016, on the eve of oral argument before Judge Papak, the Ministry provided further clarification. Ex. X. In that letter, the Ministry of Justice stated:
Ex. X at 2 (bold in original).
Seizing on the last sentence above—"As these [2006] documents were not issued under the seal, they cannot cancel the previous Order of 2001"—Mr. Fejfar argues:
Br. in Supp. at 20.
For several reasons, Mr. Fejfar's argument fails. First, under Czech law, a statute of limitations is "interrupted . . . if the court takes steps to enforce a sentence to which the limitation period is related[.]" Ex. U at 13. While Mr. Fejfar argues the court must take "valid steps to enforce a sentence," the Czech law merely states the limitation is interrupted "if the court takes steps to enforce a sentence[.]" While the 2006 order was clearly a "step" taken by the court, only one versed in Czech law could know if the statute required a "valid" step. Second, as noted by the December 1, 2016 letter from the Ministry of Justice, "orders to deliver a person to prison," such as the 2006 order to deliver Mr. Fejfar's to prison, "are only `technical' measures aiming at execution of a judgment . . . (nevertheless, such measures are still valid reasons to interrupt the limitation period)."
Additionally, Mr. Fejfar's argument fails because it asks this Court to reject his sentence based on a technical argument advanced under the intricacies of Czech law. Courts reviewing certificates of extradition have rejected arguments that "savor of technicality." Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517 (1916). In rejecting a "technical" challenge to the Russian criminal code in upholding a certification of extradition, the Court explained:
Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184-85 (1902).
Again, this Court is not well-versed in Czech law and is ill-equipped to decide rather arcane and technical matters found in the Czech Collection of Laws. Czech courts are more suited to consider such arguments, and those courts have repeatedly concluded Mr. Fejfar's 2001 sentence is not time-barred. Like other courts rejecting technical-based limitations arguments to avoid extradition, "this Court will not question the reliability or trustworthiness of a judicial decree from a foreign nation." In re Extradition of Jimenez, 2014 WL 7239941 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2014).
Judge Papak did not err in finding that the 2006 order reset the five year limitations period. Mr. Fejfar's travel abroad to the United States in 2009 tolled, and continues to toll, the limitations period.
Mr. Fejfar argues Judge Papak violated his due process rights by certifying extradition prior to the adjudication of Mr. Fejfar's immigration claims. This argument is meritless. The BIA administratively closed Mr. Fejfar's immigration case pending the outcome of the extradition proceedings pursuant to BIA policy. See Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing practice). The court in Barapind upheld the practice, holding:
Id. at 1114.
Barapind forecloses Mr. Fejfar's due process claim. Judge Papak did not err in certifying extradition before the resolution of Mr. Fejfar's immigration claims.
Mr. Fejfar argues Judge Papak erred by not granting a stay of his extradition proceedings pending the resolution of either his immigration claims or his ongoing litigation in the Czech Republic. A stay is not a matter of right, but an exercise of judicial discretion, highly dependent on the facts of the particular case at hand. Nken v. Holder, 566 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). The party requesting a stay must prove that his individual circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion. Id. at 433-34. Here, the circumstances do not justify a stay.
To warrant a stay of his extradition proceedings pending the resolution of his other legal proceedings, Mr. Fejfar must show that: (a) he is likely to succeed on the merits of his other legal proceedings; (b) he will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay; (c) granting a stay will not substantially injure the other parties in the proceeding; and (d) granting a stay is in the public interest. Id. at 434.
While Mr. Fejfar seeks a stay in order to proceed with his immigration claims, those immigration claims are "separate and independent" from the extradition proceedings. Barapind, 225 F.3d at 1104-05. Additionally, as discussed above, Judge Papak did not err in certifying the extradition order. Therefore, the public interest is not served by staying the valid extradition application from the Czech Republic. See Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) ("We note that the public interest will be served by the United States complying with a valid extradition application from [the requesting country] under the treaty. Such proper compliance promotes relations between the two countries, and enhances efforts to establish an international rule of law and order.").
For similar reasons, Judge Papak did not err by denying Mr. Fejfar's request for a stay while he proceeds with litigation in the Czech Republic challenging the 2006 order. Mr. Fejfar also fails to demonstrate he is likely to succeed on the merits of his new legal challenge. As noted, several Czech courts have rejected Mr. Fejfar's argument that the 2006 order failed to interrupt the limitations period. Ex. X at 1.
Because Magistrate Judge Papak did not err in certifying the request for extradition, and did not err in declining to stay certification, the petition is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
