KENNETH S. McHARGH, Magistrate Judge.
This case is before the Magistrate Judge pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 15). The issue before the undersigned is whether the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying Plaintiff Christopher McGlothlin's application for a Period of Disability and Disability Insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act,
For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.
On February 24, 2009, Plaintiff Christopher McGlothlin ("Plaintiff") applied for a Period of Disability and Disability Insurance benefits. (Tr. 141-42). Plaintiff alleged he became disabled on July 31, 2007, due to suffering from post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder. (Tr. 141, 231). Plaintiff's Disability Insurance benefits expired on June 30, 2010. (Tr. 185). The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's application initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 85-87, 92-94). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge to contest the denial of his application. (Tr. 90-91). The administration granted Plaintiff's request and scheduled a hearing. (Tr. 97-100).
On January 31, 2011, Administrative Law Judge Julia Terry (the "ALJ") convened a hearing via video to evaluate Plaintiff's application. (Tr. 60-81). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and gave testimony from Cleveland, Ohio, (Tr. 41), and the ALJ presided over the hearing from St. Louis, Missouri. (Id.). A vocational expert, Barbara Burk, also appeared and testified at the proceeding. (Tr. 76-81).
On February 25, 2011, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (T. 41-54). After applying the five-step sequential analysis,
Plaintiff, born on September 7, 1977, was 29 years old as of his alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 64). Accordingly, he was considered as a "younger person" for Social Security purposes.
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in his application of the five-step analysis. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of July 31, 2007. (Tr. 43). At step two, the ALJ held Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, mixed personality disorder, drug and/or alcohol addiction and obesity. (Tr. 44). As a result, at step three, the ALJ concluded that these impairments, including Plaintiff's substance abuse, met Listing 12.04 and 12.09 of the Listings of Impairments codified in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "listings"). (Tr. 44-45).
In light of this finding, the ALJ examined the effect Plaintiff's substance abuse had on his other impairments. The ALJ found that even if Plaintiff ceased abusing substances, his other severe impairments would remain. However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments would not meet or medically equal listing level if Plaintiff stopped abusing drugs and/or alcohol. (Tr. 46). Accordingly, at step four, the ALJ held that Plaintiff would retain the ability to perform a reduced range of medium work if he were to stop abusing drugs and alcohol. (Tr. 47-51).
Furthermore, at step four, the ALJ ruled that absent substance abuse, Plaintiff was capable of returning to his prior job as a kitchen helper. (Tr. 51-52). Alternatively, the ALJ ruled that Plaintiff could also perform work as a commercial cleaner, day worker or housekeeping cleaner. (Tr. 52-53). Thus, the ALJ ultimately found that Plaintiff was not disabled, because absent his substance abuse, Plaintiff would be able to work successfully. (Id.).
A claimant is entitled to receive Disability Insurance and/or Supplemental Security Income benefits only when he establishes disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
Judicial review of the Commissioner's benefits decision is limited to a determination of whether, based on the record as a whole, the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, and whether, in making that decision, the Commissioner employed the proper legal standards. See
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's ruling on two grounds. First, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ improperly concluded that his substance abuse was a contributing factor material to his disability. Second, Plaintiff attacks the ALJ's negative assessment of his credibility.
The ALJ began by considering whether Plaintiff was disabled when taking his substance abuse into account. The ALJ held that Plaintiff's substance abuse constituted as a severe impairment. The ALJ then ruled that Plaintiff was disabled because Plaintiff's impairments, including substance abuse, combined to meet the requirements of listings 12.04 (affective disorders) and 12.09 (substance addiction disorders) of the listing of impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart A, Appendix 1.
With regard to activities of daily living, the ALJ noted that during periods of substance abuse, Plaintiff reported experiencing low self-esteem, low self-worth, feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, decreased energy, and was unable maintain his personal hygiene.
With regard to social functioning, Plaintiff was generally unable to maintain relationships with others while he was abusing drugs and/or alcohol. Hospital records show that Plaintiff was unable to get along with hospital staff and social workers. With regard to personal relationships, Plaintiff was not welcome at the home of his mother-in-law and was eventually imprisoned for domestic violence against his wife. It was further noted that he "went on [an] alcohol and drug binge, did not take his medication and wound up arrested". (Tr. 45).
Plaintiff also suffered difficulties in the area of concentrating, persisting and keeping adequate pace when he abused drugs. Hospital records show that he reported racing thoughts, rapid speech, hyperactivity, depressed mood, irritability and auditory hallucinations. Finally, although the ALJ did not explicitly identify periods when Plaintiff experienced episodes of decompensation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had experienced one or two such episodes of an extended duration.
However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would not be disabled if he were to stop abusing substances. To begin, the ALJ noted that although Plaintiff's remaining impairments would cause more than a minimal impact upon his ability to work, they would no longer combine to meet or equal listing level. The ALJ found that absent substance abuse, Plaintiff would no longer satisfy the criteria set forth in paragraph B of listing 12.04. After taking substance abuse out of the analysis, the ALJ held that Plaintiff only suffered from mild restrictions in daily activities, moderate deficiencies in social functioning and concentration, persistence and pace, and no episodes of decompensation of an extended duration.
Plaintiff takes great issue with this portion of the ALJ's ruling. Plaintiff acknowledged his history of drug and alcohol abuse at the hearing. He also concedes that it was proper for the ALJ to consider whether his substance abuse was a contributing factor material to the ALJ's disability finding. However, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's determination was erroneously based upon a narrow period of time spanning only three months: May through July 2008.
Pursuant to the Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, disability benefits cannot be awarded to an individual where drug addiction or alcoholism is a material contributing factor to the finding of disability.
In fact, the ALJ's decision finding Plaintiff disabled relied heavily upon hospitalizations Plaintiff underwent in May, June and July 2008. In May 2008, Plaintiff was hospitalized for approximately two days. (Tr. 295-96). During his hospital stay, Plaintiff admitted that he had used marijuana five days earlier. In June 2008, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital after overdosing on prescription medication. (Tr. 258). Finally, in July 2008, Plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital for overdosing on prescription medication again. (Tr. 529).
It was reasonable for the ALJ to rely upon Plaintiff's hospitalizations between May and July 2008 to determine whether his substance abuse was a contributing factor material to his disability. The Sixth Circuit has sanctioned the practice of looking at periods of sobriety and comparing those periods with times when the claimant was abusing substances, in making the materiality determination.
Records from Plaintiff's hospitalizations between May and July 2008 note substance abuse. During his hospitalization in May, Plaintiff conceded that he had used marijuana five days prior. Though the hospital records do not indicate that Plaintiff was under the influence of drugs at the time he presented to the emergency room, Plaintiff's admission of recent drug use was relevant evidence for the ALJ to consider as it demonstrated that Plaintiff was still actively using drugs at that time. Despite Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, his hospitalizations from June and July also involved substance abuse — albeit the abuse of prescription medication. Both hospitalizations were precipitated by Plaintiff's misuse of medications prescribed to him. Courts have considered prescription drug abuse as "substance abuse" which can preclude an award of benefits.
Therefore, to determine whether Plaintiff's substance abuse was material to his disability, the ALJ looked at Plaintiff's level of functioning during the above-referenced times of substance abuse and compared them with Plaintiff's reported functionality during the following periods of sobriety. First, the ALJ cited prison records addressing Plaintiff's functionality while incarcerated and presumably sober. During this time, Plaintiff was regretful for his actions, cooperative, exemplified intact thought process and normal thought content, and admitted that drugs and alcohol were a "big part" of his problems. Additionally, in February and March 2009, Plaintiff was actively looking for work and even applied to and was accepted into college. Plaintiff was also responsible for taking care of his children for roughly half of the summer.
Although Plaintiff was hospitalized several times, even during periods of noted sobriety, the ALJ ruled that Plaintiff's symptoms, in each of the four relevant categories considered under "paragraph B" of the listings,
In regards to social functioning, the ALJ noted that when sober, hospital staff described Plaintiff as polite, calm and cooperative. (Tr. 421). In contrast, Plaintiff generally behaved more aggressively when abusing substances, which had led to arrests in the past. He also had problems getting along with relatives during periods of substance abuse.
The ALJ also adequately distinguished Plaintiff's abilities in the area of concentration, persistence and pace between hospitalizations related to substance abuse and those occurring during periods of sobriety. When abusing substances, Plaintiff's thought processes were described as "hyper-productive". (Tr. 530). He also admitted experiencing auditory hallucinations and being distracted. But, when sober, hospital records revealed that Plaintiff denied experiencing any auditory or visual hallucinations or illusions. Furthermore, Plaintiff denied suicidal or homicidal ideation. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was better able to control his symptoms when he was not abusing drugs and/or alcohol.
Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had not experienced any episodes of decompensation when sober.
Therefore, based upon a review of the record, the undersigned finds the ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ properly drew comparisons between Plaintiff's functionality during periods of sobriety and periods of substance abuse, and reasonably concluded that Plaintiff's substance abuse contributed materially to his disability. Because the ALJ's decision is supported by the record, it is entitled to deference. The Court is mindful that there is a "zone of choice" within which the ALJ can render a decision without disturbance by the Court.
Plaintiff also argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's discounting of his credibility. It is well-established that an ALJ's credibility findings are entitled to great deference.
Here, the ALJ provided numerous reasons for discrediting Plaintiff's claims of disability. For instance, the ALJ held that Plaintiff's ability to care for his children for nearly half the summer demonstrated his ability to care for himself and others. The ALJ further relied upon evidence from Plaintiff's case worker, who had a long-standing relationship with Plaintiff, and opined that Plaintiff "probably" could hold down a full time job. Aside from the medical evidence cited supra, the ALJ also pointed to Plaintiff's actions, such as his enrollment in college, to disprove his allegations.
Plaintiff's challenges to the ALJ's reliance upon this evidence are unavailing. First, Plaintiff objects to the ALJ's reference to his ability to enroll in community college because Plaintiff notes that he was in school for less than one year and did not perform well in his classes. But, the ALJ cited to this evidence to demonstrate that Plaintiff was motivated to live positively when not abusing substances, and likewise was capable of being a productive member of society. Admittedly, Plaintiff testified that he did not perform well in college because "the math was too hard for [him]", but regardless of Plaintiff's academic performance, his actions demonstrate that when not engaging in substance abuse, he retained the ability to engage in meaningful activities, which suggested he was not disabled.
Similarly, it was reasonable for the ALJ to consider Plaintiff's ability to care for his children during a portion of the summer. Plaintiff notes that at the time of the hearing, he did not have custody of his children because the local child protection agency did not feel he was fit to keep them due to his mental health problems. Nonetheless, it was proper for the ALJ to consider this evidence because Plaintiff was able to care for his children for at least a portion of the relevant time under review. Thus, Plaintiff's impairments were not completely disabling for the entire period for which he seeks disability benefits. Furthermore, any alleged error committed by the ALJ in considering this evidence after Plaintiff's children were removed from his home was rendered moot by the ALJ's reliance upon other substantial evidence in the record justifying his credibility determination.
Lastly, Plaintiff claims it was improper for the ALJ to conclude that his suicide attempts were actually subterfuges to obtain housing when he was homeless. Instead, Plaintiff suggests that his mental illness triggered his substance abuse, especially during times of homelessness, and caused him to behave accordingly.
It is important to note that the ALJ did not reject Plaintiff's claim that he suffers from mental impairments. Rather, the ALJ discredited Plaintiff's allegation that the severity and limiting effects of those impairments were disabling. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, there is substantial evidence showing that the totality of his impairments are not disabling when he is sober and compliant with treatment. Both the state agency reviewers as well as Plaintiff's case worker agreed that Plaintiff retained the ability to work when not abusing alcohol or other substances. Furthermore, as stated above, Plaintiff previously admitted to medical professionals that he had indeed used suicide attempts as a method to obtain housing. Although the undersigned acknowledges that Plaintiff's mental impairments undoubtedly had some effect upon his substance abuse — substantial evidence demonstrates that his mental impairments do not alone restrict Plaintiff to the degree to which Plaintiff asserts. Plaintiff has not identified any medical opinion evidence wherein his physicians found him to be disabled when sober and fully compliant with his medication. As a consequence, the undersigned declines to disturb the ALJ's ruling.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990).
