TIMOTHY J. SAVAGE, District Judge.
Plaintiff Quintez Talley, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. They have also asserted qualified immunity and sovereign immunity as to the state claims. Because Talley has failed to state a federal claim, we shall grant the motion and dismiss those claims, and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
On January 3, 2018, Talley was housed in a Psychiatric Observation Cell (POC) at the DOC's State Correctional Institution at Graterford.
Before entering the cell, Talley was instructed by the extraction team lieutenant to face the wall.
Talley bases his claims on three sets of acts and omissions. First, he alleges that all defendants discriminated and retaliated against him under the ADA; violated his rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and committed the tort of "coercion"
Second, Talley claims that Paul and the Unknown Extraction Team Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and committed the tort of assault and battery when one assaulted him with the shield and the others failed to intervene or report the assault.
Third, he contends that Mascellino, Clark, Banta, Link and the Unknown Extraction Team Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution's "Cruel Punishment" clause
Talley seeks compensatory and punitive damages. He has withdrawn his demand for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Defendants argue that Talley fails to state an ADA claim against the DOC. They also contend that none of the alleged acts or omissions give rise to a § 1983 claim. They assert qualified immunity as to his federal claims and sovereign immunity as to his state claims.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A conclusory recitation of the elements of a cause of action is not sufficient. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must allege facts necessary to make out each element. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8). In other words, the complaint must contain facts which, if proven later, support a conclusion that a cause of action can be established.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must first separate the factual and legal elements of a claim, accepting the well-pleaded facts as true and disregarding legal conclusions. The court next determines whether the facts alleged, if proven, show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). In making this determination, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all inferences must be drawn in his favor. See McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).
The ADA makes it unlawful for public entities, including prisons, to discriminate against the disabled in providing services, programs and activities. Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm'r, N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004)); Chisholm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 325 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998)). To state an ADA claim, a plaintiff must allege "that he is a `qualified individual with a disability' [and] that he was excluded from a service, program, or activity of a public entity . . . because of his disability." Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 301 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)). Mental illness is a disability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
Talley asserts he was denied the opportunity to speak to a mental health professional prior to his removal from the POC. He does not claim that he was denied treatment "because of" his mental health issues.
Talley also claims that the failure to provide him an opportunity to consult with a mental health professional prior to his cell transfer constitutes retaliation under the ADA. To state a claim under the ADA for retaliation, Talley must allege facts showing (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse action after or contemporaneous with the protected activity, and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp. Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir.1997)). Talley appears to allege that the protected activity was his request to consult a mental health professional prior to his transfer and that the adverse action was the use of an extraction team to remove him from the POC by force. However, as the complaint alleges, Mascellino informed Talley that an extraction team would be assembled because he was refusing to leave the POC, not because he had requested a mental health consultation.
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The DOC, as a state agency, is not a "person" under § 1983. Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 769 F.3d 850, 847 (3d Cir. 2014). Nor do the facts pled by Talley establish a plausible constitutional violation against any individual defendant.
Talley's theory of Eighth Amendment liability
To state an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of the failure to treat his medical condition, Talley must plead sufficient facts that, if proven, would establish two elements: (1) he had a serious medical need; and (2) prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that need. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004).
A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). See also Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003). A medical condition is serious when the denial or delay of medical treatment causes "unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain." Monmouth Cty., 834 F.3d at 347.
Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is shown when: (1) a doctor intentionally inflicts pain on a prisoner; (2) a prison official denies reasonable requests for medical treatment, exposing the inmate to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury; or (3) an official intentionally refuses to provide care even though he is aware of the need for such care. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he disregards a known excessive risk to the inmate's health and safety. It is not enough that the official is aware of facts from which an inference can be drawn that the inmate is exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm. The official must actually draw that inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994).
Talley claims Doyle and Ladonne were deliberately indifferent when, without first examining him, they placed him in "the DTU where he could've easily gained access to something to harm himself with from one of the other inmates . . . ."
At most Talley alleges medical malpractice
Medical malpractice does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; Monmouth Cty., 834 F. 2d at 347. Likewise, disagreement as to proper medical treatment does not establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235-36.
The prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to Talley's suicidal ideation. Rather, they chose to handle it in a manner other than what he preferred. Thus, we shall dismiss Talley's Eighth Amendment claim.
The due process analysis starts with determining whether the liberty interest asserted is one that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Montanez v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 482-83 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Evans v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 663 (3d Cir. 2011)). If it is a protected interest, we must then determine what process is necessary to protect it. Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 783 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). If the interest is not protected, no process is necessary. Thus, at the threshold, the plaintiff must establish that he had a protected liberty interest that triggered due process rights. See Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that succeeding on a due process claim requires demonstrating that the plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest).
Prisoners do not enjoy the same liberty interests as ordinary citizens do. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). Incarceration "brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Id. (quoting Jones v. N. Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977)). "To rise to the level of a liberty interest, the right alleged must confer `freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" Williams v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 559 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997)) (emphasis in Griffin).
Talley appears to assert two Fourteenth Amendment violations, the transfer from the POC to the DTU and his placement in restraints once there. "An inmate does not have a right to be placed in the cell of his choice." Sheehan v. Beyer, 51 F.3d 1170, 1174 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)). "As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight." Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Accordingly, Talley has not stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on his placement in the DTU.
Talley was placed in a waist restraint belt after he was transferred from the POC to the DTU.
"Where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so." Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original) (citing Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). No exceptions apply here.
There is no reason to retain jurisdiction over Talley's state law claims. He may assert them in state court. See, e.g., Segers v. Williams, No. 13-2413, 2014 WL 285078, at *5 n.9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2014). Thus, we shall decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Because Talley failed to state a federal claim, we shall grant the defendants' motion. We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. Therefore, this action will be dismissed with prejudice as to the federal law claims and without prejudice as to the state law claims.
