SARA LIOI, District Judge.
Before the Court are two motions regarding the record in this case: (1) respondent's motion to expand the record (Doc. No. 28 ["R.Mot."]), which is unopposed; and (2) petitioner's motion for a court order allowing access to certain materials (Doc. No. 25 ["P.Mot."]), which has been opposed by respondent (Doc. No. 27 ["Opp'n"]).
On May 21, 2015, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion reversing one aspect of this Court's denial of a petition for habeas corpus. The court stated, in relevant part:
(Doc. No. 22 ["Opinion"] at 1992-93.)
(Id.)
This Court had denied Schwieterman's petition, in part, on the basis of procedural default, "credit[ing] the state appellate court's determination that the claim could and should have been raised on direct appeal[.]" (Id. at 1996.) The Sixth Circuit faulted the state court's "anomalous application of" the procedural default rule as an independent, adequate state ground for denying further review. It pointed out that "Ohio law prescribes the parallel paths Schwieterman took: directly appealing the issues supported by the record and bringing a separate collateral petition to address issues that required further factual development." (Id. at 1996-97.)
But this Court had also conducted what the Sixth Circuit characterized as a "limited merits analysis[.]" (Opinion at 1999.) This analysis was rejected due to application by this Court of a standard that was too onerous. The Sixth Circuit noted that the appropriate question is "whether reasonable counsel and a reasonable defendant would have accepted the state's facts and entered a no contest plea after reviewing the expert reconstruction." (Id.)
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit ruled as follows:
(Id. at 1999-2000.)
This unopposed motion seeks to add to this Court's record postconviction expert evidence that was presented to the state court along with Schwieterman's May 7, 2009 petition to vacate or set aside the judgment and conviction. (See Doc. No. 7-23, Return, Ex. 23.) The evidence includes:
Respondent cites Rule 7 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases as authority for "expanding" the record to include this evidence. However, this would not actually be an expansion of the record; rather, it would be inclusion of matters that were in the state court record and were not supplied to this Court. Further, the Sixth Circuit's remand requires inclusion of these materials in the record of this Court.
Accordingly, respondent's motion to "expand" the record (Doc. No. 28) is granted. The color photographs attached to the motion (Doc. No. 28-1) are hereby deemed part of the record. Further, the certified copy of the flash drive manually supplied to the Clerk shall be appropriately marked as filed and shall be placed in the file folder for this case.
In this motion, petitioner takes the position that the Sixth Circuit has ordered an "evidentiary hearing" in this case and that this Court cannot comply with the remand order without holding such a hearing. He believes that the evidence which now "expands" the record will require testimony and explanation by his expert.
In opposition to the motion, respondent argues that no evidentiary hearing is required and that none was ordered. He is of the view that the Sixth Circuit's remand order requires only a non-oral hearing or an oral argument wherein this Court would consider "the full state court record, including the reconstruction," to determine whether the state court judgment was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. (Opp'n at 2012, quoting Opinion at 1993.)
The Court concludes that, at this juncture, respondent has the better view. The Sixth Circuit has directed this Court to reexamine "whether the petitioner's plea counsel was ineffective in light of the postconviction expert evidence concerning how the accident occurred, including the video reconstruction evidence mistakenly witheld [sic] from the district court." (Opinion at 1999-2000.) The Sixth Circuit did not order an evidentiary hearing. That said, this Court is not precluded from later deciding, in the context of its reexaminationof the issue, that such a hearing would be advisable under Rule 8 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
Petitioner's current request, however, goes beyond the scope of both the remand and his habeas petition. This Court's role is to determine, based on the record as it now stands (with or without an evidentiary hearing), whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus due to ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilty plea stage of the state court proceedings. If "the facts contested by the petitioner's expert reconstruction" (Opinion at 1993) warrant granting the writ under clearly established federal law relating to ineffective assistance of counsel, and applying the standard identified by the Sixth Circuit, then it will be for the state court to determine in the first instance how to handle any issues relating to expert testimony.
Accordingly, the Court denies petitioner's motion (Doc. No. 25) without prejudice.