THOMAS E. JOHNSTON, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jesse James McGhee's Complaint seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner"). (ECF No. 2.) By standing order entered on May 7, 2014 and filed in this case on June 9, 2014, this action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert for submission of proposed findings and recommendations for disposition (the "PF&R"). (ECF No. 4.) On July 10, 2015, Magistrate Judge Eifert entered her PF&R, in which she recommends that this Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Plaintiff's Motion"), (ECF No. 11), grant Defendant's request for judgment on the pleadings, (ECF No. 13), and affirm the final decision of the Commissioner. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff filed timely objections to the PF&R on July 24, 2015 (the "Objections"). (ECF No. 15.)
For the reasons that follow, the Court
The facts concerning this matter are fully set forth in the PF&R and need not be repeated here at length. In short, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits, supplemental security income, and child's insurance benefits on October 29, 2010, alleging disability as of June 28, 2009. (ECF No. 9-6 at 24-31, 47-53.) The applications were initially denied on April 8, 2011, (ECF No. 9-4 at 18-32), and upon reconsideration on July 5, 2011, (id. at 35-55).
A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge William R. Paxton (the "ALJ") on January 14, 2013. (ECF No. 9-2 at 27-53.) On January 24, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision.
The Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendations to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party "makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
"Under the Social Security Act, [a reviewing court] must uphold the factual findings of the Secretary if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ."); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) ("A factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law."). Substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). "[I]t consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (alteration in original) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). "In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should] not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Secretary." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990)). If "conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled," the Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision. Id. (citing Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Plaintiff "bears the burden of proving that he is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act." English v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) and Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981)). "The term `disability' means . . . inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Commissioner uses a five-step "sequential evaluation" process to evaluate a disability claim.
Plaintiff's sole objection is to Magistrate Judge Eifert's finding in the PF&R that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff's symptoms. (See ECF No. 15 at 2-4.) The Court overrules this objection for the following reasons.
Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(a) and 404.1529(a), "the determination of whether a person is disabled by pain or other symptoms is a two-step process." Craig, 76 F.3d at 594; see also Soc. Sec. Admin., SSR 96-7p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual's Statements (1996) (describing the "two-step process for evaluating symptoms"). Under the first step, "there must be objective medical evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged." Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b) & 404.1529(b)). "At this stage of the inquiry, the pain claimed is not directly at issue; the focus is instead on establishing a determinable underlying impairment . . . which could reasonably be expected to be the cause of the disabling pain asserted by the claimant." Id.
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff "has the following severe impairments: pseudoseizures, syncope orthostatic hypotension, tachycardia, hypertension, obesity, degenerative disc disease of the thoracic and lumbar spine, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease." (ECF No. 9-2 at 16.) The ALJ then found that these impairments satisfy the first step of the inquiry into whether Plaintiff is disabled by pain or other symptoms. (See id. at 19 ("[T]he undersigned finds that the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.").)
Plaintiff's objection relates to the second step in this analysis. Under the second step, "the intensity and persistence of the claimant's pain, and the extent to which it affects [the claimant's] ability to work, must be evaluated." Craig, 76 F.3d at 595 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(c)(1) & 404.1529(c)(1)); see also SSR 96-7p (providing that, under the second step, "the adjudicator must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual's symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit the individual's ability to do basic work activities"). "Because pain is subjective and cannot always be confirmed by objective indicia, claims of disabling pain may not be rejected solely because the available objective evidence does not substantiate the claimant's statements as to the severity and persistence of [their] pain." Craig, 76 F.3d at 595 (citations omitted). However, "a claimant's allegations about [their] pain . . . need not be accepted to the extent they are inconsistent with the available evidence, including objective evidence of the underlying impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can reasonably be expected to cause the pain the claimant alleges [they] suffer." Id.; cf. Smith v. Astrue, 457 F. App'x 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2011) ("[G]reat weight is afforded to subjective evidence when it is either uncontradicted or supported by substantial evidence." (citing Combs v. Weinberger, 501 F.2d 1361, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1974))). The Fourth Circuit noted the following regarding this secondstep analysis:
Craig, 76 F.3d at 595 (citations omitted); see also SSR 96-7p ("[W]henever the individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the adjudicator must make a finding on the credibility of the individual's statements based on a consideration of the entire case record.").
At this second stage of the analysis, the ALJ found that "the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely credible" and do not limit Plaintiff's ability to work to the extent he claims. (ECF No. 9-2 at 20-23.) Magistrate Judge Eifert found that substantial evidence supports this determination. (ECF No. 14 at 32.) Plaintiff nonetheless argues that this finding is incorrect
The ALJ provided a detailed description of Plaintiff's claims regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms. (See ECF No. 9-2 at 19.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's statements regarding his symptoms were not "entirely credible" for two reasons. First, the ALJ provided a thorough description of Plaintiff's treatment record and found that "the frequency and severity of [Plaintiff's] reported [symptoms] is not supported" by this record. (Id. at 20-23). Indeed, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff underwent an extensive battery of tests, which failed to corroborate Plaintiff's allegations regarding his feinting spells.
Second, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff provided contradictory statements regarding the severity of his symptoms and "at times greatly minimized" the limitations on his "activities of daily living." (Id. at 21-23.) For example, Plaintiff alleged on his function report that he required the use of a wheelchair, but the ALJ "documented that [Plaintiff] does not use a cane, walker, or wheelchair." (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff also "told Drs. Gallagher and Faulkner that he had not passed out since his last visit three months earlier," but subsequently "denied that he said this" and "reported that he had passed out the week before the appointment," which he then modified by "elaborate[ing] that he might have gone one or two months without a syncopal episode." (Id. at 19.) Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's counsel asserted "that even the smallest of activities increase [Plaintiff's] symptoms," (id. at 19), but Plaintiff "indicated on his function report forms or testified that he can still watch television, perform some household chores, prepare small meals, attend medical appointments, go for rides, build computers, play on his computer, and talk on the phone for three or four hours," (id. at 22).
The Court finds that the ALJ performed the proper analysis when analyzing Plaintiff's assertions of pain and other symptoms. The ALJ described, in detail, Plaintiff's statements regarding his symptoms. (See id. at 19.) However, the ALJ properly viewed the entire record and, based on this review, found that Plaintiff's assertions were not "entirely credible." (See id. at 19-23.) Additionally, based on the objective evidence and Plaintiff's contradictory statements regarding his symptoms, the ALJ's credibility determination is undoubtedly supported by substantial evidence. (See id.) Ultimately, the ALJ performed the proper analysis and it is not the province of this Court to challenge the ALJ's credibility determination upon review. See, e.g., Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)) ("In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should] not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Secretary." (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990))). The Court must therefore defer to the ALJ's credibility determination. See, e.g., id.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
The Court
658 F.2d at 264-65; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920 (providing the "sequential evaluation" analysis).
In the context of reviewing agency actions, "courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action; . . . an agency's discretionary order [may] be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself." Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962); see also id. at 169 ("[A] simple but fundamental rule of administrative law . . . is . . . that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action." (citation omitted)). "While [a court] may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given, we will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may be reasonably discerned." Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974) (citations omitted).
Insofar as this principle of judicial review of agency action is implicated in the present case, Plaintiff's "post hoc" argument clearly misapprehends the Magistrate Judge's analysis. In the PF&R, Magistrate Judge Eifert notes that the ALJ identified two overarching discrepancies between Plaintiff's assertions regarding his symptoms and the record, as a whole: (1) the objective evidence did not support Plaintiff's assertions; and (2) Plaintiff provided numerous contradictory statements. (See ECF No. 14 at 27-32.) Magistrate Judge Eifert then found that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination based on this record and did not "as Plaintiff argues" supply a reasoned basis for the ALJ's determination that was absent from the ALJ's decision. (See id.) This analysis does not raise any "post hoc" concerns and, as such, the Court
The Court notes that Plaintiff's counsel has recently raised similar "post hoc" arguments with increasing frequency. The Court encourages Plaintiff's counsel to consider the statement of law provided above regarding such arguments "and the application of this legal standard to the facts of each case" prior to making similar arguments in future cases before this Court.
