REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GARY M. PURCELL, Magistrate Judge.

Petitioner, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss based primarily on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the following reasons, it is recommended the Petition be dismissed as moot.

I. Background

Petitioner filed this action on October 11, 2018. Doc. No. 1. He asserted the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") had incorrectly calculated his federal sentence by failing to give him credit for time spent in custody upon his initial arrest and detention. Id. at 6-7. He also stated that without the time served for which he has not been given credit, his release date was December 12, 2018. Id. at 7.

On November 28, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to initiating this action and, in the alternative, he is not entitled to the credit requested. Doc. No. 12. Petitioner did not respond to the Motion to Dismiss and the BOP website indicates he was released from custody on December 10, 2018.1

II. Legal Standard

A district court is only authorized to issue a writ of habeas corpus when the Petitioner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). An action brought by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is one that challenges the execution of a sentence. See Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 833 (10th Cir. 2005); McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[A] § 2241 attack on the execution of a sentence may challenge some matters that occur at prison, such as deprivation of good-time credits and other prison disciplinary matters . . . ."); see also Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) ("A motion pursuant to §2241 generally . . . [includes] such matters as the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of detention and prison conditions.").

III. Mootness

As previously noted, the BOP's inmate locator website indicates Petitioner was released from custody on December 10, 2018. See, supra. Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may only adjudicate live controversies. Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009). An "actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." Id. (quotations omitted); see also McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction."). A case becomes moot if an event occurs during the pendency of the action that "makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party." Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992); see also id. ("It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it." (quotations omitted)). See also Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 568 F.3d 784, 794 (10th Cir. 2009) ("If, during the pendency of the case, circumstances change such that [a party's] legally cognizable interest in a case is extinguished, the case is moot, and dismissal may be required." (quotations and citation omitted)).

Once Petitioner was released from custody, he no longer had a redressable injury arising from the BOP's alleged error in calculating his sentence. "[T]he best this court could do for him would be to declare [in an advisory opinion] that he spent longer in prison than he should have," which is not enough to satisfy Article III. Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 935 (10th Cir. 2012). See also See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998) (stating that the federal courts "are not in the business of pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong.").

To continue to present a live case or controversy under § 2241 after being released from custody, Petitioner must allege "some concrete and continuing injury." Lucero v. McKune, 340 F. App'x 442, 443-44 (10th Cir. 2009). Petitioner's filings present no clear allegations regarding a continuing injury. Accordingly, Petitioner's action should be dismissed as moot. Lucero, 340 F. App'x at 444.2

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be DISMISSED as moot. Petitioner is advised of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by January 28th, 2019, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, or by such date in conformity with Temporary General Order No. 18-2 entered on December 26, 2018, whichever is later. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.").

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not specifically addressed herein is denied.