NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, District Judge.
Petitioner Kenneth O'Connor ("Petitioner"), a Pennsylvania state prisoner acting pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he asserts that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("Commonwealth"), as the prosecutor, violated his constitutional rights by withholding exculpatory evidence of an eyewitness contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). [ECF 1]. In accordance with Title 28 U.S.C § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 72.1.IV(c), the petition was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Henry S. Perkin for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). [ECF 2]. On April 21, 2016, Magistrate Judge Perkin issued an R&R, which recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. [ECF 17]. Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R. [ECF 19]. The matter before this Court is, therefore, ripe for disposition.
Upon a thorough and independent de novo review of the state record and court filings, for the reasons stated herein, this Court overrules Petitioner's objections, approves and adopts the R&R, and denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On September 16, 2008, Petitioner was tried with co-defendant Patrick Horgan, without a jury before the Honorable M. Teresa Sarmina in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and found guilty of murder of the third degree. The facts underlying Petitioner's conviction were summarized by the Superior Court and quoted in the R&R as follows:
Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 2014 WL 10786855, at *1-3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 2014) (alteration in original).
Following his conviction, Petitioner was sentenced on October 30, 2008, to a term of eight to twenty years imprisonment, followed by 20 years probation. Petitioner filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on March 9, 2009. Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On May 17, 2010, the Superior Court rejected Petitioner's claims, and affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 4 A.3d 194 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 17, 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on October 26, 2010. See Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 9 A.3d 628 (Pa. 2010). Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.
On October 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for collateral review under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). Counsel was appointed, and on May 24, 2012, PCRA counsel filed an amended petition. Following an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's PCRA claims, on November 30, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. By memorandum decision dated December 24, 2014, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's dismissal. See Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 2014 WL 10786855 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 2014).
On March 31, 2015, Petitioner filed the underlying pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [ECF 1]. In his habeas petition, Petitioner asserts that the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence regarding a key eyewitness, Janice Joniec, in violation of the Commonwealth's disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Specifically, Petitioner contends that the Commonwealth withheld evidence that allegedly showed that Ms. Joniec was essentially coerced into testifying against Petitioner.
The habeas petition was referred to the Honorable Magistrate Judge Henry S. Perkin for a report and recommendation. [ECF 2]. After considering the parties' submissions and the underlying state court record, Magistrate Judge Perkin submitted a well-reasoned R&R which addressed Petitioner's habeas claims, and recommended that the petition be denied. Petitioner filed objections to the R&R, in which he essentially argues that the conclusion of the Magistrate Judge is wrong. For the reasons that follow, this Court disagrees, and approves and adopts the R&R.
Where objections to an R&R are filed, the court must conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of the R&R, see Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C)), provided the objections are both timely and specific. Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 607 (3d Cir. 1984). In conducting its de novo review, a court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the factual findings or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Although the review is de novo, the statute permits the court to rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1980); Goney, 749 F.2d at 7.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") amended the standards for reviewing state court judgments raised in federal habeas corpus petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). AEDPA increased the deference federal courts must give to the factual findings and legal determinations of the state courts. Id. at 196. Thus, in accordance with § 2254(d), a habeas corpus petition may only be granted if the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
To establish that the state court decision was "contrary to" federal law, "it is not sufficient for the petitioner to show merely that his interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is more plausible than the state court's; rather, the petitioner must demonstrate that Supreme Court precedent requires the contrary outcome." Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 888 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original). Similarly, a federal court may only find a state court decision to be an "unreasonable application" of federal law if the decision, "evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent." Id. at 890. "[T]he requirements of 2254(d) are difficult to meet." Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). This section "sharply limits the circumstances in which a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner." Id. at 1094.
Further, factual determinations made by the state court are "presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with "clear and convincing evidence" of the state court's error. Id. "This presumption of correctness applies to factual determinations of both state trial and appellate courts." Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 111 (3d Cir. 2009). Consequently, a habeas petitioner "must clear a high hurdle before a federal court will set aside any of the state court's factual findings." Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d 590, 597-98 (1st Cir. 2001).
As stated, in his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner claims that the Commonwealth withheld evidence regarding eyewitness Janice Joniec in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Specifically, Petitioner contends that the Commonwealth suppressed evidence that the police "arrested her illegally" on the night before Petitioner's preliminary hearing, that the police "promised the benefit of release from jail if she cooperated with the Commonwealth," that the police "threatened to prosecute her with perjury if she refused to cooperate," and that corrections officers "threatened [her] with the disciplinary punishment of solitary confinement if she refused to attend court." (Petitioner's Memorandum at 5, 10, 19, 20). The Pennsylvania Superior Court, on the appeal of the dismissal of Petitioner's PCRA petition, rejected this claim on the merits.
After carefully reviewing the entire record, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the Superior Court's determination that the allegedly suppressed coercion evidence regarding Ms. Joniec was not material, was correct, and was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. In his objections to the R&R, rather than articulating a specific objection to the R&R, Petitioner repeats the identical arguments made in the habeas petition regarding the Commonwealth's alleged withholding of evidence that law enforcement officers essentially coerced a key eyewitness into providing incriminating testimony against him.
When addressing the merits of a Brady claim on habeas review, the applicable and "clearly established federal law" is the familiar test articulated by the Supreme Court in Brady and its progeny; to wit: that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. . . ." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. "Impeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Under the Brady progeny, the prosecution has an affirmative "duty to disclose such evidence . . . even though there has been no request [for the evidence] by the accused." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (citations omitted). This affirmative obligation "encompases evidence `known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.'" Id. at 280-81 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995)). However, the failure to disclose favorable evidence alone is not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2013). A habeas petitioner is only entitled to relief when: "(1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the state; and (3) the evidence is material." Id.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the "materiality" requirement of Brady as follows:
Id. at 128-29 (citations and quotations omitted). "The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.
Petitioner advances no argument in either his objections or the habeas petition that the Superior Court decision affirming the denial of PCRA relief, is contrary to extant United States Supreme Court precedent, or that the test applied by the state court was inconsistent with the test established in Brady and its progeny. Clearly, he cannot. When ruling on Petitioner's PCRA appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court correctly considered and applied the governing test for Brady claims. See Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 2014 WL 10786855, at *5-6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 2014) (citing to and applying the Brady test to Petitioner's claim and concluding that the challenged evidence was not "material" as required to obtain post-conviction relief under Brady). Therefore, its decision cannot be regarded as "contrary to" the test established in Brady and its progeny.
The dispositive question then becomes whether the Superior Court's opinion reflects an unreasonable application of the Brady test. To meet his burden, Petitioner must demonstrate that the state court's decision evaluated on the merits objectively, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under Brady. Here, the Superior Court determined that the allegedly suppressed coercion evidence regarding eyewitness Ms. Joniec was not "material," as required to grant habeas relief. In reaching this conclusion, the Superior Court considered and summarized Ms. Joniec's testimony provided during the PCRA hearing, as follows:
O'Connor, 2014 WL 10786855, at *5-6.
As noted by the Superior Court, although Ms. Joniec testified that she told law enforcement that she did not wish to testify in court, she also testified that she did not feel any pressure from law enforcement to testify untruthfully, and that her testimony against Petitioner at trial was, in fact, truthful. In light of these assertions, this Court finds, as did the Magistrate Judge, that it was objectively reasonable for the Superior Court to conclude that the allegedly withheld evidence was not material to Petitioner's defense.
Assuming, however, as Petitioner would like this Court to do, that Ms. Joniec's appearance and testimony was coerced, other compelling evidence of Petitioner's guilt existed beyond that provided by Ms. Joniec. The Superior Court referenced another eyewitness, Peter Fedorin, who testified at trial that Petitioner and his accomplice beat the victim to death. This testimony was buttressed by Officer James Strohm, who testified that Petitioner was outside the victim's apartment shortly before the murder, and that Petitioner told the officer that he was there to "beat the s[**]t out of [the victim]." Id. at *6. Indeed, Petitioner conceded at trial that he was in the victim's apartment when the victim was killed, and that he (Petitioner) pushed the victim, grabbed him and fell onto the kitchen table with him. (N.T. 9/12/08, at 232-235).
In light of the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner's guilt, this Court finds that even if the Commonwealth had produced the allegedly withheld evidence, it cannot be said that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different. As such, the Superior Court's decision on this issue is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor is it an unreasonable determination of the facts. Therefore, finding no basis for relief, the habeas corpus petition is denied.
For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner's objections to the Report and Recommendation are overruled, the Report and Recommendation is approved and adopted, and Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. In addition, because reasonable jurists would not debate this Court's disposition of Petitioner's claims, a certificate of appealability is denied. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion follows.
