ORDER

DAVID E. PEEBLES, Magistrate Judge.

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), and 1383(c)(3) are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on April 7, 2017, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

THE COURT: I have before me a request for judicial review of an adverse determination by the Acting Commissioner. The review is sought under 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) and 1383(c).

The background is as follows. The plaintiff was born in September of 1967. He is currently 49 years old. He was 47 at the time of the hearing and 45 at the alleged onset of his disability. He lives in Auburn with a nine-year-old son in a second floor apartment which he accesses by stairway.

He has a GED. He last worked in May of 2013. The Administrative Transcript at 31 through 33 and 191 reveals that the plaintiff had a variety of positions, including assembly, construction and home remodeling, as a forklift driver, as a kitchen worker, and as a laborer.

Medically he suffers from several diagnosed conditions. He has a heart condition which has been diagnosed as high-degree AV block. Although at 226 to 235 there does not appear to be evidence of coronary disease. At 230 he reports symptoms of intermittent dizziness and lightheadedness. In June of 2013 he underwent a pacemaker implant.

He suffers from a shoulder condition, underwent surgery on June 13, 2014 by Dr. Jeffrey Giuliani. That's at pages 400-402. As we discussed during the oral argument, on October 10, 2014 he reported that his pain had significantly improved, that he was satisfied with the surgery and had minimal pain and no need for medication for his shoulder. That's at page 390 of the Administrative Transcript.

Plaintiff suffers from a lumbar back condition. For that he has seen primarily Dr. Renee Ryan, who is a general medical practitioner. He underwent a CT myelogram on September 25, 2014, that's at page 508 to 509, which disclosed minimum disc bulging, no evidence of root compression, no foraminal or central stenosis.

The plaintiff uses a cane to help him stand and walk, and that was prescribed by Dr. Ryan. That's at page 431 of the Administrative Transcript.

The plaintiff has been diagnosed by Auburn Orthopedic Specialists, at page 505, as suffering from lumbago and sciatica.

In terms of daily activities, among other things testified at the hearing and also at 362, which I believe is Dr. Ganesh's report, he reported that he cooks, cleans, showers, dresses, watches television, reads, and takes care of his son.

Procedurally, the plaintiff applied for Title II and Title XVI benefits under the Social Security Act on August 2, 2013, alleging an onset date of May 29, 2013. In that he listed sleep apnea, heart condition, pacemaker, and lower back pain as his medical conditions imposing limitations. That's at page 189.

A hearing was conducted by John Ramos, Administrative Law Judge, on January 6, 2015. ALJ Ramos issued a decision on March 11, 2015 that was unfavorable to the plaintiff. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on May 23, 2016, making the ALJ's decision a final determination of the Agency.

In his decision ALJ Ramos applied the now familiar five step sequential test for determining disability.

At step one he concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date.

At step two he concluded that plaintiff suffers from several severe impairments, including a history of right shoulder surgery, history of heart blockage, lumbago, sciatica, and obesity.

At step three he concluded that the plaintiff's conditions did not either meet or medically equal either singly or in combination any of the listed presumptively disabling conditions. He considered listings 1.02, 1.04 and 4.05, and relied on the opinions of Dr. Plotz primarily for making that determination.

The ALJ then went on to conclude that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity, or RFC, to perform sedentary work, except that he can never kneel, crouch, or crawl; he can occasionally stoop, balance and climb; he can never tolerate exposure to unprotected heights; and he can occasionally tolerate exposure to extreme cold and extreme heat.

The Administrative Law Judge then concluded at step four that the plaintiff cannot perform any of his past relevant work.

And at step five applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, or the grids, set forth in the Commissioner's regulations, and after concluding that the limitations experienced by plaintiff do not sufficiently erode the job base on which the grids are predicated as to require vocational expert testimony, concluded that under the grids, and particularly Rule 201.21, a finding of not disabled is directed.

As you know, my standard of review — my task is limited. The standard of review is that correct legal principles were applied in determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination. Obviously, at the heart of plaintiff's argument is that the treating physician opinion of Dr. Renee Ryan was improperly rejected as controlling, although counsel has withdrawn that argument considerably, but argues that it is nonetheless entitled to weight and that in determining the extent of the weight given, the Administrative Law Judge failed to apply the factors set forth in the regulations.

Clearly the regulations require in determining what weight to give or assign to a treating physician's opinions, the regulations require that the ALJ consider the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the degree to which the medical source has supported his or her opinion, the degree of consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole, whether the opinion is given by a specialist, and other evidence which may be brought to the attention of the ALJ. That's at 20 CFR Sections 404.1527 and 416.927.

I am sensitive to the sheer volume of cases that Administrative Law Judges deal with. Does ALJ Ramos slavishly recite those and discuss those parameters and factors in his decision? No. But as defendant's counsel has indicated, he does go through a fairly thorough analysis of the medical records, and at pages 18 and 19 provides an indication of why he does not believe that Dr. Ryan's opinions are worthy of controlling weight. He does not specifically say the degree of weight that he is giving the opinion, but I think you can read between the lines, and the Second Circuit has been very clear that, although I'm cognizant of the Greek decision, in Atwater versus Astrue, 512 F.App'x 67, as long as the reasoning is clear, slavish recitation of the factors need not be made.

In this case, as I indicated in oral argument, it's pretty clear Dr. Ryan's opinions are outliers; they're not supported by the objective medical evidence, they're not supported by her own treatment notes, and they're certainly inconsistent with the opinions of Dr. Plotz, which is rendered based on a review of the entire record after the opinion of Dr. Ryan was given. And also it's inconsistent with Dr. Ganesh, Dr. Ganesh's consultative report, although I acknowledge that that occurred several months before the report from Dr. Ryan.

But, in sum, I believe that the rejection of Dr. Ryan's report either as controlling or as entitled to significant weight is explained and is supported. So the rationale I think is clear. And so I think the Jones case, which was cited by the Commissioner, Jones versus Colvin, it's a Northern District case, 2017 WL 758511, controls and shows that since the rationale is clear, the rejection is proper.

Dr. Ryan is not a specialist; she's a primary care doctor. As I indicated, her opinions are inconsistent with Dr. Ganesh and Dr. Plotz. To the extent that she argues or asserts that plaintiff is disabled, that's at 507, that is a matter that's reserved to the Commissioner. Her opinions are inconsistent with the plaintiff's daily activities, with the treatment notes, many of which show that plaintiff's gait was normal, and there are pages cited by the respondent that bear that out. It's inconsistent with the CT myelogram, and it appears to be based solely on plaintiff's subjective complaints.

So, I don't find any error and will, therefore, award judgment on the pleadings to the defendant.

Thank you both for excellent arguments. I hope you have a good weekend.

CERTIFICATION

I, EILEEN MCDONOUGH, RPR, CRR, Federal Official Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.