THOMAS M. ROSE, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion") filed by both remaining Defendants: the Board of County Commissioners of Clark County, Ohio ("County Board") and the Clark County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department" and, collectively, "Defendants"). (Doc. 26.) Plaintiff Derrick Lake ("Lake") filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion (the "Response"). (Doc. 28.) Defendants filed a reply in support of the Motion (the "Reply"). (Doc. 29.) The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
Lake brings two counts against the Defendants
Lake was born deaf. He is fluent in American Sign Language ("ASL"). On the evening of February 15, 2018, Lake was arrested by the Springfield Police Department on an outstanding warrant. He was then transported to the Clark County Jail, where he arrived at approximately 6:00 p.m. Clark County deputy sheriff Shane Groves ("Deputy Groves") was working at the county jail at the time of Lake's arrival. Prior to starting the booking process for Lake, Deputy Groves was informed that Lake was deaf.
Deputy Groves wrote a note to Lake that asked Lake if he could read and write well. Lake wrote "Yeah." The note then states the following:
Deputy Groves provided Lake with a medical screening questionnaire that is given to every inmate who enters the general population. Lake placed a slash over "no" in response to each of the questions on that questionnaire that required an inmate response.
Following Lake's communications with Deputy Groves, Clark County deputy sheriff Brad Barnhart ("Deputy Barnhart") also inquired as to Lake's ability to understand English. Deputy Barnhart wrote a note to Lake asking if Lake could wait until the morning to use an interpreter at court at 10:30 a.m. Deputy Barnhart wrote "Yes" and "No" on the note and pointed to those responses; Lake indicated that his answer was "Yes" (with that word being circled on the note), meaning that he could wait until morning for an interpreter.
At Lake's deposition in this case, the following exchanges took place, with Lake's answers being provided through a sign language interpreter:
(Doc. 25 at PAGEID # 113-118.)
At the county jail, Lake was issued the same items that any other inmate would have received, including a blanket, mattress, hygiene items, and jail clothing. He also was offered food and took a shower. He was placed in a pod with other inmates, and he had his own cell (as did the other inmates on that pod). No interpreter was provided to Lake at the county jail. Lake was released from the jail following a court hearing the next morning (February 16, 2018) at approximately 11:15 a.m. According to the Defendants, Lake did not conduct any discovery in this case.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Alternatively, summary judgment is denied "[i]f there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Once the burden of production has shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rule 56 "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. "There must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. The inquiry, then, is whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict. Id.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[a] district court is not... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim." InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091 (1990). The Court relies on the Rule 56 evidence called to its attention by the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e).
In the Motion and Reply, Defendants make five arguments. (See Docs. 26 and 29.) First, they argue that the Sherriff's Department is not an entity capable of being sued. Second, they argue that the Rehabilitation Act claim fails as a matter of law because there is no evidence that the "program or activity" at issue receives federal funding. Third, they argue that Lake was not discriminated against. Fourth, they argue that, even if Lake was discriminated against (which they deny), he cannot recover compensatory damages because there is no evidence of
Lake does not address Defendants' first, second, or fifth arguments in his Response. (Doc. 28.) Lake's Response also does not address whether the alleged discrimination was intentional. Instead, the Response argues that Lake was discriminated against under the ADA because the Defendants "failed to make reasonable accommodations [
Defendants argue that the Sheriff's Department should be dismissed from the case because it is not a legal entity capable of being sued. (Doc. 26 at PAGEID # 154.) Lake failed to respond to this argument, and the Court finds that Defendants' cited authority supports their position. See, e.g., Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 571 F. App'x 426, 435 (6th Cir. 2014) ("[t]he district court explained that the Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Department is not sui juris, and therefore the claims against it should be dismissed. Plaintiff did not argue to the contrary before the district court... [and,] as the district court correctly noted, federal courts have held that, under Ohio law, a county sheriff's office is not a legal entity that is capable of being sued. ... Therefore dismissal of the claims against the Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Department was proper"); Ebbing v. Butler Cnty., Ohio, No. 1:09-cv-39, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125029, at *8, 2010 WL 596470 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2009) (collecting cases) (recommending that plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add a county sheriff's department as a defendant be denied because "Ohio and federal courts agree that a county sheriff's department is not sui juris"), report and recommendation adopted by 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13233, 2010 WL 596470 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 16, 2010). See also Jackson v. Adult Parole Authority, No. 1:19-cv-2339, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23120, at *5, 2020 WL 639187 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2020) (dismissing ADA claim and holding that the county sheriff's office was not a proper party to the action because it is "not sui juris, meaning [it is] not [a] separate legal entit[y] under Ohio law that can sue or be sued"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (indicating law to be applied in determining capacity to sue or be sued).
As noted above, Lake brings a claim against the County Board under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. (Doc. 1.) That statute states, in relevant part, the following: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance...." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Sixth Circuit has held that:
Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 1995) (alterations in original
Defendants argue that, "[b]ecause there is no evidence that the Clark County Jail, Clark County Sheriff's Office or Clark County, Ohio for that matter receives federal funds, Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act must be dismissed." (Doc. 26 at PAGEID # 156.) Once again, Lake failed to respond to this argument, and the Court agrees with Defendants' argument and finds that Defendants' cited authority supports their position. See, e.g., Ewbank v. Gallatin Cnty., Kentucky, No. 03-156, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1578, at *13-15 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 17, 2006) (granting county's motion for summary judgment on Rehabilitation Act claim where the plaintiffs failed to offer any proof that the defendant was a recipient of federal funds); Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F. App'x 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of Rehabilitation Act claim because the plaintiff "offered no evidence that the Randall County jail received federal funds, so the [Rehabilitation Act] is inapplicable to his claims"). As in Ewbank, Lake has not offered—or even attempted to offer—any evidence whatsoever that "[t]he relevant program or activity is receiving Federal financial assistance," an element of his claim. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1030-31. The County Board is entitled to summary judgment on Count II of the Complaint.
The case of Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2008), dealt with a claim similar to Lake's claim. In Tucker, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of two government entities on the claims of the plaintiffs—individuals who were allegedly deaf and mute—that the government entities failed to provide reasonable accommodation(s) under the ADA at their arrest, post-arrest detention, initial appearance, or disposition hearing. Tucker, 539 F.3d at 528-30. The court held that, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified; and (3) he was being excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program because of his disability.
"If the plaintiff meets these requirements, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the accommodation provided was either effective, or that the accommodation sought and not provided would have resulted in a fundamental alteration of the procedures or an undue financial or administrative burden." Tucker, 539 F.3d at 532-33. The Sixth Circuit also noted that "the requirements of Title II [of the ADA] are subject to the bounds of reasonableness" and that "the federal regulations that have been promulgated to effectuate compliance by public entities make clear that the duty upon public entities is not absolute." Id. at 532.
Lake argues that his claim is one concerning "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA.
The Response wholly fails to address Defendants' argument that, even if Deputy Groves and Deputy Barnhart intentionally discriminated against Lake (which they deny), the County Board cannot be vicariously liable for such conduct and Lake has not provided evidence to support a direct liability claim against the County Board. (Doc. 26 at PAGEID # 160.) Defendants cite a number of recent cases to support their argument that there is no vicarious liability under Title II of the ADA.
The cases cited by the Defendants provide a thorough discussion and analysis to support their conclusion that a public entity cannot be held liable under Title II of the ADA. For example, the recent Jones case from the Eastern District of Michigan explains the ADA's remedial scheme and the relationship between the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, Title VI, and Title IX, finding that "the Supreme Court's decision to prohibit respondeat superior liability under Title IX extends to Title VI, which in turn extends to the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA because those statutes incorporate the remedies of Title VI by reference." Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93018, at *13-17. The court in Jones then explained that, therefore, the plaintiff's claim pursuant to Title II of the ADA does not survive because "Jones does not take issue with a municipal policy, practice, or custom. Instead, Jones seeks to hold the City liable under the ADA for its police officer's failure to reasonably accommodate him during his post-arrest transport." Id. A similar scenario is presented here.
Lake has not addressed Defendants' argument concerning vicarious liability, has not addressed any of the cases cited by the Defendants in support of their argument, and has not set forth evidence that would support a direct claim under Title II of the ADA against the County Board in light of the caselaw set forth by Defendants.
In summary, the Court agrees with Defendants' first, second, and fifth arguments in their Motion. The Court neither condones nor condemns the specific conduct at issue. Instead, the Court simply finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, on the claims against them.
For the reasons stated above, the Court
