JAMES S. GWIN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Shannon Most alleges that Defendant BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. ("BWXT") violated Ohio anti-discrimination laws by firing him. Plaintiff Most claims that BWXT fired him because he has a disability, and that BWXT refused to accommodate his disability, and retaliated against him for asserting his legal rights. BWXT now seeks summary judgment on all of these claims.
For the following reasons, the Court
Plaintiff Most has a diagnosed case of social anxiety disorder.
This disorder prevents Most from speaking in front of groups larger than three or four people.
Defendant BWXT manufactures nuclear reactor components for the U.S. Navy. On April 4, 2016, BWXT hired Plaintiff Most to work as a Senior Numerical Control Programmer (hereinafter "NC Programmer") at its Euclid, Ohio facility.
During his job application process, Plaintiff did not disclose that he had social anxiety disorder.
Plaintiff began working for BWXT at the same time as another new NC Programmer, Mike Paulocsak.
After two weeks of training, Most had not progressed as quickly as expected.
On May 8, Plaintiff Most informed Defendant BWXT that he had spoken with the Ohio Unemployment Agency as well as other people with a human resources background, and that he wished to inform BWXT that he had a social anxiety disorder protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act.
It is unclear how Most's restrictions affected the billable portions of his work. NC Programmers generally worked on billable projects alone. Only when the machining equipment has broken down do NC Programmers need to speak with others.
During this process, BWXT requested medical documentation supporting Most's social anxiety disorder diagnosis.
On May 24, Most's supervisor had a conversation with him about his lack of improvement.
BWXT terminated Most on June 6, 2016.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, "[s]ummary judgment is proper when `there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"
When parties present competing versions of the facts on summary judgment, a district court adopts the non-movant's version of the facts unless incontrovertible evidence in the record directly contradicts that version.
Plaintiff Most brings claims against Defendant BWXT for disability discrimination, refusal to accommodate, and protected activity retaliation. Ultimately, all of Most's claims suffer the same fatal flaw: he has provided no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that BWXT fired him because of his disability instead of his well-documented failure to perform his job's core function of producing billable work.
Plaintiff Most claims that Defendant BWXT discriminated against him because of his disability and retaliated against him for engaging in protected conduct related to his disability in violation of Ohio law.
If an employee establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Plaintiff Most can attempt to show pretext by proving that BWXT's stated nondiscriminatory reasons for termination were insufficient to merit his firing, that its stated reasons for his firing were factually false, or that BWXT did not honestly believe in its stated reasoning.
To state a retaliation claim, an employee must prove that: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer knew that the employee had engaged in the protected activity; (3) the employer engaged in some retaliatory conduct; and (4) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision.
Most's discrimination and retaliation claims fail because he has not shown that he could perform the essential functions of an NC Programmer, regardless of his requested accommodation. He also has not shown that BWXT's stated motivation for firing him — his performance issues — was a pretext for either discrimination or retaliation.
In its termination letter, BWXT offered three reasons for why it fired Most: he did not meet the company's performance standards; his requested accommodation was unreasonable; and he failed to provide BWXT with the requested medical documentation of his disability.
Four facts contradict Most's argument that his performance woes were merely pretext for a discriminatory or retaliatory firing. First, Defendant warned Most that he was not performing adequately before he ever self-identified as having a disability.
Second, BWXT provided Most with additional training above and beyond what most new hires needed.
Third, Most argues for his competency in two ways: (1) that he was capable of performing billable work, but BWXT withheld that work from him after he self-identified; and (2) that he performed some billable work after he self-identified but did not bill that work because he had a question about billing practices that went unanswered.
The second strand of this argument is supported by record evidence that undercuts the first. Plaintiff Most states that he performed approximately fifty hours of billable work after he self-identified, but had issues with billing logistics.
Fourth, and finally, Mike Paulocsak, the other new NC Programmer, began the same day and received essentially the same training as Most. This makes Paulocsak the closest and most obvious comparator to Most. In spite of the similarity in the training they received, Paulocsak was capable of performing billable work by his fourth week at BWXT, while Most never performed billable work on his own.
Ultimately, the record evidence presents only one plausible timeline of Most's employment with BWXT. In the four weeks before he self-identified, BWXT gave Most the same training as its other newly hired NC Programmers.
By the point in his tenure with BWXT when Most self-identified as having a disability, virtually all other NC Programmers hired in the past eight years had completed training and begun performing billable work.
After he self-identified, BWXT continued to provide Most with training and opportunities to improve.
Most's argument that two supervisors once made off-hand, seemingly dismissive comments towards him after he self-identified does not create a genuine dispute of fact.
Plaintiff Most fails to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his ability to perform the required functions of an NC Programmer. For this reason, the Court
A plaintiff must make five showings in order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination for failure to accommodate. He must show that: "(1) he is disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) his employer knew or had reason to know about his disability; (4) he requested an accommodation; and (5) the employer failed to provide the necessary accommodation."
Most's accommodation claim fails for two reasons. First, because he has offered no evidence that BWXT failed to accommodate his disability while he was employed there. Second, because he was not "otherwise qualified" for the position.
BWXT did state in Most's termination letter that it viewed Most's requested accommodation — conducting shutdown and other meetings by email or other means — as unreasonable.
During his training, Most was invited to attend some meetings with enough people to potentially trigger his anxiety.
As such, to the extent that he requested accommodation for his training, BWXT did accommodate Most. Ohio law did not require BWXT to accommodate him further once it became clear that, regardless of any accommodation, he was unable to perform the tasks that would make his work billable.
Additionally, as discussed previously, Most was not "otherwise qualified" to perform the essential functions of an NC Programmer. The Code of Federal Regulations defines the term "qualified" to mean "that the individual . . . with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of [his] position."
The "otherwise qualified" inquiry determines whether an employee is qualified to perform a job's requirements ex ante. It is not meant to evaluate on-the-job performance.
Here, while Most's previous experience led BWXT to believe that he was "qualified" for the position, Most's failure to complete the initial job training in a reasonable amount of time disproved that original belief.
For these reasons, the Court
The Court
IT IS SO ORDERED.
A hypothetical example helps to explain this point. If Most had completed his training and shown that he was capable of performing the basic requirements of the NC Programmer position, he would be "otherwise qualified" for the position. If, after reaching this minimum threshold, Most created sloppy billable work, then BWXT might still have a nondiscriminatory reason for firing him. But, it could not argue that he was not qualified. Cf. id.