MEMORANDUM

ROBERT D. MARIANI, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Kendall Hudson, an inmate presently confined at the State Correctional Institution, in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, initiated the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The named Defendants are Keith Carberry, Harrison Collins, Laurel Harry, John Killeen, Anthony Kot, Delbert Moeller, Darrin Reeder, and Tracy Williams. (Id.). The complaint sets forth claims of destruction of personal property, physical assault, and inadequate conditions of confinement. (Id.).

Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. 13). For the following reasons, the motion will be denied without prejudice.

Although prisoners have no constitutional or statutory right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, the Court has discretion "to request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997); Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492,499 (3d Cir. 2002); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147,153 (3d Cir. 1993). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that the appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant should be made when circumstances indicate "the likelihood of substantial prejudice to him resulting, for example, from his probable inability without such assistance to present the facts and legal issues to the court in a complex but arguably meritorious case." Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22,26 (3d Cir. 1984).

The initial determination to be made by the Court in evaluating the expenditure of the "precious commodity" of volunteer counsel is whether the case has some arguable merit in fact or law. Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 499. If a plaintiff overcomes this threshold hurdle, other factors to be examined are:

Id. (citing Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals added two other factors to be taken into consideration: (1) the court's willingness to aid the indigent party in presenting his or her own case; and (2) the available supply of lawyers willing to accept section 1915(e) requests within the relevant geographic area. See Gordon v. Gonzalez, 232 Fed. Appx. 153 (3d Cir. 2007).

Assuming that Plaintiffs claims have an arguable basis in law and fact, he fails to set forth any special circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-56. Plaintiff bases his motion on the inability to afford counsel, the alleged complexity of the case, inability to investigate the facts, limited education, and limited access to the prison law library. (Doc. 13; Doc. 14, pp. 2-4). Upon review, the legal issues herein are relatively simple and may not require expert testimony. Furthermore, despite his incarceration, investigation of the facts is not beyond Plaintiffs capabilities and he is familiar with the facts of his case. Additionally, in his court filings, Plaintiff demonstrates the ability to present comprehensible arguments and to present his own case. See (Docs. 1, 13, 14, 17-19). It is also noted that this Court does not have a large group of attorneys who would represent this action in a pro bono capacity.

Based on the foregoing, it does not appear that Plaintiff will suffer prejudice if forced to prosecute this case on his own. The Court's duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1985), coupled with Plaintiffs apparent ability to litigate this action, militate against the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the motion for appointment of counsel will be denied, however said denial will be without prejudice. As the Court in Tabron stated,

Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156-57. Therefore, in the event that future proceedings demonstrate the need for counsel, the matter may be reconsidered either sua sponte or upon motion of Plaintiff.

A separate Order follows.