RENÉE MARIE BUMB, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court upon an appeal by Plaintiff Brian Harrison ("Plaintiff"), seeking judicial review of the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's application for social security disability insurance benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
On January 29, 2013, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability due to Crohn's disease, irritable bowel syndrome, depression, anxiety, chronic back and hip pain, and a sleep disorder, with an onset date of August 1, 2012. The claim was initially denied on September 11, 2013, and again upon reconsideration on January 18, 2014. Record of Proceedings ("R.P.") at 15. On February 3, 2016, Plaintiff testified at an administrative hearing held before Administrative Law Judge Nycole Watson. At the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by his attorney, Paul Tendler. The ALJ also heard testimony from a vocational expert.
On December 14, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's claim for benefits, based on testimony from the vocational expert that jobs existed in the economy for individuals with non-exertional limitations. R.P. at 27-28. On December 6, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision as final. R.P. at 1-3. Plaintiff now seeks this Court's review.
When reviewing a final decision of an ALJ with regard to disability benefits, a court must uphold the ALJ's factual decisions if they are supported by "substantial evidence." Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). "Substantial evidence" means "`more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Cons. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).
In addition to the "substantial evidence" inquiry, the court must also determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards.
The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act further states,
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step, sequential analysis for evaluating a claimant's disability, as outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). In
The Court recites only the facts that are necessary to its determination on appeal, which is narrow. Plaintiff worked as a middle school teacher from 1998 through June 2009. R.P. at 42. Although Plaintiff completed a master's degree in instructional technology in 2012 and briefly worked part-time, he has not been employed full-time since June 2009.
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that he suffers from Crohn's disease, irritable bowel syndrome, anxiety, depression, and ankylosing spondylitis. R.P. at 43. Plaintiff was diagnosed with Crohn's disease around 2000 and eventually required a bowel resection surgery in 2010.
Plaintiff claims that his medical impairments have substantially limited his ability to work and perform daily activities. Plaintiff testified that his Crohn's and depression forced him to miss work and negatively impacted his ability to hold his job as a middle school teacher. According to Plaintiff, his medical conditions worsened in 2009 and he began receiving reprimands from his employer for poor attendance. [R.P. at 56-57]. Plaintiff states that in June 2009, the school asked him to resign if he did not feel that he was healthy enough to meet their expectations and continue to work.
After leaving his job as a middle school teacher, Plaintiff testified that he sought a masters degree, which he hoped would improve his future job prospects. However, Plaintiff contends that his worsening health and the bowel resection surgery disrupted his coursework, forcing him to complete most courses from home. R.P. at 57-58. Plaintiff last worked for Stockton College in a temporary summer role during the Summer of 2012, reformatting and editing documents in Adobe Acrobat.
Plaintiff testified that his medical conditions have also negatively impacted his ability to perform daily tasks. Plaintiff explained that during a typical day, he drives his daughter to her bus stop down the block, but then returns home to watch television and nap, helps his wife set the table for dinner, and uses the computer for as long as he can without becoming too stiff. R.P. at 66-67. Plaintiff alleges that he is often in too much pain to sleep all the way through the night.
Plaintiff states that he no longer feels capable of helping with many household chores, explaining that he has difficulty doing laundry or emptying the dishwasher due to pain when he bends down. He also stated that he is no longer able to mow the lawn. R.P. at 58. Although Plaintiff can drive, he testified that he feels uncomfortable being in the car for more than twenty minutes because he becomes stiff and becomes anxious about needing to be near a bathroom.
Plaintiff explained that his physical ailments have exacerbated his depression and anxiety. Plaintiff stated that his medical conditions have made him contemplate suicide because he felt "very useless" to his family. R.P. at 54. Plaintiff claims that he wanted to work, but felt physically unable to do so, and finally decided to apply for disability benefits at the encouragement of those around him.
At Step One of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of August 1, 2012 through his last insured date of December 31, 2014. R.P. at 17. At Step Two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's ankylosing spondylitis, Crohn's disease, and generalized anxiety disorder qualified as "severe" impairments through the date last insured.
At Step Three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R.P. at 20. In making that determination, the ALJ considered Listings 1.04 (disorders of the spine), 5.06 (inflammatory bowel disease), 12.06 (anxiety disorder).
Next, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity("RFC") and found that through the date last ensured, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b):
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work as a teacher due to "moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace." R.P. at 27. Considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC as determined, the ALJ found at Step Five that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. In particular, the ALJ relied upon the testimony of the vocational expert, who testified that under the ALJ's proposed RFC, Plaintiff would be able to perform certain jobs, including mail clerk (2,900 regional positions), office helper (2,000 regional positions), and router (76,000 regional positions). Using the medicalvocational rules as a framework, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act.
On appeal, Plaintiff makes several arguments to challenge the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in: (1) finding that obesity and depression were not "severe" impairments at Step Two; (2) finding that Plaintiff did not suffer from an impairment, or combination of impairments, that met the requirements of a Listing at Step Three; (3) finding that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform range of light work; and (4) finding that Plaintiff could engage in alternative work activities at Step Five.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed a reversible legal error in failing to find that Plaintiff's obesity and depression constituted "severe" impairments at Step Two.
The ALJ's decision notes that Plaintiff started treatment at Cape Counseling Services in 2013 for "severe, recurrent major depressive disorder without psychotic features, generalized anxiety disorder, and mood disorder due to irritable bowel syndrome." R.P. at 20. Curiously, the ALJ's decision states that there are no reports of "any inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations or participation in day treatment programs."
The Commissioner argues that even if the ALJ "erroneously concluded that some of [Plaintiff's] other impairments were nonsevere, any error was harmless."
This Court finds that the ALJ committed a reversible error by determining that Plaintiff's depression was non-severe without considering Plaintiff's extensive history of depression and his hospitalization for a major depressive episode in 2013. The failure to consider this relevant evidence potentially impacted the ALJ's disability analysis at later steps of the sequential process because the ALJ did not evaluate whether Plaintiff's depression qualified for a Listing and may not have assigned proper weight to Plaintiff's combination impairments when assessing his ability to work.
As to obesity, this Court finds that the ALJ did not err in finding that finding that Plaintiff's obesity was non-severe, as Plaintiff never alleged, and his medical records are devoid of, any specific obesity-related functional limitations.
The ALJ's decision contains a discussion of three Listings, 1.04 (disorders of the spine), 5.06 (inflammatory bowel disease), 12.06 (anxiety disorder), but finds that Plaintiff's impairments do not meet the criteria for those Listings. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision lacks sufficient reasoning to justify her conclusion that no Listings were satisfied, under the standard set forth in
The
Although the ALJ conducted a comprehensive analysis of Listing 5.06 with citations to substantial evidence from Plaintiff's medical history, R.P. at 20-21, the ALJ's discussion of Listings 1.04 and 12.96 lacked that same degree of detail. First, the analysis of Listing 1.04 consisted of little more than a recitation of the Listing's technical requirements along with a conclusory statement that "claimant's back disorders lack the degree of severity required to satisfy the criteria."
Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ's RFC determination "is not supported by any reasonable view of the medical evidence and testimony taken as a whole." Pl.'s Br., p. 29. Based on this Court's finding that the ALJ overlooked elements of Plaintiff's extensive history of depression, including the 2013 hospitalization due to suicidal ideation, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ's RFC determination overlooked material aspects of Plaintiff's medical history and, therefore, was not based upon substantial evidence.
The ALJ also relied upon evidence that Plaintiff took two trips to Disney World with his family to support the ALJ's conclusion that "there is no objective support for the diminution of [Plaintiff's] daily activities as attested at the hearing." R.P. at 25. The ALJ noted "[t]his presumably active trip to an extremely large amusement park would occur while he was alleging total disability." Although the ALJ correctly identified that Plaintiff's trips to Disney Word raise questions about his credibility, the ALJ failed to ask Plaintiff questions about this trip at the administrative hearing and develop the record on that issue. It is quite possible that these trips to Disney World were quite difficult and required substantial accommodations. Indeed, a review of Plaintiff's medical record from October 29, 2013 indicates that Plaintiff was "esp. concerned since he's going to Disney World next wk and is having a rectal pain/urgency and if doesn't go immediately, pain is much worse and has great anxiety." R.P. at 511. If the ALJ chooses to rely upon these trips in determining Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ must further develop the record.
This Court finds that in formulating the RFC, the ALJ's analysis was not supported by substantial evidence and may have improperly weighed Plaintiff's history of depression. Because the ALJ's RFC determination necessarily impacts the findings related to Plaintiff's ability to work, this Court need not reach that issue.
Because the ALJ's decision overlooked elements of Plaintiff's extensive history of depression and misstated Plaintiff's record of mental health treatment, the Court cannot determine whether the ALJ's disability analysis was, as a whole, based upon substantial information. Furthermore, the ALJ's failure to cite to specific contradictory medical evidence from the record in the analysis of Listings 1.04 and 12.06 prevents the Court from ascertaining the basis for the ALJ's Step Three conclusions. Although the ALJ's final conclusions could very well remain unchanged, the Court is unable to meaningfully review the ALJ's determinations without further discussion of the aforementioned issues. Therefore, the Court will vacate the ALJ's decision and remand for further proceedings.