PAIGE J. GOSSETT, Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, Willie H. Hutchison ("Hutchison"), who is self-represented, filed a Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas in York County asserting retaliation and wrongful termination by his employer. Defendant K-Mart Corporation ("K-Mart") removed the case to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting jurisdiction based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, and construing Hutchison's claims as arising, in part, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e,
Hutchison alleges that his employment was terminated in December 2008 in retaliation for a sexual harassment complaint that Hutchison filed against a female co-worker. He also alleges that he was terminated because he is African-American. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 5-6.) Hutchison filed an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter dated January 6, 2010. (ECF No. 17-1.) Hutchison filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas in York County on December 9, 2011. K-Mart removed the case to this court on January 9, 2012.
K-Mart moved to dismiss Hutchison's Complaint, arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in that the Complaint fails to allege that Hutchison filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission and that the Complaint fails to allege the essential elements of either a claim for wrongful termination or for retaliation. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 13-1.) In his response in opposition, Hutchison asserts that he filed a claim with the EEOC and attaches his right-to-sue letter dated January 6, 2010. (ECF No. 17.) K-Mart filed a reply in which it additionally argues that Hutchison's Complaint should be dismissed as untimely.
K-Mart correctly asserts that, under controlling statutes and Fourth Circuit precedent, Hutchison's federal claims are untimely. Title VII provides a ninety-day limitations period within which to file suit after receiving a right-to-sue letter.
Based on his own filing, Hutchison acknowledges that the right-to-sue letter was mailed to him on January 6, 2010. Pursuant to the federal statute, Hutchison was required to file his civil action in court no later than April 6, 2010 for it to be timely. Hutchison filed his lawsuit over twenty months late. In his response, Hutchison argues that his Complaint was timely filed pursuant to South Carolina state law. However, the statute cited by Hutchison, which establishes a three-year statute of limitations for "an action for assault, battery, or any injury to the person or rights of another," is inapplicable to his Title VII claim.
Nor has Hutchison presented any argument justifying equitable tolling. Generally, to warrant equitable tolling of a statutory deadline, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way."
Because Hutchison's Title VII claims are untimely under controlling law, the court recommends that the defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) be granted, and that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims and remand this action to the York County Court of Common Pleas.