An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
McGEE, Chief Judge.
Ezekiel Evan Curry ("Defendant") appeals from judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of felonious breaking or entering and larceny after breaking or entering. We find no error.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show that, in the middle of the day on 13 December 2012, William Shaw ("Mr. Shaw") noticed a car backed into the driveway at the house belonging to his friend and neighbor, Kenneth McCrorie ("Mr. McCrorie"), in Charlotte, North Carolina. Mr. Shaw then saw an African-American male jump into the car and drive down the road. Mr. Shaw, who had known Mr. McCrorie for fifty years, thought it was strange to see anyone at Mr. McCrorie's house because Mr. McCrorie and his girlfriend would have been at work during that time of day, so Mr. Shaw decided to follow the car in an attempt to get the license plate number. The suspect sped up and tried to turn onto Interstate 485 ("I-485") while driving about sixty miles per hour. However, the suspect did not make the turn, lost control of the car, and hit the median. The suspect kept driving on I-485, but eventually pulled over, likely due to a damaged tire. Mr. Shaw passed him, exited I-485, and circled back to the spot where the car had stopped. It took Mr. Shaw five to eight minutes to return, and by that time, the suspect had fled. Mr. Shaw continued to drive around to look for the suspect, but was unsuccessful, and called the police. He then called a friend and asked the friend to drive to where the car was abandoned and wait for the police.
Mr. Shaw was unable to see the car's license plate number because it had a temporary 30-day tag. He was, however, able to get a side view of the suspect after the car ran into the median. Because Mr. Shaw had only seen the suspect in profile, he was unable to pick the suspect out of a photo lineup, but identified Defendant at trial as the suspect.
Law enforcement responded within five to ten minutes after receiving Mr. Shaw's call, and found an unoccupied Saturn Ion ("the vehicle") on the side of I-485. An unidentified man in a truck told the officer that the vehicle had been involved in a break-in. The vehicle was then towed to a secured lot.
Law enforcement arrived at Mr. McCrorie's house and found that the door had been forced open. When Mr. McCrorie arrived, he walked through the house with the officers. He indicated the following items were missing: a.38 caliber Smith & Wesson handgun, a Ruger nine-millimeter handgun, a camera, an iPad, and a jar containing approximately $150.00 in change, along with a handwritten note referencing amounts of money added to the jar and the dates on which the money was added. It also appeared as if someone had attempted, unsuccessfully, to remove a flat screen television mounted to a wall.
On the same day, another officer went to the secured lot to process the vehicle. The officer took photographs, swabbed for any potential DNA, and lifted latent fingerprints from the vehicle and its contents. The trunk contained broken pieces of glass that appeared to be from the jar missing from Mr. McCrorie's house. The trunk also contained a piece of paper with dates and various dollar amounts written on it. One of the pieces of glass contained latent fingerprints. The officer placed all of the lifted fingerprints in an envelope and sealed the envelope with his initials, badge number, and date printed on the seal. He then took the envelope to Property Control, which was in a secure section of the police department.
Nancy Kerns ("Ms. Kerns"), a latent fingerprint examiner, received a sealed envelope containing the fingerprints from Property Control. She compared them to known fingerprints in the database in the Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("AFIS"). Sixteen prints were lifted, and Ms. Kerns was able to identify nine. Of those nine, six matched Defendant's fingerprints, and the other three were dissimilar to Defendant's. The prints matching Defendant's fingerprints were taken from a broken piece of glass from the trunk, the exterior window on the driver's side of the vehicle, and a handicapped placard that was in the vehicle. Mr. McCrorie was shown a photo of the broken piece of glass and identified it as belonging to the money jar that was stolen from his house.
Defendant was indicted for felonious breaking or entering and larceny after breaking or entering. At the close of the State's evidence at trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges, which motion was denied. Defendant presented no evidence and did not renew his motion to dismiss the charges at the close of all of the evidence. A jury found Defendant guilty of felonious breaking or entering and larceny after breaking or entering. The trial court imposed two consecutive sentences of six to seventeen months' imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
In Defendant's sole argument on appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the fingerprint lifted from the broken piece of glass found in the trunk of the vehicle. Defendant asserts there was a gap in the chain of custody and that the piece of glass itself was not admitted into evidence or preserved. We disagree.
"This Court has stated that a two-pronged test must be satisfied before real evidence is properly received into evidence. The item offered must be identified as being the same object involved in the incident and it must be shown that the object has undergone no material change." State v. Campbell, 311 N.C. 386, 388, 317 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1984). "Determining the standard of certainty required to show that the item offered is the same as the item involved in the incident and that it is in an unchanged condition lies within the trial court's sound discretion." State v. Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 131, 512 S.E.2d 720, 736, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999). "A detailed chain of custody need be established only when the evidence offered is not readily identifiable or is susceptible to alteration and there is reason to believe that it may have been altered." Campbell, 311 N.C. at 389, 317 S.E.2d at 392. "Further, any weak links in a chain of custody relate only to the weight to be given evidence and not to its admissibility." Id.
After reviewing the record, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The fingerprint that was admitted into evidence was shown to be the same one involved in the crime, and Defendant has made no showing that it underwent material change. The evidence shows that the fingerprint was taken from a broken piece of glass found in the trunk of the vehicle. Mr. Shaw followed the vehicle until it was abandoned, and law enforcement arrived five to ten minutes later. After the vehicle was abandoned, law enforcement towed it to a secured lot. On the same day, an officer processed the vehicle by taking photographs and lifting latent fingerprints from the vehicle and its contents, including the broken piece of glass. The officer who lifted the fingerprints placed them in a sealed envelope, which was stored in a secured part of the police station. The fingerprint examiner received the sealed envelope containing the lifted fingerprints. Thereafter, the fingerprints were admitted into evidence. Thus, the only gap in the chain of custody was the five to ten minutes before the police arrived at the site of the abandoned vehicle. Based on the evidence, there is no reason to believe that the piece of broken glass or the fingerprint lifted from it may have been altered. Thus, the gap in the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility.
We also find Defendant's argument regarding the preservation of the glass to be unavailing. The fingerprint itself was the evidence, not the broken piece of glass, and the fingerprint was properly preserved. The officer who processed the vehicle testified that this was standard procedure, and the officer took photos of the broken piece of glass, which were admitted into evidence. Furthermore, Mr. McCrorie identified the broken piece of glass as belonging to the jar that was stolen from his house. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the fingerprints into evidence.
No error.
Judges STEPHENS and HUNTER, JR. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).