WILLIAM H. BAUGHMAN, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
Before me
Mitchell, who was 51 years old at the time of the hearing,
The ALJ, whose decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, found that Mitchell had the following severe impairments: alcohol abuse and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease/emphysema.
After concluding that the relevant impairments did not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ made the following finding regarding Mitchell's residual functional capacity ("RFC"):
The ALJ decided that this RFC precluded Mitchell from performing his past relevant work as a construction worker.
Based on an answer to a hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert at the hearing setting forth the RFC finding quoted above, the ALJ determined that a significant number of jobs existed locally and nationally that Mitchell could perform.
Mitchell asks for reversal of the Commissioner's decision on the ground that it does not have the support of substantial evidence in the administrative record. Specifically, Mitchell presents the following issues for judicial review:
For the reasons that follow, I will conclude that the ALJ's finding of no disability is supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, must be affirmed.
Sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) permits a court to order a case remanded for consideration of additional evidence under certain circumstances. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted this statute as creating three requirements for a remand to consider new evidence:
(1) that the evidence be "new;" that is, not cumulative of evidence already in the record;
(2) that the evidence be "material;" which requires a showing that the Commissioner would have reached a different disposition of the claim if presented with the evidence; and (3) that "good cause" exists for not producing the evidence in a prior proceeding.
When a claimant presents pain as the cause of disability, the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
Under the first prong of this test, the claimant must prove by objective medical evidence the existence of a medical condition as the cause for the pain. Once the claimant has identified that condition, then under the second prong he or she must satisfy one of two alternative tests — either that objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain or that the medical condition is of such severity that the alleged pain can be reasonably expected to occur.
Objective medical evidence of pain includes evidence of reduced joint motion, muscle spasm, sensory deficit, or motor disruption.
A claimant's failure to meet the Duncan standard does not necessarily end the inquiry, however. As the Social Security Administration has recognized in a policy interpretation ruling on assessing claimant credibility,
The regulations also make the same point.
Under the analytical scheme created by the Social Security regulations for determining disability, objective medical evidence constitutes the best evidence for gauging a claimant's residual functional capacity and the work-related limitations dictated thereby.
As a practical matter, in the assessment of credibility, the weight of the objective medical evidence remains an important consideration. The regulation expressly provides that "other evidence" of symptoms causing work-related limitations can be considered if "consistent with the objective medical evidence."
The regulations set forth factors that the ALJ should consider in assessing credibility. These include the claimant's daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and treatment or measures, other than medication, taken to relieve pain.
The specific factors identified by the regulation as relevant to evaluating subjective complaints of pain are intended to uncover a degree of severity of the underlying impairment not susceptible to proof by objective medical evidence. When a claimant presents credible evidence of these factors, such proof may justify the imposition of work-related limitations beyond those dictated by the objective medical evidence.
The discretion afforded by the courts to the ALJ's evaluation of such evidence is extremely broad. The ALJ's findings as to credibility are entitled to deference because he has the opportunity to observe the claimant and assess his subjective complaints.
If the ALJ rejects the claimant's complaints as incredible, he must clearly state his reasons for doing so.
The strong statement from the administrative ruling quoted above constitutes a clear directive to pay as much attention to giving reasons for discounting claimant credibility as must be given to reasons for not fully accepting the opinions of treating sources. An ALJ in a unified statement should express whether he or she accepts the claimant's allegations as credible and, if not, explain the finding in terms of the factors set forth in the regulation.
The issue presented here concerns Mitchell's liver damage from alcohol abuse. More specifically, Tammy Mitchell argues that evidence of Allen Mitchell's cirrhosis and GI bleeding, which came to light only after the ALJ's decision in 2012, is material to that decision by showing that Allen Mitchell's liver problems were "far advanced" at the time of the decision, despite a lack of evidence to that effect at the time of the decision.
A brief review of the record before the ALJ confirms that any evidence of severe liver damage post-dates the hearing. In fact, although there were some signs of liver damage at the time of the hearing in 2012, those signs were that Mitchell was diagnosed with only hepatitis of the liver, and not cirrosis, and that an ultrasound of his liver had shown only "mild heptomegaly," or enlargement.
In fact, Mitchell testified that he had stopped drinking alcohol a month before the hearing due to his liver condition,
Moreover, even if the evidence of the rapid decline in Mitchell's liver condition after the ALJ's decision could be said to relate back to the relevant period, such evidence cannot be shown to have rendered Mitchell disabled for a continuous period of 12 months or more. As the Commissioner notes, Mitchell was not treated at all between June 2012 and April 2013, indicating that even if the underlying disease was silently progressing, it was not manifesting itself in worsening symptoms that effected Mitchell's functional capacity.
Thus, Mitchell has not established a basis for a Sentence Six remand here, and to the extent she now moves for such a remand, the motion is denied. That said, however, nothing in this decision should be construed as precluding another application for benefits with an onset date after the date of the ALJ's decision in this matter.
Tammy Mitchell contends that the ALJ erred in the decision to discount Allen Mitchell's allegations of disabling pain. In particular, she maintains that if the ALJ were to recognize the medical conditions that were actually causing the pain — i.e., the upper GI bleeding and the alcoholic hepatitis — "his analysis of the credibility of [Allen Mitchell's] pain complaints would have been different."
The Commissioner, in response, notes that the ALJ essentially found five reasons for discounting Mitchell's pain complaints: (1) minimal supporting medical evidence;
A review of Mitchell's arguments in light of the reasons cited by the Commissioner discloses that even if Mitchell were correct that the ALJ failed to accurately locate the cause of the pain, the Commissioner — and the ALJ — are also correct in observing that whatever the cause, any pain here did not result in Mitchell seeking any treatment for pain, nor in any objective medical evidence that he was disabled as a result of pain, nor in any opinion from a medical source that he was experiencing disabling pain. Although, as discussed above, such evidence is not required as a condition for finding that pain is a cause for disability, the lack of any record concerning treatment for pain, or any other medical evidence regarding pain, all support the decision to discount Mitchell's testimony as to the functional limitations of his pain.
In sum, Mitchell has provided no basis for me to overturn the Commissioner's decision in this regard.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I find that substantial evidence supports the finding of the Commissioner that Mitchell had no disability. The denial of Mitchell's applications is therefore affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
