SYLVIA H. RAMBO, District Judge.
On August 23, 2018, Petitioner Camden Barlow ("Barlow"), a prisoner confined at the Lewisburg United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) Barlow challenges the Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP") calculation of his good conduct time, asking the Court to correct "his sentence of imprisonment to reflect the loss of good conduct time days," which he calculates to be "a loss of 216 good conduct time days total." (Id. at 5.) Having received the $5.00 filing fee on September 17, 2018, an Order to Show Cause was issued on September 25, 2018. (Doc. No. 4.) Respondent filed a response to the § 2241 Petition on October 15, 2018. (Doc. No. 6.) Barlow has not filed a traverse. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, Barlow's § 2241 Petition will be denied.
Barlow is currently serving an 87-month sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina for Felon in Possession of a Firearm. (Doc. No. 8 Ex. 1 ¶ 3, Frymoyer Decl.) Barlow began serving his sentence on October 3, 2014, and his "current projected release date is July 8, 2021, via good conduct time . . . release." (Id.)
The BOP awards good conduct time to inmates in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which states:
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1)-(2). The BOP has interpreted this statute as permitting 54 days of good conduct time "for each year served." 28 C.F.R. § 523.20. To calculate good conduct time, the BOP uses a formula that "takes into account the fact that an inmate's time actually served becomes incrementally shorter each year as he is awarded" good conduct time. O'Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 2004)). As the Seventh Circuit has explained,
White, 390 F.3d at 1000.
During his first year of incarceration, Barlow received Disciplinary Hearing Officer ("DHO") sanctions that resulted in the disallowance of 136 days of good conduct time. (Frymoyer Decl. ¶ 4; Attach. B; Attach. C.) Thus, Barlow did not receive any good conduct time credit at the end of his first year of imprisonment. (Id.) Likewise, Barlow did not receive any good conduct time credit at the end of his second and third years of imprisonment, because he received DHO sanctions resulting in the disallowance of 448 days and 81 days, respectively, of good conduct time. (Frymoyer Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Attach. B; Attach. C.)
At the end of his fourth year of imprisonment, Barlow had received DHO sanctions resulting in the disallowance of 27 days of good conduct time. (Frymoyer Decl. ¶ 7; Attach. B; Attach C.) Thus, he received credit for 27 days of good conduct time at the end of that year. (Id.) However, those 27 days do not vest until Barlow is released from custody, see 28 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(2), and therefore are subject to future forfeiture (see Frymoyer Decl. Attach. E.) During his seventh year of imprisonment, Barlow "will be eligible to receive up to 41 days of [good conduct time] in accordance with the BOP's formula." (Id. ¶ 8.)
The record before the Court reflects that Barlow was eligible to receive credit for up to 216 days of good conduct time during his first four years of incarceration. However, because of the various disciplinary sanctions, he only received credit for 27 days of good conduct time. While the DHO's sanctions disallowed a total of 692 days of good conduct time "on paper," pursuant to § 3624(b) and the BOP's formula, Barlow simply did not receive credit for 189 days of good conduct time.
Contrary to Barlow's assertion, he was never deprived of 472 days of good conduct time. Rather, his projected release date of July 8, 2021 takes into account the credit for the 27 days of good conduct time he earned during his fourth year of incarceration, as well as credit for an additional 149 days, presuming that he receives full credit for good conduct time for the remainder of his incarceration. (Frymoyer Decl. Attach. B.) The "excess" time disallowed by the DHO simply had no effect on his length of his sentence. Accordingly, Barlow's § 2241 Petition lacks merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the BOP has properly calculated Barlow's amount of good conduct time. Accordingly, Barlow's § 2241 Petition will be denied. An appropriate Order follows.