MARK R. HORNAK, District Judge.
This case alleges two claims, one under federal law asserted via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the other under Pennsylvania law consistent with the Court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Both claims arise from an incident involving a broken arm sustained by minor Plaintiff G.J., a sixth-grade special needs student in the Brownsville (PA) School District. The Defendant was one of his teachers.
In the federal claim, the Plaintiffs
The standard for considering a summary judgment motion is set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and the attendant caselaw, familiar to all. Granting such a motion is proper only when there is no issue of material fact on a dispositive issue and the moving party is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 812 F.3d 319, 328 (3d Cir. 2016). The nonmoving party gets the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor, and the Court does not make credibility determinations in ruling on the motion.
Here is what the record before the Court demonstrates. G.J. broke his arm in the Defendant's classroom during class time when he fell backward. The Defendant took the deposition of about a half-dozen of G.J.'s fellow students, all of whom testified that G.J. fell, essentially over his own feet, when he tried to kick the Defendant. According to those witnesses, G.J. in essence "whiffed" with his kick, his feet went out from under him, and down he went, breaking his arm. ECF Nos. 34-6, at 3; 34-7, at 3; 34-8, at 3; 34-9, at 3; 34-10, at 4; 34-11, at 4. The third-party witness testimony is essentially uniform in those regards. No third-party witness testimony materially to the contrary has been submitted to the record.
Of course, as noted above, the Court has to give the Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record evidence, and this Court cannot make credibility determinations at this juncture. So we have to give the benefit to the testimony of G.J. himself. ECF No. 34-13. G.J. admits that during class he started acting up by pushing classroom chairs over. Id. at 3. The Defendant told G.J. to "quit messing around," id. at 4, and G.J. repeatedly told the Defendant that he would not. Id. at 4. The Defendant told G.J. to "sit down" and moved toward G.J., id. at 5, and G.J. dashed away from the Defendant, knocking yet another chair over. Id. at 5. The Defendant was visibly angry with the Plaintiffs conduct, id at 4, and told G.J. that he would be "written up" for his behavior. Id. at 5. Thereafter, G.J. says that he and the Defendant began punching at one another in a "playful" manner, but with G.J. hitting the Defendant in the chest at least once "kind of hard." Id. at 6. G.J. also admits that he kicked the Defendant several times, at least once hard enough that the Defendant showed visible pain and grabbed at his own leg. Id. at 8. G.J. says that as he was moving away from the Defendant in an effort to leave the classroom (during the class), id. at 9, the Defendant intentionally moved his leg toward G.J., tripping G.J.,
The Court has the benefit of very recent Third Circuit precedential caselaw directly addressing these issues. To make out the federal claim the Plaintiffs assert here, a four (4) factor test must be met: First, was there a pedagogical justification for the use of force by the teacher? Second, was the force utilized excessive to meet the legitimate objective in this situation? Third, was the force applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm? Fourth, was there a serious injury? Betz v. Satteson, No. 17-1950, 2017 WL 5495632, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Nov. 16, 2017). The third factor is dispositive: a constitutional violation will be found only where a defendant's actions were malicious and sadistic. Id. at *3. Further, there has to be an intention to cause harm, and serious harm at that. At summary judgment, the question is whether a reasonable jury could rationally find that the defendant's action met that high standard of intentionality such that the challenged conduct shocks the conscience. Id.; see also Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2001).
The Court has no trouble concluding that the Plaintiff's injury, a broken ann, could be considered to be "serious." But as to the other Betz factors, particularly the "intentionality" standard, the Court concludes that there is no triable issue here. There is no record evidence advanced by G.J. of any prior "bad blood" between G.J. and the Defendant,
Even ignoring all of the testimony from all of the third-party witnesses and from the Defendant,
As to the remaining state law claim, there is no independent basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction over it. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3), it is therefore proper for this court to dismiss that claim without prejudice for want of federal jurisdiction.
An appropriate Order will enter.