ROBERT D. MARIANI, District Judge.
The background of this Order is as follows:
Jury selection and trial in this matter are currently scheduled to commence on December 11, 2017. (Doc. 54).
On August 24, 2017, Defendant filed "Supplemental Pre-Trial Motions" (Doc. 42) with an accompanying brief (Doc. 42-1). The Motions are titled as follows:
The Government subsequently filed a brief in opposition to Defendant's motions. (Doc. 45). As a result, the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to be held on October 12, 2017, on Defendant's first motion. (Doc. 48).
On October 7, 2017, Defendant's counsel filed an unopposed motion with the Court requesting a continuance of the suppression hearing. (Doc. 55). In support of his motion, counsel stated that he had "has issued a Subpoena to testify for a necessary witness at the Suppression Hearing, Attorney George P. Skumanick, Jr. of Tunkhannock, Pennsylvania, who acted as the Defendant's Public Defender in State Court." Counsel further explained the efforts he had taken to serve Attorney Skumanick with the subpoena; specifically:
(Doc. 55, at ¶ 3). Counsel therefore requested that the suppression hearing be continued on the basis that "Defendant does not believe that Skumanick will be served in adequate time before the Hearing."
On October 10, 2017, the Court granted Defendant's motion and rescheduled the evidentiary hearing for October 24, 2017. (Doc. 56).
On October 20, 2017, the Friday proceeding the scheduled hearing, Defendant's counsel filed a letter which "enclosed a proposed Order directing the United State [sic] Marshals Service to serve the subpoena forthwith. . . ." (Doc. 58). Although the letter does include a proposed order, the Court does not construe it as a motion. The document is not in the form of a motion, there is no supporting brief, and Defendant has failed to include a certificate of concurrence or even set forth the Assistant U.S. Attorney's position in the letter. Furthermore, the letter does not, in fact, contain a request. The letter merely states that a proposed order is enclosed directing the U.S. Marshals to serve the subpoena.
The Court also notes that the letter sets forth the exact same attempts to serve Attorney Skumanick as those set forth in the first request for a continuance. Thus, it appears that the only action Defendant's counsel took following the Court's continuance of the evidentiary hearing in order to permit counsel additional time to serve Attorney Skumanick, was to "vist[] the United States Marshal Service Office in Scranton." After being told by the Marshals' service that he needed to obtain an Order from the Court if he wanted the Marshals to serve the subpoena, Attorney Katsock waited until the Friday before the hearing to inform the Court that he has been unsuccessful in serving Attorney Skumanick and providing the Court with an Order directing that the U.S. Marshals serve Attorney Skumanick.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17, "[a] marshal, a deputy marshal, or any nonparty who is at least 18 years old may serve a subpoena." Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(d) (emphasis added). The permissive nature of this language makes clear that ordering the U.S. Marshals to serve a subpoena, and in particular where Defendant's counsel has already had a "non-party" attempt to serve the subpoena, is within the sound discretion of the Court.
To the extent that Defendant's letter is an attempt to request that the Court order the U.S. Marshals to serve Attorney Skumanick with the subpoena, the Court will deny this request. In addition to the reasons set forth above, namely Defendant's failure to follow the rule of procedure, lack of diligence, and untimeliness, Defendant's "request" is deficient in several other respects. First, at no time, either in the original motion to suppress evidence or in any request for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing or to have the U.S. Marshals serve Attorney Skumanick, has Defendant's counsel explained the need, or importance, of Attorney Skumanick's testimony at the evidentiary hearing.