SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Raymond and Beverly Preusser (the "Preussers"), on behalf of their minor son, E.P., filed suit against Taconic Hills Central School District alleging violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and against John Gulisane alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Preussers appeal from the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees. We review an award of summary judgment de novo. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

In order for the Preussers to succeed on their Title VI and § 1983 claims, they are required to prove intentional racial discrimination. See Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 664-65 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin); DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 240 (2d Cir. 2012) ("To prevail on a § 1983 claim of race discrimination in violation of equal protection, the law requires a plaintiff to prove the defendant's underlying racially discriminatory intent or purpose." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

"[I]n the educational setting, a school district is liable for intentional discrimination when it has been `deliberately indifferent' to teacher or peer harassment of a student." Zeno, 702 F.3d at 665. "[A] school district's actions are only deliberately indifferent if they were `clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.'" Id. at 666 (quoting Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999)). "[C]laims of intentional race discrimination can be based on the `deliberate indifference' of school boards, administrators, and teachers to invidious `harassment, in the school environment, of a student by other children or parents.'" DiStiso, 691 F.3d at 240-41 (quoting Gant ex rel. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1999)).

Regarding their §1983 claim against Gulisane, the Preussers argue that summary judgment was improperly granted because the district court applied an incorrect legal standard, analyzing the case as though it were a claim asserting selective enforcement of the law. See Preusser ex rel. E.P. v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 1:10-CV-1347 (MAD), 2013 WL 209470, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013). We agree that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard. As we stated in DiStiso, a §1983 equal protection claim asserting racial harassment of a student by another student requires proof

DiStiso, 691 F.3d at 241 (citations omitted). Applying the appropriate standard under DiStiso and for the reasons that follow, we hold that the judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellees was properly entered.

The Preussers contend that while E.P. was in the third and fifth grades, Defendants-Appellees were deliberately indifferent to racial harassment by his classmate, E.H. We analyze each contention in turn.

The Preussers assert that when E.P. was in third grade Mr. Preusser informed Gulisane that E.P. was being called names, that Gulisane failed to act on this information and, therefore, was deliberately indifferent to the racial harassment. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Preussers, the evidence in the record fails to show any basis on which Gulisane or other school officials knew or should have known E.P. was being harassed on account of his race. At most the record indicates Mr. Preusser informed Gulisane that his son was being called "names" without specifying the nature of the name calling. See Gant, 195 F.3d at 142-43 nn. 8 & 9 (testimony that school officials were told simply that a child was called "names" permits no inference that the name-calling was racially motivated).

With regard to the fifth grade harassment the record reflects that when the school district was made aware of the harassment, school officials disciplined E.H. For example, when E.H. referred to E.P. as "poopy" and "brownie," Gulisane met with the parents of both students and initiated a plan to resolve the issue. The uncontroverted evidence that such action was undertaken precludes a finding that the school's response was clearly unreasonable and thus precludes a determination that Defendants-Appellees were deliberately indifferent. Although E.P.'s parents may not agree with the school's approach, "victims do not have a right to specific remedial measures." Zeno, 702 F.3d at 666.

Having conducted a de novo review of the record, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.