ROBERT D. MARIANI, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss, filed by the Defendants, Sergeant Michael Mayer and the City of Scranton, in this civil rights action. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion and dismiss each count of Plaintiffs Complaint with leave to amend.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Sergeant Michael Mayer and the City of Scranton on February 21, 2013. (See Compl., Doc. 1.) The Complaint contains sparse factual allegations. It stems, however, from a visit by the Plaintiff, Frank Trunzo, to the Robert Morris School on May 21, 2012 to pick up his son at the conclusion of the school day. (Id. at ¶ 2.) The reader is left to believe by negative implication that nothing out of the ordinary happened during Trunzo's visit to the school. (See id. at ¶¶ 8-11, 13-14 (denying that the factual allegations made in the Affidavit of Probable Cause subsequently filed against Trunzo actually occurred).) However, the Complaint does not explain what actually did occur during his visit.
Instead, the Complaint next alleges that Defendant Michael Mayer, asergeant with the Scranton Police Department, (see id. at ¶ 4), filed a Criminal Complaint and an Affidavit of Probable Cause against Frank Trunzo, (id. at ¶¶ 15-16). Plaintiff alleges that "[s]ome of the language in that paperwork appears to be intentionally misleading and factually inaccurate," while "[o]ther parts of the paperwork are simply inadequate, regardless of Mayer's subjective intent, to establish probable cause to believe ... that a crime had been committed." (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff did not submit a copy of the Criminal Complaint or the Affidavit of Probable Cause to his Complaint. However, Defendants did submit them as an attachment to their Motion to Dismiss, (see Doc. 8-1), and, following an Order of this Court, (see Doc. 20), Plaintiff produced a sworn affidavit by Trunzo's criminal attorney stating that the documents so submitted as CM/ECF docket entry 8-1 are in fact true and correct copies of the Criminal Complaint and Affidavit of Probable Cause referenced in the civil Complaint, (see Aff. of Louis Cimini, Doc. 25, at ¶ 5). This agreement as to the authenticity of the criminal documents allows the Court to consider their content at the motion to dismiss stage. "[A] court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs claims are based on the document." Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). "The rationale underlying this exception is that the primary problem raised by looking to documents outside the complaint—lack of notice to the plaintiff—is dissipated `where plaintiff has actual notice and has relied upon these documents in framing the complaint.'" In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1,4 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal alterations omitted).
The Affidavit of Probable Cause states that on May 21 at 8:26 pm, Sergeant Michael Mayer received a report of harassment from one Nancy Jennings. (See Aff. of Prob. Cause, Doc. 8-1, at 4.) It continues:
(Id.)
The instant Complaint, on the other hand, disputes the information listed in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. It alleges:
Plaintiff summarized these allegations as follows:
(Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.)
Plaintiff then alleges that the Affidavit of Probable Cause contains several omissions, in addition to those listed above. Namely, Sergeant Mayer allegedly omitted in the Affidavit of Probable Cause "that there was no interaction between Frank Trunzo and Ms. Jennings at the school," (id. at ¶ 20) and "that the Facebook Friend Request was in no way material to any criminal conduct," (id. at ¶ 21). Moreover, "[t]he Affidavit of Probable Cause does not state the basis for the assertion that Ms. Jennings felt uncomfortable as there were no facts sworn to support it." (Id. at 22.)
Despite this alleged lack of probable cause, "Defendant Mayer charged Mr. Trunzo with harassment pursuant to 18 Pa. C. S. 2709(A)(4)."
Trunzo then filed this Complaint against both Sergeant Mayer and the City of Scranton. Against Mayer, Plaintiff alleged claims of false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), malicious prosecution under section 1983 (Count II), another claim involving unlawful seizures (Count III), another malicious prosecution claim, apparently under Pennsylvania tort law (Count IV), abuse of process (Count V), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI). He also filed a Monell claim (Count VII) against the City of Scranton, for engaging in policies and customs that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and which resulted in Trunzo suffering "substantial injuries and damages." (Id. at ¶ 57.)
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss as to every count. (See Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 2-9.)
A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-1965 (internal citations and alterations omitted). In other words, "[ijactual allegations must be enough to raise aright to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. A court "take[s] as true all the factual allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, but ... disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As cited above,
Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).
"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This "plausibility" determination will be a"context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
However, even if a "complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id.
Having summarized the standards governing a motion to dismiss, the Court now turns to an evaluation of Plaintiffs Complaint. In so doing, the Court finds numerous deficiencies that warrant granting Defendants' Motion.
At the outset, the Court finds Count III indecipherably vague. The Count is styled as arising under "41.S.C. § 1983," (see Compl. at 9), which presumably means "42 U.S.C. § 1983." But the body of the claim is more confusing still. After realleging all previous allegations, Count III asserts, in its entirety:
(Id. at ¶¶ 40-42.)
Defendants interpret this claim as alleging a constitutionally protected right to receipt of charges by summons, which would not be a cognizable claim under section 1983. (See Brief of Defs. in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 9, at 14-15.) Plaintiff disagrees and says that the claim is actually about "the arrest and seizure of the Plaintiff by the Defendant Mayer [being] a violation of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights." (Doc. 11 at 13.) He then restates his allegations that Mayer wrongfully "represented to the Magisterial District Judge that the charges will be filed via summons" and that the Affidavit of Probable Cause wrongfully claimed that Mayer was unable to speak with Trunzo. (Id. at 13-14.)
Even if the Court were to accept Plaintiffs interpretation—which is not necessarily compelled by the face of the Complaint—a number of questions remain. For instance: How is this unconstitutional seizure claim different from that of Count I, which also claims that Trunzo was unconstitutionally seized under section 1983?
Or is Plaintiff in fact alleging that Mayer provided false information to the Magisterial Judge or otherwise fraudulently procured an arrest warrant? If so, the Complaint does not say so. If not, then it is hard to see what unlawful conduct Mayer engaged in under the Count as alleged. In the absence of allegations of fraud, the Count only appears to allege that Mayer's actual actions differed from those predicted in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. But such allegations do not appear on their face to state a cause of action. They especially do not appear to state a claim for false arrest, as Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition implies, given that a misrepresentation as to how service would be effected appears to have no connection to a false arrest claim.
Rather than try to make sense of the allegations in Count III, the Court will dismiss the Count as insufficiently stated, but will allow Plaintiff leave to amend to provide a clearer statement. Because the remaining counts of the Complaint will also be dismissed with leave to amend for various reasons, also dismissing Count III would not additionally prejudice the Plaintiff. Moreover, the Court believes that it is better to allow the original author of the Complaint the opportunity to clarify his allegations rather than undertake the task of construing them itself, in order to avoid the possibility of misconstruing Plaintiff's claims.
The consistent thread running through most of Plaintiffs remaining claims is that he was arrested without probable cause.
"The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false arrest or misuse of the criminal process," as in Counts I and II,
Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If Mayer had probable cause to arrest and initiate charges against Trunzo, his actions would have been legal and certainly not "utterly intolerable in a civilized society."
Therefore, Counts I, II, IV, and VI (and, potentially, amended Count III) can only proceed if Plaintiff has properly pleaded a lack of probable cause. `The substance of all definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). That is, "[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990). "On many occasions [the Supreme Court has] reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370, 124 S.Ct. 795, 799, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide `whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause." Id. at 371, 124 S. Ct. at 800 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661-62, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996)). In reaching this conclusion, the arresting officer's state of mind—whether good or bad—is irrelevant; all the fact finder must ask is whether the facts available to the arresting officer objectively gave rise to a finding of probable cause at the time the arrest was made. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996) (summarizing cases and concluding that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis").
Here, when accepted as true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs allegations show, at most, that most of the facts on which the Affidavit of Probable Cause was based were inaccurate or irrelevant. The Complaint does not, however, show that these facts were not such as to warrant an objectively reasonable and prudent officer to believe that a crime had been committed. Even if Trunzo had never interacted with Jennings before his arrest, even if he never appeared at the Robert Morris school on the morning of May 21, even if the encounters between Dougher and Jennings and between Dougher and Trunzo never occurred, even if the Facebook friend requests and messages mentioned in the Affidavit of Probable Cause could be characterized as not in violation of section 2709(a)(4), and even if the Affidavit was wrong to credit Jennings's statement that Trunzo's conduct made her uncomfortable, (see Compl. at ¶¶ 8-11, 19-22), none of this would indicate that there was a reasonable basis on which areasonable police officer should have formed the belief that each one of those pieces of information was not in fact true at the time of `filing charges and the arrest. To the contrary, a police officer may reasonably rely on apparently credible information that he receives in the course of a criminal investigation to establish probable cause for an arrest, even if a subsequent investigation might disclose that such information was, in fact, untrue. See, e.g., Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 790 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[The police officer] had every reason to believe acredible report from a [person] who witnessed the alleged crime. This report alone sufficiently established probable cause. [The officer] was not required to undertake an exhaustive investigation in order to validate the probable cause that, in his mind, already existed."); Karkut v. Target Corp., 453 F.Supp.2d 874, 884 (ED. Pa. 2006) ("[W]hen an officer has received his information from some person—normally the putative victim or an eyewitness—who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth, he has probable cause to arrest the accused perpetrator.") (quoting Lynch v. Hunter, 2000 WL 1286396, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). While it is true that the Complaint alleges aconversation between Mayer and Trunzo prior to the filing of criminal charges, (id. at ¶ 14), and it is therefore conceivable that Trunzo could have told Mayer information that would negate probable cause, nowhere in the Complaint is the substance of this conversation alleged, which leaves the Court with no information to conclude that Mayer should not reasonably have relied on the facts available to him.
Instead, the Court is left with the Affidavit of Probable Cause which, as quoted above, states that Mayer received complaints that Trunzo was harassing Jennings following a confrontation about his intoxication at a school. It is not unreasonable to believe that a pattern of behavior that included stares in Jennings's direction, followed by messages stating that Jennings "f with the wrong person" and "will be surrounded"
"The tort of `abuse of process' is defined as the use of legal process against another `primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.'" Rosen v. Am. Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 682).
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 682, cmt. a) (emphasis added). To succeed on an abuse of process claim,
Lerner v. Lerner, 954 A.2d 1229, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (quoting Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)) (internal alterations omitted).
When read as awhole, Plaintiffs Complaint focuses on the allegation that Mayer wrongfully initiated criminal charges against him. It is in that context that the Court reads Plaintiffs abuse of process claim, which, after realleging all previous allegations, reads in its entirety:
(Compl. at ¶¶ 50-52.)
This, however, only states a malicious prosecution claim. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania characterized the two torts:
Publix Drug Co. v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 32 A.2d 412, 415 (Pa. 1943) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs Complaint appears to better fit the latter tort. It does not appear to involve process being perverted in some unlawful way, but simply alleges that valid criminal process was procured for malicious or unlawful purposes.
In an attempt to address this problem, Plaintiff states in his Brief in Opposition that the "perversion of process" complained of is Mayer's decision to arrest Trunzo instead of serving him by mailed summons, as stated in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. However, the problems with this argument are twofold. First, it is not apparent on the face of the Complaint that the phrase "Defendant Mayer used criminal legal process" refers to Mayer arresting Trunzo instead of serving him by summons. Second, arresting a criminal defendant is not using a legal process for a purpose for which it was not designed. Rather, arrest is a perfectly valid legal process; the issue is that Plaintiff contends that Mayer arrested him and initiated his criminal prosecution for unlawful reasons. But, under Publix Drug, these allegations only state claims for false arrest and/or malicious prosecution, which Plaintiff has already alleged multiple times.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Complaint does not state a claim for abuse of process. Moreover, even if the Court were to construe the Complaint in the way that Plaintiff requests in his Brief in Opposition, then Count Vwould still only state claims that have already been alleged, and would therefore warrant dismissal for superfluity.
Nonetheless, consistent with the Court's duty to freely permit curative amendments, the Court will dismiss Count V with leave to amend. In an amended complaint, Plaintiff should allege specific facts showing how process was perverted in such a way that could give rise to an abuse of process claim.
Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim against the City of Scranton under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). This succinct claim alleges only:
(Compl. at ¶¶ 56-57.)
These policies and customs are themselves barely mentioned in the body of the Complaint. Prior to Count VII, the only information alleged relevant to the Monell claim is a series of assertion that "the City of Scranton and its Police Department does not adequately train its officers" to file criminal charges only in the presence of probable cause, (id. at ¶¶ 28-29), and that the City and the Police Department "do not train police officers, without assuring that the police department uses its police power appropriately and constitutionally, and provides adequate training to its officers," (id. at ¶ 30).
This claim must also be dismissed for at least two reasons.
First, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a lack of his probable cause for his arrest or prosecution. Therefore, even if it were true that the City and Police Department do not adequately train their officers in correct constitutional procedure, that would be irrelevant to the instant Complaint, because Plaintiff has not shown that he was arrested or prosecuted without probable cause.
Second, the claim does not satisfy Twombly and Iqbal's requirements that all factual allegations provide "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. Rather, all that Plaintiffs Monell claim does is formulaically recite the elements of the cause of action. It conclusorily alleges that the grounds for Monell liability apply, without providing any factual allegations in support. Indeed, aside from Plaintiffs conclusory assertions, there are no allegations of any kind in the Complaint to raise Plaintiffs right to Monell relief above a speculative level.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Monell claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Again, this dismissal is without prejudice. In an amended complaint, Plaintiff should provide specific factual allegations that show how the City and Police Department failed to train their employees and how this failure harmed the Plaintiff.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is
