MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL F. URBANSKI, Chief District Judge.

This social security disability appeal was referred to the Honorable Robert S. Ballou, United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), for proposed findings of fact and a recommended disposition. The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation on June 15, 2017, recommending that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied, the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment be granted and the Commissioner's final decision be affirmed. Plaintiff Rodney L. Stamback has filed objections to the report, the Commissioner has responded, and this matter is now ripe for the court's consideration.

I.

Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to "serve and file specific, written objections" to a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the report. See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Fourth Circuit has held that an objecting party must do so "with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection." United States v. Midgette. 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir.), cert denied. 127 S.Ct. 3032 (2007).

Id. The district court must determine de novo any portion of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which a proper objection has been made. "The district court may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); accord 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

If, however, a party `"makes general or conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations,'" de novo review is not required. Diprospero v. Colvin, No. 5:13-cv-00088-FDW-DSC, 2014 WL 1669806, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 2014) (quoting Howard Yellow Cabs. Inc. v. United States, 987 F.Supp. 469, 474 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (quoting Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982))). "The court will not consider those objections by the plaintiff that are merely conclusory or attempt to object to the entirety of the Report, without focusing the court's attention on specific errors therein." Camper v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, No. 4:08cv69, 2009 WL 9044111, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2009), aff'd, 373 F. App'x 346 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 131 S.Ct. 610 (2010); see, Midgette, 478 F.3d at 621 ("Section 636(b)(1) does not countenance a form of generalized objection to cover all issues addressed by the magistrate judge; it contemplates that a party's objection to a magistrate judge's report be specific and particularized, as the statute directs the district court to review only `those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.'"). Such general objections "have the same effect as a failure to object, or as a waiver of such objection." Moon v. BWX Technologies, 742 F.Supp.2d 827, 829 (W.D. Va. 2010), aff'd, 498 F. App'x 268 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985) ("[T]he statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed").

Additionally, objections that simply reiterate arguments raised before the magistrate judge are considered to be general objections to the entirety of the report and recommendation. See Veney v. As true, 539 F.Supp.2d 841, 844-45 (W.D. Va. 2008). As the court noted in Veney:

539 F. Supp. 2d at 846. A plaintiff who reiterates his previously-raised arguments will not be given "the second bite at the apple []he seeks;" instead, his re-filed brief will be treated as a general objection, which has the same effect as would a failure to object. Id.

II.1

This case involves a closed period of disability. Stamback filed for disability insurance benefits (DIB) on June 4, 2009 alleging disability beginning April 15, 2003. He was insured through December 31, 2008. Thus, he must establish disability on or before that date in order to be entitled to DIB.

Stamback's DIB claim was denied in a written decision issued by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on July 14, 2011. (Administrative Record, hereinafter "R." at 19-27.) The ALJ determined Stamback had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a limited range of light work (R. 23), and found at step five of the sequential evaluation process that Stamback could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy (R. 26); therefore, he was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review (R. 1-4), and Stamback appealed. On the motion of the Commissioner, the case was remanded for further administrative proceedings. (R. 2047, 2051.)

In the meantime, Stamback filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) on July 25, 2011, which was approved. State agency physician Bert Spetzler, M.D., determined that Stamback had the RFC to perform only sedentary work and, given his age, education and lack of transferable skills, the medical-vocational rules directed a finding of disability. Stamback was therefore entitled to SSI benefits beginning July 25, 2011.

Following remand, the ALJ held two administrative hearings on Stamback's DIB claim (R. 1986-2023, 2024-46), and enlisted the assistance of Dr. Leonard Rubin in conducting an independent review of the medical evidence in this case and opining as to Stamback's RFC (R. 2225-37). In a decision issued on October 19, 2015, the ALJ denied Stamback's DIB claim for benefits, again finding Stamback had the RFC to perform a limited range of light work during the relevant period, and determining at step five that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Stamback could perform. (R. 1963-78.) The Appeals Council denied Stamback's request for review, and this appeal followed.

In a lengthy summary judgment brief, Stamback raised six arguments2 before the magistrate judge in support of his contention that the ALJ's decision to deny his DIB claim is not supported by substantial evidence. Stamback's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation mirror those six summary judgment arguments. Compare Pl.'s Obj., ECF No. 24 with Pl.'s Summ. J. Br., ECF No. 15. On the whole, Stamback's objections are general objections to the magistrate judge's conclusions; he seeks review of his entire case, rather than points to specific errors in the magistrate judge's analysis. This defeats the entire purpose of magistrate judge review. See Midgette, 478 F.3d at 621-22; see also Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).

A.

For instance, on summary judgment, Stamback argued the ALJ erred in failing to give greater weight to the opinions of his treating cardiologist, Dr. McLuckie, and primary care physician, Dr. Watts, as to Stamback's RFC. After considering these arguments, the magistrate judge held that the ALJ appropriately considered the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(5) and adequately explained his reasons for giving these opinions little weight. The magistrate judge determined that substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's decision in that regard. Report & Recommendation, ECF No. 23, at 9-11. In his objections, Stamback argues this conclusion is erroneous for a number of reasons, all of which he previously argued in his summary judgment brief:

The magistrate judge addressed all of these arguments at length in his report and recommendation. Stamback simply reasserts them here without pointing to any specific errors made in the report, aside from the general conclusion that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. This general objection to the magistrate judge's report does not warrant de novo review by the court. In any event, having reviewed the record, the court agrees with the magistrate judge that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to give the opinions of Drs. McLuckie and Watts little weight.

B.

In his second objection to the report and recommendation, Stamback likewise reiterates his previous argument that the independent medical consultant, Dr. Rubin, offered no explanation for his change in opinion, and that the ALJ gave greater weight to the opinions of the non-examining state agency physicians and Dr. Rubin than he did Stamback's treating physicians. Compare Pl.'s Obj., ECF No. 24, at 4 with Pl.'s Summ. J. Br., ECF No. 15, at 35-36. Again, the magistrate judge fully addressed these arguments in his report, ECF No. 23, at 12, noting the ALJ adequately explained his decision to give significant weight to the opinions of these non-examining physicians over those of Stamback's treating physicians. Stamback insists the record documents continued complaints of pain in his right shoulder following his surgery in 2003, Pl.'s Obj., ECF No. 24, at 5, just as he did on summary judgment, Pl.'s Summ. J. Br., ECF No. 15, at 30-31. As the ALJ noted, however, "the objective medical evidence, including diagnostic imaging, testing, and physical examination results show only mild abnormalities. After the claimant's shoulder surgery, physical examination revealed mostly normal musculoskeletal findings. He had near normal range of motion in his shoulder, and he did not complain of tenderness to palpitation in his shoulder when distracted." (R. 1975; see also R. 264.) Indeed, Stamback's treating orthopedic surgeon Dr. David Novak noted in 20043 that Stamback could return to light duty work (R. 266), and prescribed a course of conservative treatment, including "[physical] therapy, possible localized injection, acupuncture." (R. 265.) The ALJ did not, as Stamback asserts, mischaracterize the evidence.

As regards Dr. Rubin, it is the job of the ALJ, not this court, to weigh the evidence. Dr. Rubin reviewed the entirety of the medical evidence in this case and on March 22, 2015 answered certain interrogatories as to Stamback's RFC. (R. 2226-34.) The ALJ found some inconsistency in Dr. Rubin's opinion, however. In response to a question about whether Stamback's impairments meet or equal a listed impairment, Dr. Rubin remarked "no", explaining:

(R. 2227.) Yet, on his Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Physical), Dr. Rubin checked boxes indicating Stamback could only stand 2 hours and walk 2 hours in an 8-hour day. (R. 2230.)

Finding it inconsistent for Dr. Rubin to remark in a written narrative that Stamback did not meet a listing because he had the ability to stand and walk 6 hours in a workday and then on the next page check a box indicating plaintiff could only stand and walk 4 hours in a workday, the ALJ asked Dr. Rubin to "clarify [his] responses to indicate whether the claimant can stand and walk 4 hours or 6 hours out of 8." (R. 2237.) Dr. Rubin responded by changing his answer on the medical source statement to indicate Stamback could stand 6 hours and walk 6 hours in an eight hour day and initialing those changes. (R. 2236.)

At the second administrative hearing held on remand (R. 2033-34), as well as on summary judgment, Stamback argued that Dr. Rubin had merely recited the state agency physician's RFC determination in the narrative part of the form, rather than give his own opinion as to Stamback's ability to stand and walk, and gave no explanation for the subsequent change in his opinion on the medical source statement following the ALJ's inquiry. The ALJ plainly considered this argument and remarked at the second administrative hearing:

(R. 2036.) Later in his decision, the ALJ addressed Stamback's argument again:

(R. 1974.) The ALJ further stated he gave Dr. Rubin's clarification significant weight because his opinion is consistent with the medical evidence of record, specifically noting that Dr. Rubin "cited medical evidence showing the claimant underwent shoulder surgery but received little treatment after that. He also had a stent placed in 2002, but he had no serious cardiac complaints after that." (R. 1974.)

The ALJ adequately explained his reasons for giving significant weight to the clarified opinion of Dr. Rubin, and substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's decision in that regard. The court declines Stamback's invitation to reweigh the evidence in this case.

C.

Stamback's third argument on summary judgment was that the ALJ failed to properly consider his mental impairments under Social Security Ruling 96-8p—specifically, by failing to properly assess his moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace. Pl.'s Summ. J. Br., ECF No. 15, at 36. He argued: "Simply limiting plaintiff to simple, routine, unskilled tasks in his RFC assessment is not enough to fulfill SSR 96-8p." Id. at 37.

After setting forth the requirements of SSR 96-8p, the magistrate judge determined that the ALJ's discussion of Stamback's mental impairments satisfied those requirements by providing a narrative discussion of his mental impairments and treatment, and that the ALJ properly accounted for Stamback's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace by limiting him to simple, routine, unskilled tasks and to work that allows for breaks every two hours.5 Report & Recommendation, ECF No. 23, at 14-15. The magistrate judge determined that this is "not a situation like Mascio [v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015)], where the ALJ summarily concluded that a limitation to simple, unskilled work accounts for the claimant's moderate limitation in concentration, persistence and pace without further analysis." Report & Recommendation, ECF No. 23, at 16. Rather, here, the ALJ "specifically accounted for a diminished ability to stay on task by providing for breaks every two hours, and explained why Stamback's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace were accommodated by a restriction to simple, unskilled work, with breaks every two hours." Id.

In what is perhaps the one specific objection raised by Stamback to the magistrate judge's analysis in this case, Stamback argues that the ALJ's RFC findings do not specifically link the need for breaks at least every two hours to plaintiff's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, and "[tjhe ALJ does not state whether the need for breaks is due to plaintiff's physical impairments or mental impairments." Pl.'s Obj., ECF No. 24, at 7. This argument, however, is belied by the record. The ALJ expressly states in his decision: "Because there is little evidence of any mental deficits, the undersigned has given the claimant only 2 limitations to his mental residual functional capacity, which are the limitation to simple, routine, unskilled tasks and the need for a normal work break every two hours." (R. 1976.) Moreover, contrary to Stamback's assertions, the ALJ adequately explained how he arrived at this conclusion. He noted in his decision that although Stamback took routine medication for his anxiety, he rarely complained of active mental symptoms related to this disorder, never went to counseling, never needed inpatient treatment prior to the date last insured, never alleged significant limitations in social functioning to his practitioners, and almost always had a normal mental status at his appointments, suggesting his medications worked well to control any symptoms. (R. 1976.) The ALJ further explained:

(R. 1967.) The ALJ did not summarily limit Stamback to simple, routine, unskilled tasks without explanation, as plaintiff suggests. Substantial evidence supports his RFC determination as regards Stamback's mental impairments.

D.

Portions of plaintiff's fourth objection to the report and recommendation are taken verbatim from his summary judgment brief, in which he argued that the ALJ erroneously concluded that the state agency physician's opinion in the subsequent SSI claim was based upon evidence that post-dated plaintiff's date last insured. Compare Pl.'s Obj., ECF No. 24, at 10 with Pl.'s Summ. J. Br., ECF No. 15, at 40-41. This argument was considered, and rejected, by the magistrate judge. As the magistrate judge determined, the ALJ specifically explained his reason for giving little weight to the 2011 SSI decision, noting that decision was based on cardiac treatment evidence beginning May 2010, which showed an enlarged heart and multiple stents placed in 2010, as well as a reduced ejection fraction on an echocardiogram from June 2011. (EL 1974.) The ALJ held:

(R. 1974.) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision in this regard, and the court finds no error in the magistrate judge's decision.

E.

In his fifth objection to the magistrate judge's report, Stamback reiterates three points raised in his summary judgment brief— that the ALJ improperly assessed his credibility by noting (1) that Stamback only took acetaminophen for pain, when in fact he took Acetaminophen-Caff-Butalbital, which contains a barbiturate; (2) that the record documents he performed certain activities, such as climbing a ladder and using a chainsaw, inconsistent with the level of pain and limitation he claims, when those activities were not performed on a sustained basis; and (3) that Stamback's migraines improved after cervical steroid injections, when in fact he continued to complain of migraines. Compare Pl.'s Obj., ECF No. 24, at 11-12 with Pl.'s Summ. J. Br., ECF No. 15, at 41-44. As the magistrate judge determined, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Stamback is only partially credible, which he explained in detail in his written decision. Credibility determinations are emphatically the province of the ALJ, not the court, and courts normally should not interfere with these determinations. See, e.g., Chafin v. Shalala, No. 92-1847, 1993 WL 329980, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1993) (per curiam) (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453,1456 (4th Cir. 1990) and Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964)); Melvin v. Astrue, 6:06 CV 00032, 2007 WL 1960600, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2007) (citing Hatcher v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1989)). Stamback points to no specific error made in the magistrate judge's report, and the court finds no error in the magistrate judge's consideration of the ALJ's credibility analysis.

F.

Finally, Stamback reiterates his argument that the ALJ failed to perform a functionby-function analysis and therefore runs afoul of SSR 96-8p. Stamback, once again, points to no error in the magistrate judge's analysis but rather disagrees generally with his conclusion that the ALJ provided a sufficient narrative discussion to allow for meaningful review. The court finds no error in the magistrate judge's conclusion. In an exhaustive decision, the ALJ outlined Stamback's medical history issue by issue, all of the opinion evidence of record, Stamback's complaints and testimony, and the ALJ's conclusions. There is simply no merit to Stamback's argument that the ALJ failed to meet the requirements of SSR 96-8p or that the ALJ's decision does not provide sufficient information to allow for meaningful review.

III.

At the end of the day, it is not the province of a federal court to make administrative disability decisions. Rather, judicial review of disability cases is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving disability. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). To that end, the court may neither undertake a de novo review of the Cornrnissioner's decision nor re-weigh the evidence of record. Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992). Evidence is substantial when, considering the record as a whole, it might be deemed adequate to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), or when it would be sufficient to refuse a directed verdict in a jury trial. Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is not a "large or considerable amount of evidence," Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988), but is more than a mere scintilla and somewhat less than a preponderance. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; Laws, 368 F.2d at 642. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Perales, 402 U.S. at 401.

The court has reviewed the magistrate judge's report, the objections to the report, and the administrative record and finds that the magistrate judge was correct in concluding that there is> substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision in this DIB case. As such, the magistrate judge's report and recommendation will be adopted in its entirety.

An appropriate Order will be entered to that effect.