KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Magistrate Judge.
This is a pro se civil rights action, initiated upon the filing of the original, fee-paid complaint in this matter by Plaintiff Robert John Altavilla (hereinafter referred to as "Altavilla") on September 7, 2017, asserting claims against Defendants Larksville Borough Police, Officer Shawn Reilly, Officer Nicholas Riebel (collectively referred to as the "Police Defendants") and Matt Evans
In the complaint, Altavilla alleges that the Police Defendants violated his civil rights when they came to his home and executed the 302 order. (Doc. 1 at 6). Altavilla contends that the Police Defendants unlawfully imprisoned him without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Police Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) after Altavilla effected proper service. (Doc. 28 at 1; 2 ¶ 5-7). The Police Defendants submit that Altavilla's claim must be dismissed as probable cause existed to take Altavilla into custody, Officers Reilly and Reibel are entitled to Qualified Immunity, and the Larksville Borough Police is not a proper defendant in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("1983") suit. (Doc. 28 at 3-4). In response, Altavilla submits that the warrants were frivolous, and that there was no harm to the household or the general public that would have provided the basis for the warrants. This matter is now ripe for review. (Doc. 29); (Doc. 30); (Doc. 31); (Doc. 33); (Doc. 35).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court is generally limited to the allegations set forth in the pleadings, although it may also consider documents attached to the complaint and matters of public record. Opposition briefs to a motion to dismiss may not be used to amend a complaint.
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Additionally, "the statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and of the grounds upon which it rests." Bayer v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. CIV.A. 3:13-1900, 2014 WL 3670499, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 2014) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)). It is not the responsibility of the defendant to translate the claims of the plaintiff for the Court. Nor is it the responsibility of the Court to translate the statutes, vague assertions, case citations, and general grievances of the plaintiff into a complaint.
Because the complaint raises a 1983 claim based on a constitutional violation, subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The events giving rise to this claim occurred in Larksville, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania and thus venue is proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b)(2); Kocher v. Larksville Borough, 926 F.Supp.2d 579, 605 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
"The plain language of section 1983 . . . solely supports causes of action based upon violations, under the color of state law, of federal statutory law or constitutional rights. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state statutes." Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1980)). "To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause." James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he was detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful. James, 700 F.3d at 682-83 (3d Cir. 2012). An unlawful detention is an unreasonable one where the officers lack reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 204-207 (3d Cir. 2003); Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F.Supp.2d 212, 219-21 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (collecting cases). Officers have probable cause for an arrest if "at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Kauffman v. Barbagello, No. 1:13-CV-00659, 2013 WL 6388487, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2013); quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). The Court must determine whether "the objective facts available to the officers at the time of arrest were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense was being committed." United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1205 (3d Cir.1984).
The entirety of Altavilla's claim against the Defendants is as follows:
Attached to his complaint is the incident report completed by the Defendants, in which Defendant Labar describes the call from the Department of Defense, and that he believed it was in Altavilla's best interest that he be seen by a professional concerning his safety and . . . of others, and on that basis he obtained a 302 from crisis at Wilkes-Barre General Hospital. (Doc. 1 at 9).
Liberally construing his complaint, it appears that Altavilla raises Fourth Amendment false arrest and false imprisonment claims against the officers who came to his house and committed him on an involuntary basis pursuant to a warrant obtained under § 7302 of the MHPA. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 23 at 3 n. 2). Stripping away the conclusory allegations that he was falsely imprisoned and that his 4th amendment rights were violated, Altavilla alleges that he was sitting at his house, not bothering anyone, and posing no threat to anyone, when the Defendants arrested him and transported him to an involuntary commitment. Nothing in the incident report contradicts these allegations; indeed, while the report notes that it was "in Altavillas best interest, that he be seen by a professional concerning his safety and of others" it does not indicate anywhere that at any time Altavilla posed a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.
The pertinent portions of the MHPA define a person subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment as follows:
"Clear and present danger" is established by a showing that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated. 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7301(b). "Section 7302 of the MHPA permits the issuance of a warrant for an involuntary emergency examination." Doby v. Decrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1999). Under the statute,
However, the MHPA also provides civil and criminal immunity for peace officers participating in an involuntary commitment process, so long as their conduct is without "willful misconduct or gross negligence." Kauffman v. Barbagello, No. 1:13-CV-00659, 2013 WL 6388487, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2013); 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7114(a). Thus, the MHPA shields the conduct of Defendants unless Altavilla is able to establish that they engaged in "willful misconduct or gross negligence." Id. "Willful misconduct" occurs "when the danger to the plaintiff, though realized, is so recklessly disregarded that, even though there be no actual intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a conscious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong." Kauffman, 2013 WL 6388487, at *10; citing Doby, 171 F.3d at 875. Gross negligence is characterized by "facts indicating more egregiously deviant conduct than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference. . . . The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care." Id.
The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Smierciak v. City of Pittsburgh Police Dep't, No. 2:18-CV-00734-MJH, 2018 WL 6790312, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 26, 2018); citing Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000). Although Altavilla's complaint is quite brief, it names the defendants, it identifies the cause of action, and it supplies the factual basis for that claim — that the Defendant officers came into his house for a 302 commitment without cause or reason. However, Altavilla has not met the pleading standard for willful misconduct or gross negligence. Although he alleges that the officers came to his house for the 302 commitment without cause or reason, he fails to specifically plead that they engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence such that their conduct would not be shielded by the qualified immunity protection of the MHPA. See Kauffman, 2013 WL 6388487, at *10. As such, it is recommended that Altavilla's claims against the Defendant officers be dismissed without prejudice.
Altavilla states that he is "suing larksville [sic] police department for false imprisonment . . ." but only describes the conduct of the Defendant officers who came to his house. (Doc. 1 at 6-7). Larksville Borough Police, a sub-unit of local government, moves to dismiss itself from this action, arguing that it's an improper entity in a 1983 claim. (Doc. 29 at 11 ¶ C). Larksville Borough Police cannot be held liable for the conduct of persons it supervises pursuant to respondeat superior. Brickell v. Clinton County Prison Bd., 658 F.Supp.2d 621, 626-27 (M.D.Pa.2009). In order for Altavilla to successfully allege a constitutional claim under § 1983 against this Defendant, he must raise a Monell claim alleging that the Police Department is a governmental entity and thus a "person" under § 1983 and, alleging that either a policy or lack of policy of the Department led to the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F.Supp.2d 581, 587 (M.D.Pa.2008). Thus, Defendant Larksville Borough Police would be "subject to liability [in a § 1983 action] to the extent [it] maintain[ed] an unconstitutional custom or policy that caused the alleged constitutional violation." Id. (citation omitted). However, Altavilla has failed to identify any policy or custom adopted by the Department that caused his injury, and as such, it is recommended that his claim against the Larksville Borough Police be dismissed without prejudice.
The Third Circuit has instructed that district courts generally must permit a curative amendment if a complaint filed pro se is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the Third Circuit has also acknowledged that a district court possesses "substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend." Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000).
As the complaint in its current form does not clearly set forth any cognizable claims, dismissal is warranted. However, out of an abundance of caution, and to preserve Altavilla's rights as a pro se litigant, the Court will allow him an opportunity to file a single, unified, legible complaint setting forth factual allegations and legal claims in a manner that can be reviewed by the Court and, if necessary, answered by defendants.
The amended complaint must be a pleading that
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 28) be