The R&R correctly construed the petition as claiming violations of the substantive and procedural components of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The R&R also correctly articulated the relevant legal standards. Substantive due process "bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them. . . . [W]hen an executive action is at issue, only the most egregious conduct will be considered arbitrary in the constitutional sense." Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2002). "[T]he cognizable level of executive abuse of power [i]s that which shocks the conscience." Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). Procedural due process, as relevant, protects certain constitutional and state-created liberty and property interests from deprivation without adequate procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).

The denial of reparole cannot be said to shock the conscience. The Board's stated reasons for denying reparole include Carney's "prior unsatisfactory supervision history" and his "level of risk to the community." Doc. No. 6 at 35. Carney's prior unsatisfactory supervision history is amply supported by the record, id. at 39, 48. Carney argues that his level of risk to the community had not changed between the revocation of his parole and the denial of reparole and that it is unconstitutional for the Board to deny reparole based on facts known at the time of parole revocation but not considered in rescinding parole. But it does not shock the conscience that the Board's revocation determination does not provide an exhaustive list of all the factors it considers or that a factor may not weigh heavily against a defendant at the revocation stage yet may loom more largely at reparole. Such flexibility is entirely consistent with the discretion the Constitution grants to executive officers making parole determinations. Similarly,

The second objection further develops his incorrect legal theory that he has a liberty interest in being granted reparole. He argues that because there is a statutory scheme that constrains the Board's judgment in its parole determinations, there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole. However, the Supreme Court has held that there is no such interest by the Constitution's own force, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Pennsylvania law does not vest in people eligible for parole any right other than the right to a parole hearing. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7; Rogers, 724 A.2d at 321 n.2, accord id. at 324 (dissenting opinion).

The third objection is that the Board should not have considered the Department of Corrections' negative recommendation for reparole because a favorable recommendation was not listed as a condition with which Carney needed to comply in the Board's earlier order revoking parole. But even if a favorable recommendation was not a special requirement, that does not mean that the Board is forbidden from considering the Department of Corrections' recommendation. No statute or court decision creates such a rule, and it would pose a serious impediment to the flexible administration of parole proceedings that the Supreme Court has identified as desirable and constitutional.

The final objection is that the Board relied in part on a pretextual reason for denying him reparole, namely that he needed to participate in a drug and alcohol treatment program. The reason was a pretext, Carney argues, because the institution where he was incarcerated did not offer the program. He argues that the Board violated due process by requiring him to complete a treatment program and subsequently failing to transfer him to a facility that offered the program before denying him reparole. However, since his denial of reparole, he has been transferred to a facility that offers the treatment program. Doc. No. 19 at 6. At most, he argues that it was a due process denial to delay transfer until after another reparole hearing. Given the limited resources available to penal institutions, it does not shock the conscience that there was a delay between the Board's determination that a treatment program was required and Carney's placement in an appropriate facility, especially since Carney does not allege any facts that give rise to the inference that the Board took any steps to impede Carney's eventual transfer and because the other factors relied on by the Board independently support its reparole determination. Moreover, there is no protected liberty interest in such a program for the same reason that there is no protected liberty interest in parole.