LAWRENCE F. STENGEL, District Judge.
This § 1983 case stems from the tasing of a teenager by a school police officer. Presently before the court is a motion for reconsideration of my decision to quash a post-discovery subpoena for Carissa Thomas, a non-party to this action. Ms. Thomas witnessed the events leading up to the tasing incident. An explanation of the procedure of this case will put this motion in context.
The complaint in this action was filed almost three years ago.
On August 22, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to compel the deposition of Carissa Thomas, a non-party to this action but an eyewitness witness to the tasing and the events leading up to the tasing. According to the motion to compel, Ms. Thomas had previously been served a subpoena ad testificandum on June 13, 2013 for a deposition on June 26, 2013. She did not attend the deposition.
On September 27, 2013, I held a status conference with counsel for the parties during which the parties indicated that there was an unopposed motion to compel the deposition of Ms. Thomas. At that time Judge Perkin was still working to resolve the parties' discovery disputes, including the motion to compel.
On January 17, 2014, ahead of the dispositive motion schedule, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
On August 22, 2014, I denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that several genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute. On September 5, 2014, the day that a motion for reconsideration on the summary judgment decision was due, the defendants requested an extension until September 12, 2014 to file a motion for reconsideration on the motion for summary judgment decision.
On September 5, 2014, the plaintiff also filed a motion to quash a post-discovery subpoena for Ms. Thomas to appear at a deposition. It is unclear whether this subpoena was actually served on Ms. Thomas.
On September 8, 2014, I granted the defendant's request for an extension and gave the defendants until September 12, 2014 to file a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision.
On September 8, 2014, I also granted the plaintiff's motion to quash Ms. Thomas' subpoena.
The defendants never filed a motion for reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment.
"The purpose of a motion for reconsideration ... is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence."
The defendants' issuance of Ms. Thomas' August 25, 2014 subpoena appeared to be tied to an anticipated motion to reconsider the summary judgment decision. The defendants now argue that they should be permitted to depose Ms. Thomas because her testimony will be important at trial. Essentially, the defendants argue that they would be prejudiced if they were not permitted to take Ms. Thomas' deposition.
The defendants imply that their failure to depose Ms. Thomas sooner was the fault of the court. They imply that the court's decision on the motion to compel, which came after their motion for summary judgment had been filed, somehow prejudiced the outcome on their motion for summary judgment. Yet, the fact that the defendants filed their motion for summary judgment without having the benefit of Ms. Thomas' testimony would indicate that they did not believe the disposition of that motion turned on Ms. Thomas' testimony. If her testimony was crucial to their motion, they should have raised that concern with the court before filing their motion.
Then, once the defendants' "administrative error" in not serving Ms. Thomas with the motion to compel was brought to their attention with Judge Perkin's ruling, the defendants sought no recourse. They did not re-serve Ms. Thomas with a motion to compel nor bring it to the court's attention that her testimony was necessary for the motion for summary judgment.
The defendants indicate that they waited until after the motion for summary judgment was filed in order to ensure that "the need for Ms. Thomas' testimony was clear." While I appreciate counsel's concern for not expending time and resources unnecessarily, this second subpoena was clearly served long past the time when discovery was due, if it was served at all. While that may have been done for good reason, the lack of communication on counsel's part suggests otherwise.
All that aside, I agree Ms. Thomas' testimony would be relevant evidence at trial.
I will permit the defendants to serve a new subpoena on Ms. Thomas.
An appropriate Order follows.