SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

In 2011, plaintiff Lauren Andersen was involuntarily committed to North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System's Zucker Hillside Hospital (the "Hospital") following an incident at JFK Airport. The Hospital kept her for psychiatric treatment for 18 days. After she was released, Andersen sued the Hospital and various individuals involved in her confinement, alleging violation of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act, along with a number of state law claims. The district court dismissed all of her federal law claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over her state law claims. It found that because the Hospital is a private institution and the doctors and nurses involved in her care are private actors, Andersen could not pursue a claim of unlawful state action under § 1983. The court also determined that Andersen had not plausibly alleged that her treatment had been motivated by bias, as required to find discrimination under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

After reviewing Andersen's complaint de novo, we conclude that the district court correctly held that Andersen may not pursue a claim under § 1983. As this Court recently held in a case with nearly identical facts, "the forcible medication and hospitalization of [a plaintiff] by private health care providers can[not] fairly be attributed to the state" for purposes of § 1983. McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1703 (2015). Likewise, because Andersen "has not plausibly alleged that Defendants forcibly medicated and hospitalized her on the basis of considerations that were `unrelated to' or `improper to consideration of' the likelihood that she posed a danger to herself or others," "she has not stated a claim of discrimination under the [ADA or the] Rehabilitation Act." Id. at 234. We find no reason to depart from our recent precedent in McGugan, and we therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Andersen's federal claims.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.