KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by pro se Plaintiff Joseph Edward Dixon (Doc. 119) and Defendant Roger Williams (Doc. 123). Dixon moves for summary judgment, asserting he was detained in a manner violating numerous Constitutional rights by Pennsylvania State Police while awaiting the arrival of New York State Police to question him on the death of Dolores Warner in New York. (Doc. 119). Williams moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the stop of Dixon by Pennsylvania State Police—made at the behest of the New York State Police—was based upon sufficient information and did not result in a violation of Dixon's Constitutional rights. (Doc. 123). For the following reasons, it is recommended that Defendant's motion be granted and summary judgment be entered in Defendants' favor.
New York State Police ("NYSP") discovered the body of Dolores Warner at her home on November 24, 2011, in Bath, New York. (Doc. 123, at 1). Determining Warner's death to be the result of homicide, NYSP began an investigation in which multiple interviewees identified Dixon as Warner's ex-boyfriend, mentioning instances in Dixon's relationship with Warner that had caused them concern for her safety and well-being. (Doc. 124, at 1-4). On November 25, 2011, the NYSP contacted the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP"), requesting assistance in locating Dixon as a person of interest in the case. (Doc. 123, at 5). No charges were pending, nor criminal proceedings initiated, against Dixon at that time. NYSP Investigator Kemp met with Defendant, Pennsylvania State Police Investigator Roger Williams, providing Williams with a photograph and description of Dixon. (Doc. 123, at 5).
Upon information, Williams came to find Dixon at Elm's Tavern in Tioga, Pennsylvania around 3:30 p.m.
On October 7, 2013, Dixon brought a § 1983 action in the Western District of New York against Williams and five John Does PSP officers in their individual and official capacities. (Doc. 1). On November 12, 2013, the case was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 4). Upon direction of the Court, Dixon filed an amended complaint on September 29, 2014. (Doc. 39). Williams responded with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on October 6, 2014. (Doc. 42). The Court recommended granting Williams' motion in part, dismissing Dixon's Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims and Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, with prejudice. (Doc. 65). The Court recommended that Dixon's Fourth Amendment false arrest/illegal seizure claims and those under the Pennsylvania Uniform Criminal Extradition Act remain. (Doc. 65). On September 28, 2015, the Court's recommendation was adopted in full. (Doc. 73). On April 25, 2016, Dixon filed his motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 119). Williams filed his own motion for summary judgment on May 6, 2016. (Doc. 123).
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" only if the evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences "should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
A federal court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). In making this determination, "a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor." Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the court must simply "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Dixon contends that in order to be turned over to New York authorities, pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, he must have been formally arrested and charged in Pennsylvania and brought before a Pennsylvania judge in an extradition proceeding. (Doc. 119, at 7). Under the Act, "it is the duty of the Governor of this Commonwealth to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this Commonwealth." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9123. Upon demand by the state from which the accused has fled, the Governor reviews the demand and may sign a warrant of arrest reciting the facts necessary and validity of its issuance. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9128. "No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this Commonwealth who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender and of the crime with which he is charged . . ." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9131. Further, any person brought before the judge upon such demand may apply for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of the arrest, whereupon a reasonable time is affixed for its resolution. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9131.
Dixon alleges he is an accused person and fugitive for the purposes of the statute. (Doc. 138, at 4). Williams submits that at no point in the PSP involvement was Dixon accused of a crime, therefore the Extradition Act does not apply. (Doc. 140, at 3). The undisputed evidence before the Court shows that no charges were pending at the time of the PSP involvement. At the time Williams found Dixon at Elm's Tavern, only a "temporary want" had been issued; meaning Dixon was wanted for questioning. (Doc. 138, at 9). There was no warrant for his arrest
Without a warrant issued by either state, it cannot be said that Dixon fits the parameters of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9131.
Dixon moves for summary judgment on the basis that PSP did not have probable cause to either enter Elm's Tavern in search of him
The collective knowledge doctrine allows imputation of one law enforcement officer's knowledge to another officer who actually makes a stop, even if the latter does not possess all relevant facts. United States v. Gonzalez, 630 F. App'x 157, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1529, 194 L. Ed. 2d 604 (2016); see United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 745 (3d Cir.2010); see also United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir.2002) ("[R]easonable suspicion can be based on information gathered from another person."). The doctrine allows the "police . . . to act on the strength" of work done by fellow officers. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971). Under the rule, determinations concerning the existence of reasonable suspicion can be made based on the knowledge of the officer conveying the information, not on "whether those relying on the [information] were themselves aware of the specific facts which led their colleagues to seek their assistance." United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985). Thus, "[t]he legality of a seizure based solely on statements issued by fellow officers depends on whether the officers who issued the statements possessed the requisite basis to seize the suspect." Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231-32, 105 S.Ct. 675) (emphasis omitted).
The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from arresting a citizen except upon probable cause. Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)). "[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483. However, "police may stop persons in the absence of probable cause under limited circumstances." United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985). "[O]fficers making a stop to investigate past crimes may have a wider range of opportunity to choose the time and circumstances of the stop." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228-29 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). Further, the Court found that:
The Supreme Court ruled that seizure of a person made on reliance of statements by fellow officers:
In that case, a flyer issued by police in Ohio identified a person as "wanted," but did not identify him as a suspect or advise that a warrant existed for his arrest. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229. However, the flyer did describe the person sought, the underlying criminal act he was sought in in connection with, and the date and time of its occurrence. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 223. The Court found the police in Ohio had sufficient information "to arouse a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by [the subject identified] and to constitute the specific and articulable facts needed to underly a stop." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234. This reasonable suspicion extended to the police in Kentucky who saw the flyer and stopped a vehicle with a driver matching the description on the flyer. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234. The officers conducting the stop had no knowledge whether or not a warrant existed, and neither party to the case asserted that Ohio or Kentucky police had probable cause to effectuate a stop upon the person identified. Despite this, the Court found "[a] brief stop and detention at the earliest opportunity after the suspicion arose is fully consistent with the principles of the Fourth Amendment." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234. Finding that "[a]n objective reading of the entire flyer would lead an experienced officer to conclude that [the person] was at least wanted for questioning and investigation[.]" Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234. "[W]hat matters is that the stop and detention that occurred were in fact no more intrusive than would have been permitted an experienced officer on an objective reading of the flyer." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234-35.
In this case, Williams spoke directly with the NYSP, who presented a description of Dixon (Doc. 119, at 29) and informed him that Dixon was wanted for questioning in connection with a homicide. (Doc. 119, at 49). The NYSP had sufficient information justifying a stop of Dixon under a reasonable suspicion standard. (Doc. 124, at 15-25). This reasonable suspicion justifies a stop by police acting upon the facts underlying it, even where not obtained by firsthand knowledge. See Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 1997). The only facts in dispute surrounding the detainment of Dixon are the voluntariness of his compliance and the length of time he was detained as he and Williams waited for the NYSP. These facts are not material to the issue of whether the NYSP, and therefore Williams, had reasonable suspicion to stop Dixon. The undisputed material facts in the record before this Court indicate that the NYSP had reasonable suspicion to stop Dixon (Doc. 124, at 15-25), and pursuant to the collective knowledge doctrine, that same knowledge and suspicion is imputed to Williams. As such, summary judgment should be granted in Williams' favor on Dixon's Fourth Amendment claim.
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that:
Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
