ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION

BENJAMIN H. SETTLE, District Judge.

I. BASIC DATA

Type of Benefits Sought:

Plaintiff's:

Principal Disabilities Alleged by Plaintiff: Chronic pain in left hip, leg numbness, bursitis, distended belly, umbilical hernia, diabetes, hepatitis C, substance abuse, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder

Disability Allegedly Began: January 1, 2002

Principal Previous Work Experience: Child care provider, janitor

Education Level Achieved by Plaintiff: GED

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY—ADMINISTRATIVE

Before ALJ Rudy M. Murgo:

Date of Decision: June 26, 2014

Appears in Record at: AR 21-45

Summary of Decision:

Before Appeals Council:

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY—THIS COURT

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of Social Security benefits when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). "Substantial evidence" is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). While the Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). "Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Id.

V. EVALUATING DISABILITY

The claimant, Dawn Holden ("Holden"), bears the burden of proving that she is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act ("Act"). Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity" due to a physical or mental impairment which has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(3)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Act only if her impairments are of such severity that she is unable to do her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other substantial gainful activity existing in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof during steps one through four. Valentine v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id.

VI. ISSUE ON APPEAL

1. Did the ALJ err in evaluating the opinion of nonexamining physician Miller Garrison?

VII. DISCUSSION

Holden appeals the Commissioner's decision denying her disability benefits, arguing that the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion of nonexamining physician Dr. Garrsion. Dkt. 12. The Court disagrees.

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving ambiguities and conflicts in the medical evidence. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). In resolving questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence, an ALJ's findings "must be supported by specific, cogent reasons." Id. at 725. The ALJ can do this "by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Id.

In general, more weight is given to a treating or examining physician's opinion than to the opinions of those who have not seen the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996). Where a nonexamining physician and an examining physician rely on the same clinical findings, but come to different conclusions based on those findings, the ALJ should give greater weight to the conclusions of the examining physician. Id. Still, a nonexamining physician's opinion may constitute substantial evidence if "it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record." Id.; Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Dr. Garrison opined that Holden medically equaled part C of listing 12.04 for affective disorders and that Holden had marked limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. See AR 69-70. Dr. Garrison believed that Holden met listing 12.04, part C.2., indicating that Holden had a residual disease process that had resulted in such marginal adjustment that a minimal increase in mental demands or change in environment would be predicted to cause episodes of decompensation. See AR 69. Dr. Garrison appeared to base this opinion on Holden being very reactive to stressors. See id.

The ALJ gave Dr. Garrison's opinion that Holden met listing 12.04 little weight because, among other reasons, it "not only lack[ed] substantial support in the record, but it contrast[ed] sharply with the other evidence." See AR 31. The ALJ noted that Dr. Garrison's prediction that an increase in mental demands or change in environment would cause decompensation was undermined by the record showing that Holden had never experienced any episodes of decompensation. See id. Episodes of decompensation are "exacerbations or temporary increases in symptoms or signs accompanied by a loss of adaptive functioning, as manifested by difficulties in performing activities of daily living, maintaining social relationships, or maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(C)(4). As Dr. Garrison acknowledged, evaluating physicians found no such episodes of loss of adaptive functioning during the relevant period, which would be shown by significant alteration in medication or documentation of the need for a more structured psychological support system, such as hospitalization. See id.; AR 70, 329-34, 508-11. The ALJ then reasonably inferred that Dr. Garrison's prediction of decompensation was inconsistent with the examining physicians never finding any such behavior despite changes in Holden's environment throughout the relevant period. See AR 31. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ dismissing the nonexamining physician's opinion that Holden met listing 12.04 because it was not consistent with other evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31.

Similarly, the ALJ discounted Dr. Garrison's opinion that Holden had marked limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace because it was inconsistent with the evidence in the record. See AR 31. Evaluating physicians, who interviewed Holden and performed mental status examinations, found no such marked limitations. See AR 332, 409, 509-10.

Holden argues that the nonexamining physician had the benefit of two more years of evidence. See Dkt. 12 at 9-10. However, the only relevant new evidence that Holden identifies in that period is her own testimony, which the ALJ properly discounted. See id.; AR 33. Holden also notes that the evaluating physicians still opined to some limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. See Dkt. 12 at 10; AR 332, 412, 511. However, the ALJ acknowledged these limitations and either incorporated them into the RFC or gave reasons to discount them. See AR 35. The limitations were not necessarily consistent with a marked impairment in concentration, persistence, or pace. Finally, Holden argues that it is illogical for the ALJ to discount Dr. Garrison's opinion because it was inconsistent with the findings of the evaluating physicians when the ALJ did not fully accept their opinions either. See Dkt. 12 at 10. However, that the ALJ found reasons to further discount the extremity of the evaluating physicians' opinions (which Holden does not argue was in error) does not undermine, but rather supports, the finding that the record did not support the marked limitations to which Dr. Garrison opined. Therefore, the ALJ gave specific, legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount the opinion of the nonexamining physician. The ALJ did not err.

VIII. ORDER

Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED.