KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Thomas Belles filed a complaint on June 9, 2017, asserting several discrimination claims against defendants Wilkes-Barre Area School District (the "District"), Frank Castano, and Sean Flynn.
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 24). Both parties have provided statements of material facts and fully briefed the motion, which is now ripe for review. (Doc. 25; Doc. 26; Doc. 30; Doc. 31; Doc. 32). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
The factual background is taken from the parties' respective statements of material facts, unless otherwise indicated. (Doc. 25; Doc. 30). Where the parties dispute certain facts, those disputes are noted. In addition, the facts have been taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor. Where Belles disputes a fact set forth by Defendants but fails to provide a citation to the record supporting denial thereof, that fact will be deemed to be admitted. Unsupported "assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions" are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 732 F.Supp.2d 490, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
Long before the circumstances giving rise to this action, Belles, in a tragic ATV accident, became paraplegic. (Doc. 26, at 1, ¶ 3; Doc. 30, at 9, ¶ 1). Wheelchair-bound and without full functioning of his hands, Belles nevertheless became a middle school teacher and successful wrestling coach for the District. (Doc. 26, at 1, ¶ 1-2; Doc. 30, at 1, ¶¶ 1-2). He began teaching part-time in 1993, became a full-time teacher of history and social studies at Solomon-Plains Junior High School in 1999, was appointed as the head coach of the junior high wrestling team at Solomon-Plains in 2008, and was appointed as the head coach of the varsity wrestling team at the James M. Coughlin High School in 2014. (Doc. 26, at 1, ¶¶ 1-3; Doc. 30, at 9, ¶ 1-6). In 2001, Belles requested and was granted a teaching aide to help him with tasks such as correcting exams and taking attendance.
When the District appointed Belles as varsity head coach on May 12, 2014, neither Belles nor those who vetted and appointed him raised the issue of his disability or questioned whether Belles was qualified for and able to perform the demands of the position. (Doc. 26, at 1-2, ¶¶ 1-3; Doc. 30, at 9, ¶¶ 1-6, 11). Indeed, Belles was selected over four other (non-disabled) candidates for the position. (Doc. 26, at 2, ¶ 7; Doc. 30, at 2, ¶ 7). At the time of his appointment, wrestling season, which generally runs from November through March, had not yet begun. (Doc. 24-2, at 5; Doc. 24-1, at 6). As varsity head coach, Belles was expected to transition from running wrestling practices in the Solomon-Plains' gymnasium — where he had coached junior high wrestlers — to running practices out of Coughlin's lower-level wresting room, access to which was limited to steps. (Doc. 26, at 2, ¶ 8; Doc. 30, at 2, ¶ 9; Doc. 24-1, at 6). Frank Castano, the District's Human Resources Manager, was tasked with finding an accommodation for Belles given that Belles could not descend or ascend the stairs in his wheelchair. (Doc. 24-2, at 11).
On May 13, 2014, the day after Belles's appointment as varsity head coach, Castano informed Belles that unidentified students had called the District Board to voice complaints about the appointment. (Doc. 26, at 3, ¶ 11; Doc. 30, at 3, ¶ 11). There is no dispute that the complaints were made, but Belles and Castano have different recollections of the events as they actually transpired. Belles testified that Castano told him the school received phone calls, indicated that "things changed," and suggested a scenario where Belles's nephew, Mark Belles, would become a high school coach and Belles would become a "floating coach" of sorts. (Doc. 30, at 3, ¶ 1; Doc. 24-1, at 15). Castano testified that Belles was upset about the complaints and asked Castano for advice about how to proceed. Belles was not satisfied with Castano's initial response (to "coach because he was appointed as coach"), the two "kick[ed] around ideas and th[e] [floating coach idea] was one of them," and Belles told Castano he would follow up by submitting a proposal, though no proposal was ever submitted. (Doc. 26, at 3, ¶ 11; Doc. 24-2, at 14).
The complaints about Belles's appointment did not end there. Robert Hawkins, former acting head coach for the varsity wrestling team, attended a June 2014 Board meeting and called the Board to complain about Belles. (Doc. 26, at 2-3, ¶ 10; Doc. 30, at 3, ¶ 10; Doc. 24-2, at 8).
At some point — likely in either late May or June 2014, although no witnesses testified as to the precise date — District Superintendent Bernard Prevuznak told Belles that "numerous people had said practices must be in the Coughlin basement room and asserted himself that the practices could not be moved from there." (Doc. 30, at 13, ¶ 25; Doc. 24-1). Belles's testimony is that Prevuznak did not make this statement "in a nice way"; instead, "[i]t was like, they must stay here in the wrestling room." (Doc. 24-1).
On a subsequent occasion within the same timeframe, Belles met with Castano, Prevuznak, and Assistant Superintendent Brian Costello. (Doc. 26, at 4, ¶ 18; Doc. 30, at 14, ¶¶ 26, 218).
Prevuznak referenced the same meeting during his deposition. (Doc. 24-4, at 8-9). He testified to a "very supportive meeting that we are going to make this work at Coughlin High School," where practices had always been held, and "would adapt and accommodate [Belles's] disability to have it there." (Doc. 24-4, at 8-9). According to Prevuznak, he had initiated this meeting because he felt that Belles "was under a lot of stress." (Doc. 24-4, at 9).
In late June and early August 2014, the District made decisions antithetic to Belles's wishes. At an August 11, 2014 Board meeting, the District hired an associate head coach, David Parsnik,
According to Belles, the District did nothing to further the provision of accommodations that would enable him to attend wrestling practices in the Coughlin wrestling room. (Doc. 30, at 4, ¶ 14, 19-20). Until, that is, on or about August 27, 2014, when Belles became aware of emails that Castano had sent but which Belles had not received due to issues with his email account. (Doc. 30, at 4, ¶ 19). Specifically, Castano had emailed Belles, copying Clifford Jones and Patrick Patte, on August 25, 2014, to schedule a meeting with a company to assess whether they could install a lift or ramp for wheelchair access to the basement wrestling room. (Doc. 26, at 3-4, ¶¶ 14-16; Doc. 30, at 4, ¶¶ 14-16; Doc. 24-1, at 77 (Dep. Ex. C)).
On August 28, 2014, Belles resigned from his position as head coach to the varsity wrestling team, and the District later accepted his resignation. (Doc. 26, at 5, ¶ 24; Doc. 30, at 7, ¶ 24).
There are additional allegations advanced in Belles's complaint and throughout testimony adduced during the discovery phase of this case. Most notably, Belles alleged that Defendant Flynn had engaged in improper and harassing conduct during the process of having Belles's fingerprints taken. Belles is no longer proceeding against Flynn, see supra at 1 (citing Doc. 31, at 7 n.2), he has not incorporated any of these arguments in his statement and counterstatement of material facts (except by way denying, for other reasons, Defendants' assertion that Belles had alleged that Defendants embarrassed and humiliated him during the fingerprinting process in retaliation for Belles's resignation), and he makes not a single reference to this incident in his brief in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgement. (Doc. 26, at 5, ¶ 25; Doc. 30, at 7-8, ¶ 25; Doc. 31, passim). By all accounts, it appears that Belles is no longer basing his claim on this incident.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences "should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
A federal court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the court must simply "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
"Although the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the `benefit of all factual inferences in the court's consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must point to some evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact.'"
The ADA prohibits employers from "discriminating `against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.'" Taylor, 184 F.3d at 305 (quoting 42 U.S.C. ¶ 12112(a)). To establish a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show "(1) that he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability." Dahl v. Johnston, 598 F.App'x 818, 819-20 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132); see also Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n. 32 (3d Cir. 2007). A "`qualified individual' [is] a person `who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.'" Gardner v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 636 F. App'x 79, 83 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
An employee seeking relief under the ADA can prove discrimination either through direct evidence of discrimination or circumstantially. Most commonly, cases involving non-direct, i.e., circumstantial, evidence in the ADA context are claims of disparate treatment. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 n.3 (2003) ("The Courts of Appeals have consistently utilized this burden-shifting approach when reviewing motions for summary judgment in disparate-treatment cases.").
Before addressing each cause of action seriatim, the Court notes that the ADA generally does "not impose individual liability" and, as such, does not give rise to money damages in a claim against individual defendants. Michalesko v. Freeland Borough, 18 F.Supp.3d 609, 626 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (citing McInerney v. Moyer Lumber and Hardware, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 393, 398 (E.D. Pa. 2002)); see also Ciferni v. Boilermakers Local 13, 158 F.Supp.3d 263, 267 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (dismissing with prejudice retaliation claims against individual defendants). Thus, if by asserting that "[a]t all times relevant, Castano was acting in his supervisory and personal capacity," (Doc. 1, at 3, ¶ 10 (emphasis added)), Belles means to assert a claim for money damages directly against Castano as an individual, such a claim is not cognizable. However, the law permits Belles to pursue his claim against Castano for prospective injunctive damages in the form of reinstatement of his position. See, e.g., Mohney v. Pennsylvania, 809 F.Supp.2d 384, 392 (W.D. Pa. 2011) ("The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found that there is generally no individual liability under the ADA. An exception exists when an individual is sued for prospective injunctive relief." (citation omitted)).
An employer who seeks an accommodation for a disability bears the initial burden of identifying a possible accommodation and showing that the cost of the accommodation does not clearly exceed its benefits. Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., a Div. of Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 257 F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2001); Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580-81 (3d Cir. 1998). When faced with "a disabled employee's request for a reasonable accommodation, `both parties have a duty to assist in the search for appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act in good faith.'" Hohider, 574 F.3d at 187 (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at 312). The employer need not "maintain the employment of a plaintiff whose proposed accommodation for a disability is clearly ineffective" but nonetheless shares the responsibility of suggesting reasonable accommodations through an "interactive process" with the employee. Gardner, 636 F. App'x at 84 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and the potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations." Tarpley, 752 F. App'x at 349 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). Thus, there are two avenues through which an employee can establish the third element of a failure-to-accommodate cause of action, by establishing that the employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, or the employer failed to engage in the interactive process. See, e.g., Willis v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 2 F.Supp.3d 597, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
Belles first argues that Defendants violated the ADA by failing to provide him with reasonable accommodations to permit him to coach the varsity wrestling team and by failing to engage in any interactive process whereby such accommodations could be suggested and ultimately provided. Defendants do not dispute that Belles is disabled and that he was qualified for the head coaching position for which he was appointed. Thus, Belles's failure-to-accommodate claim turns on the third element: whether Defendants refused to make reasonable accommodations. See Hohider, 574 F.3d at 186.
Based on the record, the Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact concerning Defendants' purported failure to provide Belles with a reasonable accommodation. Defendants scheduled a meeting with a company for that purpose, to be held the same day Belles resigned, and Belles was invited to attend the meeting but did not receive the email invitation. Though Belles disputes the existence of any emails concerning the August 2014 meetings with the accessibility company, the evidence shows, at best, that Belles did not receive the emails through no fault of his own, or Defendants, and that the meeting was, in fact, scheduled to occur. Belles's contention throughout his submissions is that "[no] efforts to consider accommodations for Mr. Belles's attendance at his own practices were done or made known to him until August 27, 2014." (See, e.g., Doc. 30, at 4, ¶ 19).
Further, by resigning on the eve of the meeting with the accessibility company, Belles foreclosed the possibility that a factfinder could find that Defendants failed to provide an accommodation. It may never be known what may have transpired had Belles remained a head coach, and to allow the claim to proceed on this ground would be to sanction jury speculation. See, e.g., Tarpley, 752 F. App'x at 350 ("Despite her failure to follow City Colleges' policies, City Colleges considered Tarpley's request, but Tarpley resigned before City Colleges made a decision. Therefore, Tarpley's ADA reasonable accommodation claim fails—City Colleges never denied her request. Summary judgment in favor of City Colleges was appropriate.").
Nevertheless, Belles may also establish his claim by showing that Defendants failed to engage in the ADA's interactive process concerning claims of failures to provide reasonable accommodations. In the case of an "employee who tries to hold his/her employer responsible for a breakdown in the interactive process under the ADA," the employee must establish four elements:
While this is a shared "interactive process," the standard provides that "an employer is liable for discriminating against an employee in need of accommodation based upon the employee's known disability"—not a known accommodation—and thus the employee is not always required to suggest accommodations in order to trigger the employer's obligation to provide such accommodations. See Conneen, 334 F.3d at 331.
Belles's resignation foreclosed the possibility of establishing the cause of action on this ground as well. While the interactive process is statutorily mandated, the case law does not support Belles's position that an employer is liable for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation where the employer ultimately takes steps to provide an adequate accommodation, but the employee then resigns. Though Defendants' attempts to engage in the interactive process are scant between May and August 2014, the undisputed record before the Court is that there were at least some meetings, wrestling season did not commence until November, and Castano had set up a meeting with the accessibility company in late August. Nothing in the record reflects any requirement, by Belles or otherwise, that the accommodations be done by a date certain.
Not all requested accommodations are appropriate, and the ADA only provides a right to reasonable accommodation, not to the employee's preferred accommodation. Stadtmiller v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 799 F.Supp.2d 492, 509 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 491 F. App'x 334 (3d Cir. 2012). As such, the installation of a lift or ramp instead of moving practice (per Belles's suggestion) does not establish that no accommodations were offered. Simply put, there are no facts that would permit a jury to conclude that Belles "could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer's lack of good faith." See Conneen, 334 F.3d at 330-31.
Belles's allegations, bereft of any evidentiary support,
For these reasons, the Court finds that a reasonable juror could not conclude that the Belles's appointment, or where he asked Belles to check or draft emails. None of these raise a genuine dispute of material fact. Defendants denied Belles reasonable accommodations or failed to engage in an interactive process. As such, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim will be granted.
Contextualized within the framework of the ADA, Belles's claim of discrimination based on his disability (Doc. 31, at 18-22) is essentially a hostile-work-environment cause of action. To establish a prima facie case of such cause of action under the ADA, an employee must show that:
To be sufficiently severe or pervasive, the harassment must "`alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Ballard-Carter, 703 F. App'x at 152 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Courts consider "all the circumstances, including `the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'" Lowenstein v. Catholic Health E., 820 F.Supp.2d 639, 647 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Walton, 168 F.3d at 667). The ADA, however, "does not make all harassment, or every unpleasant working environment, actionable under the law. Rather, to constitute a hostile work environment under the ADA the harassing conduct must be because of the plaintiff's disability." Griffin v. Municipality of Kingston, No. 3:08-CV-2290, 2011 WL 718697, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2011) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Walton, 168 F.3d at 667).
The Court considers the harassment and discriminatory conduct that allegedly befell Belles in 2014, including his assertions that (1) Castano told him to resign, (2) Defendants did not engage in a "good faith" interactive process, (3) Hawkins's complaints about Belles, objection to Belles's appointment, and text indicating that a relocation of the wrestling practice space would destroy Coughlin wrestling, and (4) the District Board appointment of Hawkins as an assistant coach.
Under the Ballard-Carter factors, there is no dispute that Belles was disabled under the ADA and that he perceived he was being harassed following his appointment as Coughlin's head coach. Nevertheless, a review of the record reveals no genuine issue of material fact so as to overcome summary judgment on this hostile-work-environment claim. At the outset, the Court notes that Belles's testimony is often speculative, including conclusory assertions concerning the intent behind all Defendants' conduct. For example, when asked about the reasons behind the District's rejection of his proposed assistant coaching staff, Belles testified, "I think everything that they did, all actions they took, had something to do with my disability." (Doc. 24-1, at 29).
Belles allegation that Castano requested that he resign is not supported by the record. Castano testified that he told Belles, in essence, to ignore the complaints and coach because that was what Belles was hired to do. According to Castano, Belles had asked him for advice, after which Castano and Belles kicked around the idea of Belles becoming a floating "CEO" coach. Consistent with Castano's statements, Belles testimony indicates that the two did "kick" around ideas, though Belles never agreed with the proposals. (See, e.g., Doc. 24-1, at 16). There is no non-conclusory support for Belles's contention that Castano's proposals were a result of Castano's reluctance to help accommodate Belles's disability.
Regarding Hawkins's conduct, nothing in Belles's allegations suggests that Defendants were "in league" with Hawkins, a volunteer coach, such that the District could be held liable for Hawkins's actions. As Defendants note, all complaints relayed from Castano to Belles were complaints made by other people, namely Hawkins. The record reveals no evidence that Hawkins's conduct — the complaints about Belles, objection to Belles's appointment, and text — should be imputed to Defendants. The appointment of Hawkins, a long-time wrestling coach for the district, to the assistant head coach position does not create a factual issue for jurors. In opposing Defendants' motion, Belles has only proffered his own conclusory assertion that Hawkins's appointment constituted harassment animated by discriminatory intent based on Belles disability.
Other instances of alleged harassment — e.g., parents' and students' complaints about Belles's appointment, and Prevuznak having yelled, "I'm going to tell you right now . . . . The Board does not want to pay for a wheelchair lift so that you can get into the wrestling room" — may raise issues of fact, as Prevuznak denied ever yelling at Belles, but not material fact. The parents' and students' conduct is not synonymous with Defendants' conduct, and Prevuznak's single instance of yelling without any evidence of discriminatory intent is, without more, not evidence of a hostile environment. See, e.g., Greer v. Mondelez Glob., Inc., 590 F. App'x 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff had failed "to show how the [race-evocative] comments support her claim that her workplace was "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."). Even Belles stated that Prevuznak was concerned that the cost of a lift would be prohibitive, not that Prevuznak was discriminating against Belles or harassing Belles for being disabled. In any event, Belles cannot overcome Defendants' motion as to this cause of action by relying on the reasonable-accommodation claim, the bases for which the Court has rejected because they do not raise an issue of material fact.
For these reasons, the Court finds that a reasonable juror could not conclude that the Defendants created a hostile work environment, and as such, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim will be granted.
When asserting ADA-based retaliation, a plaintiff-employee must show that the protected activity she engaged in was the determinative factor motivating the defendant-employer to take the adverse employment action. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 267 (3d Cir. 2005); Watson v. SEPTA, 207 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2000)); Diffenderfer v. Pa. State Emps. Credit Union, 2018 WL 1428164, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2018) (citing Gillette v. Donahoe, 622 F. App'x 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2015)). A prima facie case of retaliation requires evidence that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, adverse action was taken against him, and there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Moore v. Temple Univ., No. 13-5079, 2016 WL 4061352, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2016), aff'd, 674 F. App'x 239 (3d Cir. 2017). To satisfy the causation element, a plaintiff "must prove either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link." Moore, 2016 WL 4061352, at *6. Where the timing between a plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse action is not unusually suggestive, "[t]emporal proximity by itself is generally insufficient to establish a causal connection." Youssef v. Anvil Int'l, 595 F.Supp.2d 547, 563 (E.D. Pa. 2009). Whether temporal proximity is sufficiently suggestive to establish causation, however, is dependent on the facts of each case, and an analysis of the probative value of circumstantial evidence in retaliation cases is intensively fact-bound and-specific. Romanaskas v. Earthbox, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00517, 2018 WL 1370876, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-517, 2018 WL 1370612 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2018).
In opposing Defendants' motion for summary judgment on his retaliation claim, Belles relies on "the same evidence which establishes [his] discrimination [i.e., hostile work environment] claim." (Doc. 31, at 23). He does specifically assert, however, that it was not until after Prevuznak screamed at Belles and told him that they would not provide a wheelchair lift that the District "appoint[ed] the antagonistic and hostile assistant coaches" and "diminish[ed] [his] role by assigning him" an associate head coach.
Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court finds that Belles has not demonstrated a genuine issue of fact sufficient to overcome Defendants' summary judgment motion as to this cause of action. First, Belles has not offered anything beyond his own allegations to raise an issue of fact concerning Defendants' evidence that Prevuznak did not scream or threaten Belles and that the assistant and associate head coaches were not hired (and Belles's proposed coaches not hired) in retaliation for Belles's appointment. Second, to the extent Belles is relying on arguments raised in other portions of his brief, the Court has already determined these do not create an issue of fact as to discriminatory intent. Third, the mere refusal to hire assistant coaches, the hiring of an associate coach, and the one-time proposal that he become a floating CEO wrestling coach do not suffice to establish sufficient "adverse conduct."
Moreover, Castano testified, and nothing in the record reflects otherwise, that it is the District Board, and not existing coaches, that appoints coaches.
Finally, even assuming Belles established a prima facie case of discrimination, Defendants proffer evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hiring the other coaches and, through Castano's testimony, proffered non-discriminatory reasons for the District's rejection of Belles's proposed hires: "Unfortunately, one withdrew, the other one didn't apply, and the third was not appointed, but we were looking at ways to include him, Mark [Belles] specifically." (Doc. 24-2, at 17).
To the extent Belles's relies on his constructive discharge claim to support his retaliation theory of liability, "[v]oluntary resignation is not an adverse employment action." Larochelle v. Wilmac Corp., 769 F. App'x 57, 60-61 (3d Cir. 2019) ("Because Defendants did not terminate or take an adverse employment action against Riker, [who had voluntarily resigned], the District Court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants on Riker's retaliation and wrongful discharge claims.").
For these reasons, the Court finds that a reasonable juror could not conclude that the Defendants retaliated against Belles. As such, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim will be granted.
Finally, Belles argues that Defendants constructively discharged him from his appointment as head coach to the Coughlin varsity wrestling team. Claims of constructive discharge are evaluated under an objective test according to which courts must, on a motion for summary judgment, "determine whether a reasonable jury could find that the [employer] permitted conditions so unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign." Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 502 (3d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Duffy v. Paper Magic Group, Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2001)). Courts consider whether the employer (1) threatened to discharge the employee, (2) demoted the employee, (3) reduced the employee's salary or benefits, (4) transferred the employee (against his or her wishes) to a less desirable position, (5) altered the employees job responsibilities, or (6) gave unsatisfactory job evaluations. Colwell, 602 F.3d at 502 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the objective standard, the "employee's subjective perceptions [do not] govern a claim of constructive discharge." Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1083 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For the same reasons that Belles "has failed to substantiate an actionable hostile work environment claim," he also "fails to meet the more stringent requirements of a hostile-environment constructive discharge claim." See Mufti v. Aarsand & Co., 667 F.Supp.2d 535, 553 (W.D. Pa. 2009). Nevertheless, after separating Belles's subjective statements from objective evidence of conditions that, according to him, precipitated his resignation, Belles has failed to establish a triable fact as to this cause of action. Looking at the first factor considered under Colwell, 602 F.3d at 502, there is no evidence that Defendants threatened to discharge Belles. The Court has rejected as unsupported Belles's claim that Castano urged him to resign, and Belles's self-serving testimony and allegations do not support that assertion. Nor can the Court accepted Belles argument that by asking Belles to write a resignation email (after Belles stated his intention to resign), Castano exhibited conduct corroborative of an intention to urge Belles to resign.
Considering the other relevant factors, there is no indication that Belles was going to be demoted, that he suffered a reduction in salary or benefits, that his job responsibilities were altered, or that he was given unsatisfactory job evaluations. While Belles argues that the District effectually demoted him by hiring an associate "co" coach, it cannot be said that an objectively reasonable person would find additional help from a co-coach to be a demotion. There is no dispute that until the day he resigned, Belles was head coach to the varsity wrestling team. He may not have liked the District's decisions, but these decisions do not permit a trier of fact to find that Belles was demoted.
Notably, in support of this and other causes of action, Belles relies heavily on allegations of Defendants' conduct vis-à-vis Belles's need for an accommodation. Regarding this final cause of action, for example, Belles argues his resignation was fueled, in large part, due to Defendants' "complete disavowal of any intent to accommodate." For the reasons stated herein, Belles testimony and assertions do not establish that he was denied reasonable accommodations, particularly given that there was some engagement in the interactive process among the key players involved, and more importantly, action was ultimately taken in the form of scheduling a meeting with an accessibility company. Indeed, Belles himself testified to having spoke with Castano sometime before August 27, 2014, regarding the accessibility company, a fact which is corroborated by Castano's conduct in scheduling a meeting. Belles stresses that he never received Castano's emails setting up the meeting, but "nothing requires employers to include the employee . . . in every discussion of possible accommodations or evaluations as part of engaging in the interactive process." See Parker v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., 309 F. App'x 551, 562 (3d Cir. 2009).
For these reasons, the Court finds that a reasonable juror could not conclude that the Defendants constructively discharged Belles. As such, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim will be granted.
Based on the foregoing,
An appropriate Order will follow.
