REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Magistrate Judge.

This is a pro se civil action for damages, initiated upon the filing of the original complaint in this matter by Plaintiff Robert Gordon (hereinafter referred to as "Gordon") on February 22, 2017. (Doc. 1). In his initial complaint, Gordon asserted a variety of claims against Kartri Sales Co., Inc. ("Kartri") and Greater Forest City Industries, Inc. ("GFCI"),1 pursuant to this Court's federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 1). After a lengthy procedural history, Gordon filed an amended complaint with leave of court on March 26, 2018, which stands as the operative pleading in this case. (Doc. 43). Now pending before the Court is Kartri's motion to dismiss and strike portions of the amended complaint, filed on April 3, 2018. (Doc. 44). For the reasons stated herein, the Court respectfully recommends that Kartri's motion be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 22, 2017, Gordon, proceeding pro se, filed the initial complaint for monetary damages against Kartri and GFCI.2 (Doc. 1). Kartri filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, along with a supporting brief, on May 4, 2014. (Doc. 13; Doc. 14). Shortly thereafter, the Court received a letter from GFCI indicating that it had entered into a settlement agreement with Gordon (the "Settlement").3 (Doc. 15). The undersigned subsequently issued a Report and Recommendation that recommended Kartri's motion to dismiss be granted.4 (Doc. 25). The District Court declined to adopt the Report and Recommendation and recommitted the matter for further consideration. (Doc. 33; Doc. 34). After construing Gordon's brief in opposition to Kartri's motion to dismiss as seeking leave to amend the original complaint, the undersigned granted Gordon leave to file a curative amended complaint. (Doc. 38; Doc. 39). Gordon filed the amended complaint on March 26, 2018, which remains the operative pleading. (Doc. 43).

In the amended complaint, Gordon avers that from June 2012, until approximately October 2013, he leased a building from Kartri. (Doc. 43, at 2). During this time, Gordon stored certain industrial equipment and machinery (the "Equipment") on the property. (Doc. 43, at 2). Notably, GFCI had a UCC security interest in the Equipment.5 (Doc. 43, at 2). However, on or about October 2013, Gordon avers that Kartri locked him out of the building, without any prior notice or implementation of eviction proceedings, "ostensibly for non-payment of rent." (Doc. 43, at 2). Gordon additionally alleges that, in distraint for the outstanding rent payments, Kartri prevented him from removing his personal property from the premises. (Doc. 43, at 3).

On April 25, 2015, Kartri commenced a civil action against Gordon in the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas ("State Court") for breach of the parties' lease agreement.6 (Doc. 43-1, at 15). The State Court entered judgment in favor of Kartri on October 14, 2014, and the parties executed a General Mutual Release Agreement ("Release Agreement") that was made an Order of the Court on March 11, 2015. (Doc. 43, at 3; Doc. 43-1, at 14-15). According to Gordon, he agreed to the terms of the Release Agreement upon the understanding that Kartri would allow him to retrieve his property, including the Equipment, from March 17, 2015 to March 31, 2015 (the "Removal Deadline"). (Doc. 43, at 5). However, Gordon claims that Kartri chained off the building for 57 days, in violation of the Release Agreement, and thereby frustrated his attempts to retrieve the Equipment by the Removal Deadline. (Doc. 43, at 5-6).

Due to the alleged denial of access, Gordon asserts that his State Court attorney, Gerald Orseck ("Attorney Orseck") contacted Kartri's attorney, Benjamin Schnessel ("Attorney Schnessel"), in relation to the matter. (Doc. 43, at 3). Presumably during their conversation, which took place on an unspecified date, Attorney Orseck and Attorney Schnessel orally agreed to extend the Removal Deadline by thirty (30) days, or to April 30, 2015. (Doc. 43, at 3). Notwithstanding this verbal agreement, Gordon alleges that Kartri commenced with liquidating the Inventory on April 1, 2015. (Doc. 43, at 3). At the time of liquidation, Gordon owed approximately $20,000 to GFCI; however, Gordon claims that Kartri sold the Equipment for a "miniscule percentage" of its fair market value and failed to account to him with any money it received. (Doc. 43, at 4). As a result, Gordon complains that Kartri prevented him from applying any proceeds from the sale of the secured Equipment to his outstanding loan balance with GFCI. (Doc. 43, at 4). Gordon further asserts that Kartri either sold or discarded his remaining personal property that had not been retrieved.7

Gordon also alleges, for the first time, that Kartri commenced with demolishing the building on or about March 19, 2015 in an effort to sell the land on which it sat. (Doc. 43 at 4-6). Seemingly in preparation for the demolition, Kartri allegedly used two large forklifts, which belonged to Gordon and remained on the property, to remove his "inventory out of the building and truck it away." (Doc. 43, at 4). Gordon asserts that Kartri completely demolished the building by June 2015, and, when liberally construed, claims that Kartri breached the terms of the Release Agreement by failing to remove his property in a reasonable manner. (Doc. 43, at 6).

Against this backdrop, the amended complaint sets forth two unnamed causes of action resulting from Kartri's alleged "breach of contract, breach of [the] lease agreement, and [breach of the Release Agreement]": (1) damages in the amount of $300,000, being the difference of the Equipment's fair market value and realized sale proceeds ("Count I"); and (2) damages in the amount of $20,000, representing the outstanding balance of Gordon's loan from GFCI ("Count II"). (Doc. 43, at 7). Kartri filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, and a motion to strike portions of the pleading, on April 3, 2018. (Doc. 44; Doc. 45). In support of its motion, Kartri argues that Count II should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) as moot, as Gordon admittedly settled and dismissed his claims against GFCI.8 (Doc. 45, at 5). Further, Kartri claims that portions of the amended complaint should be struck pursuant to Rule 12(f), as they seemingly assert new claims that exceed the scope of his original complaint. (Doc. 45, at 5). In response, Gordon appears to concede that Count II is moot, and requests that the Court strike his demand for $20,000 from Kartri. (Doc. 46, at 1; Doc. 49, at 2-3). Gordon further asserts that Kartri's motion to strike should be denied, as he has only "added more provable facts" to the amended complaint, and still relies on the claims for damages set forth in his initial pleading.9 (Doc. 46, at 7).

This motion, having been fully briefed, is now ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move for dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's `bald assertions' or `legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). A plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

A document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

B. MOTION TO DISMISS

First, Kartri moves to dismiss Count II of the amended complaint, with prejudice, as moot. (Doc. 45, at 8-9; Doc. 48, at 1). Specifically, Count II asserts an unnamed cause of action for monetary damages against Kartri "in an amount sufficient to pay the unpaid balance of GFCI's loan to [Gordon] in the approximate sum of $20,000." (Doc. 43, at 7). However, Kartri argues that Gordon previously entered into a settlement agreement with GFCI, and voluntarily dismissed the entity as a defendant. (Doc. 45, at 8). As such, Kartri asserts that Count II is subject to dismissal, as the alleged $20,000 debt Gordon owed to GFCI has since been discharged by way of settlement. (Doc. 45, at 9). In response, Gordon appears to concede this point, and "asks the court to strike [his] demand for $20,000 from [] Kartri for [GFCI] because the claim is moot." (Doc. 46, at 1).

As such, because Gordon voluntarily withdrew Count II of the amended complaint,10 the Court respectfully recommends that Kartri's motion to dismiss be DENIED as MOOT.

C. MOTION TO STRIKE

Kartri also moves to strike portions of the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, on the grounds that certain paragraphs of the pleading violate this Court's prior Order of March 12, 2018. (Doc. 45, at 9). Specifically, Kartri references the undersigned's advisement that the amended complaint must be limited to the claims "as raised in Gordon's original complaint (Doc. 1) and brief in opposition (Doc. 23)." (Doc. 38; Doc. 39; Doc. 45, at 10). In response, Gordon contends that his claim for damages against Kartri ultimately remains unchanged. (Doc. 46, at 7). He further avers that the amended complaint merely includes "more provable facts" with respect to his claims for breach of contract and conversion. (Doc. 46, at 6-7).

Rule 12(f) permits the Court to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." "The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters." Natale v. Winthrop Res. Corp., 2008 WL 2758238, at *14 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Motions to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) are generally disfavored "unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the allegations confuse the issues in the case." Natale, 2008 WL 2758238, at *14 (quoting River Road Devel. Corp. v. Carlson Corp., Civ. A. No. 89-7037, 1990 WL 69085, at *2 (E.D.Pa. May 23, 1990)). Further, "[w]hen faced with allegations that could possibly serve to achieve a better understanding of plaintiff's claims or perform any useful purpose in promoting the just disposition of the litigation, courts generally deny such motions to strike." Cestra v. Mylan, Inc., No. CIV.A. 14-825, 2015 WL 2455420, at *7 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2015) (quoting Eisai Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 629 F.Supp.2d 416, 425 (D.N.J. 2009), as amended (July 6, 2009)).

Here, Kartri moves to strike the newly asserted factual allegations as procedurally improper, and argues that certain claims and facts in the operative complaint exceed the scope of the undersigned's grant of leave to amend. (Doc. 45, at 9-10). However, upon review of the amended pleading and brief in opposition (Doc. 43; Doc. 46), the newly asserted factual allegations allow a better understanding of Gordon's claims against Kartri for breach of contract and common law conversion as seemingly raised, albeit vaguely, in the original complaint. See Cestra, 2015 WL 2455420, at *7. Further, the Court's Memorandum, filed in conjunction with its March 12, 2018 Order, also provided that "additional facts [by way of an amended complaint] may be helpful to Gordon, as a pro se litigant, in satisfying the federal pleading standard." (Doc. 38, at 6). As the contested paragraphs focus on the crux of Gordon's claims for conversion and breach of contract, namely Kartri's alleged interference with his attempts to remove the Equipment and other personal property from the building notwithstanding several agreements that existed between the Parties, the Court does not consider the new allegations to be clearly redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.

For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Kartri's motion to strike portions of the amended complaint (Doc. 44) be DENIED.

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the Court DENY Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Doc. 44). Specifically, we recommend:

NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2018. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides: