Filed: Nov. 08, 2018
Latest Update: Nov. 08, 2018
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION MARTIN C. CARLSON , Magistrate Judge . I. Factual Background Pending before the court is the plaintiff's motion to remand the instant case to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County. (Doc. 6). Paige Barnard filed this contract action against Liberty Mutual Insurance Corporation and the First Liberty Insurance Corporation (collectively, "Liberty Mutual") in Lackawanna County on May 23, 2018. (Doc. 6, 1). The action arose from an insurance policy issue
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION MARTIN C. CARLSON , Magistrate Judge . I. Factual Background Pending before the court is the plaintiff's motion to remand the instant case to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County. (Doc. 6). Paige Barnard filed this contract action against Liberty Mutual Insurance Corporation and the First Liberty Insurance Corporation (collectively, "Liberty Mutual") in Lackawanna County on May 23, 2018. (Doc. 6, 1). The action arose from an insurance policy issued..
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN C. CARLSON, Magistrate Judge.
I. Factual Background
Pending before the court is the plaintiff's motion to remand the instant case to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County. (Doc. 6). Paige Barnard filed this contract action against Liberty Mutual Insurance Corporation and the First Liberty Insurance Corporation (collectively, "Liberty Mutual") in Lackawanna County on May 23, 2018. (Doc. 6, ¶ 1). The action arose from an insurance policy issued by Liberty Mutual and an automobile accident that the plaintiff was involved in on December 21, 2015. (Doc. 7, ¶ 5). Liberty Mutual filed a Notice of Removal with this court on June 15, 2018, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). On this score, with respect to the question of diversity of citizenship the plaintiff's amended complaint states that Barnard is an adult citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, and further avers that the defendants are corporations whose business addresses are in Massachusetts. (Doc. 7, ¶¶1-4.) Liberty Mutual has also averred without contradiction that it is a corporation that is incorporated in Illinois and has its principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. (Doc. 11, at 1).
Barnard now moves to remand the case to the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that complete diversity does not exist. (Doc. 6, ¶ 7). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. For the following reasons, we will recommend that the motion to remand be denied.
II. Discussion
A. Removal Jurisdiction Legal Prerequisites
Removal of cases is governed 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which provides as follows:
(a) Generally.—A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.
(b) Requirements; generally.—(1) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
Thus, by its terms § 1446 commands parties seeking removal to act in a prompt and timely fashion, directing removing parties to seek removal "within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based." Id. Further, it is well settled that "[t]he removal statutes `are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.' Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985)), cert. dismissed sub nom. American Standard v. Steel Valley Auth., 484 U.S. 1021, 108 S.Ct. 739, 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988)." Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) Therefore, "a party who urges jurisdiction on a federal court bears the burden of proving that" removal is appropriate. Id.
Moreover, a civil action may only be removed from state court if the federal court would have original jurisdiction over the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Here, Liberty Mutual has removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A defendant may remove a case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction so long as there is "complete diversity" among the parties, i.e., no defendant is a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff, and the defendant is not a citizen of the forum state. Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005). For purposes of diversity, a corporate defendant like Liberty Mutual is a "citizen" of the state of in which it is incorporated and the state where it maintains its principal place of business, or "nerve center." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010). See 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)(1).
Here, Liberty Mutual's Notice of Removal was timely, as it was filed within 30 days of the filing of the plaintiff's complaint in state court. Furthermore, the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met in this case because there is complete diversity among the parties. The plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 7, ¶ 1). Liberty Mutual is a corporation that is incorporated in Illinois and has its principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. (Doc. 7, ¶ 4; Doc. 11, at 1).
While the plaintiff attempts to defeat diversity by alleging that Liberty Mutual has a principal place of business in Moosic, Pennsylvania, these efforts are unavailing. (Doc. 8, at 6). Barnard's argument appears to equate any corporate place of business with a corporation's principal place of business. However, a corporation may only have one principal place of business, and it is clear from the pleadings that Liberty Mutual's principal place of business is in Massachusetts, not Pennsylvania. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93 ("A corporation's `nerve center,' usually its main headquarters, is a single place"); see also Brewer v. SmithKline Beacham Corp., 774 F.Supp.2d 720, 725 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ("Focusing on a place within the state and not on state-wide activities, we distinguish between a corporation's headquarters and places where it conducts its business activities"). Indeed, we are constrained to observe that federal courts within this circuit have upheld the removal of cases brought against Liberty Mutual to federal court based upon our diversity jurisdiction, citing the fact that this corporation is a citizen of Massachusetts. See Miller v. Liberty Mut. Grp., 97 F.Supp.2d 672, 674 n. 2 (W.D. Pa. 2000). Thus, because there is complete diversity between the parties, the requirements for removal have been met, and the plaintiff's motion for remand should be denied.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. 6) be DENIED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.