GLEN E. CONRAD, District Judge.
Plaintiff has filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423, and 42 U.S.C. § 1381
The plaintiff, Samaura J. Diede, was born on September 13, 1982, and eventually completed her high school education. Ms. Diede received additional education as a nursing assistant. Plaintiff has worked as a sales clerk in a clothing store, clerk in a pet store, restaurant cashier, waitress, telemarketer, cook, and nursing assistant. Ms. Diede worked sporadically up until 2012, though much of her employment did not constitute substantial gainful activity within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (TR 24). The Administrative Law Judge determined that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date. (TR 24). On March 17, 2011, Ms. Diede filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. Sometime later, she filed an application for supplemental security income benefits. Earlier applications for social security benefits had proven unsuccessful. In filing her most recent claims, plaintiff alleged that she became disabled for all forms of substantial gainful employment on August 1, 2008 due to bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and dislocated hip. At the time of an administrative hearing on June 10, 2015, plaintiff amended her applications so as to reflect an alleged disability onset date of April 6, 2010. (TR 56). Ms. Diede now maintains that she has remained disabled to the present time. As to her application for disability insurance benefits, the record reveals that plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through the second quarter of 2013, but not thereafter.
Ms. Diede's claims were denied upon initial consideration and reconsideration. She then requested and received a
By order entered August 14, 2014, the Appeals Council remanded the case to the Law Judge for additional proceedings. The Appeals Council directed the Law Judge to give further consideration to plaintiff's residual functional capacity, and to pose more comprehensive hypothetical questions to a vocational expert. (TR 273-74).
Following conduct of two supplemental administrative hearings, the Law Judge issued a second opinion on July 2, 2015. The Law Judge found that Ms. Diede suffers from several severe impairments, including degenerative disc disease; facet arthropathy; bipolar disorder; panic disorder; and history of polysubstance dependence. (TR 24). Because of these severe impairments, the Law Judge held that Ms. Diede is disabled for all of her past relevant work roles. (TR 38). However, the Law Judge determined that plaintiff retains sufficient functional capacity for a limited range of light work activity. (TR 27). The Law Judge assessed Ms. Diede's residual functional capacity as follows:
(TR 27). Given such a residual functional capacity, and after considering plaintiff's age, education, and prior work experience, as well as testimony from a vocational expert, the Law Judge ruled that Ms. Diede retains sufficient functional capacity to perform several specific light work roles existing in significant number in the national economy. (TR 38-39). Accordingly, the Law Judge ultimately concluded that Ms. Diede is not disabled, and that she is not entitled to benefits under either federal program. (TR 40).
While plaintiff may be disabled for certain forms of employment, the crucial factual determination is whether plaintiff is disabled for all forms of substantial gainful employment.
After a review of the record in this case, the court is constrained to conclude that the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence. The medical record in Ms. Diede's case is in conflict. Plaintiff has a history of multiple musculoskeletal complaints, especially involving her right hip and sciatic nerve. She has also experienced shoulder problems and symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome. One of plaintiff's treating internists, Dr. Raj Bharathan, has produced a medical assessment which indicates that Ms. Diede is totally disabled for all forms of sustained work activity, due to her combination of impairments, including musculoskeletal problems, fibromyalgia, and chronic pain syndrome. However, the court believes that the Administrative Law Judge reasonably relied on the findings of another treating physician, Dr. Trevar Chapmon, a physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist, in concluding that plaintiff's physical problems are not so severe as to contribute to an overall disability. Following an examination on June 21, 2010, Dr. Chapmon reported as follows:
(TR 1033). The objective studies in Ms. Diede's case, including the lumbar MRI, have proven essentially unremarkable, other than for notation of mild degenerative disease process. In short, the court concludes that the Administrative Law Judge reasonably assessed the medical record in determining that plaintiff retains sufficient, physical ability for light work activity.
The court believes that Ms. Diede's emotional problems represent her more serious impairment. Plaintiff carries a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and panic disorder. She has been treated for emotional symptomatology over a period of many years. A mental health assistant has produced a report suggesting that plaintiff's emotional problems render her totally disabled. While the court agrees that plaintiff's nonexertional impairments substantially affect her capacity for work, the court must conclude that the medical record supports the Law Judge's finding that Ms. Diede is not totally disabled for all forms of work. One of her treating psychiatrists, Dr. John O. Hurt, has noted on several occasions that plaintiff remains stable when medicated, and that she gets along well when properly treated. (TR 1333, 1353, 1377, and 1379).
In assessing plaintiff's emotional condition, the Law Judge also relied on a psychological evaluation from Dr. Jeffrey B. Luckett. While Dr. Luckett confirmed the diagnoses of bipolar disorder, panic disorder, ADHD, and dysthymic disorder, he opined that Ms. Diede could be expected to work. Dr. Luckett commented as follows:
(TR 1388).
The Law Judge also relied heavily on input from another psychologist, Dr. Gary Bennett, who responded to a medical interrogatory and provided testimony at one of the supplemental administrative hearings. In his interrogatory response, Dr. Bennett assessed plaintiff's work-limitations as follows:
(TR 1347). Dr. Bennett offered similar observations in his testimony at the administrative hearing conducted on October 27, 2014. (TR 114-18).
In summary, despite the conflicts in the medical record, the court believes that the Administrative Law Judge reasonably concluded that plaintiff's combination of impairments does not prevent performance of unskilled, light work roles involving performance of simple tasks with no fast paced production, and only limited interaction with co-workers. The court finds that the Law Judge captured plaintiff's limitations in the hypothetical questions put to the vocational expert. The court concludes that the vocational expert's testimony, and the assumptions under which the expert deliberated, are both reasonable and consistent with the evidence of record. It follows that the Law Judge's reliance on the vocational expert's testimony, and the Law Judge's ultimate conclusion that Ms. Diede is not disabled for all forms of substantial gainful employment, are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the court concludes that the final decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.
On appeal to this court, Ms. Diede, through counsel, makes several arguments in support of her motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge erred in rejecting the opinion and findings of Dr. Raj Bharathan. Ms. Diede maintains that, as her treating physician, Dr. Bharathan's input should have been accorded greater weight. However, as previously noted, the Commissioner relied on clinical notes from other treating physicians, including Dr. Chapmon, in determining that plaintiff's physical problems do not contribute to an overall disability. As Dr. Chapmon reported, the objective studies in plaintiff's case simply fail to document any mechanical problem which could be expected to produce the level of physical discomfort of which plaintiff complains. In a similar vein, Ms. Diede also asserts that the Law Judge failed to adequately consider or credit her testimony at the various administrative hearings. While it is true that Dr. Bharathan's report suggests that Ms. Diede is unable to engage in sustained employment activity, and while plaintiff's testimony suggests that her subjective complaints render her totally disabled, it is well settled that, in order for pain to be deemed disabling, there must be objective medical evidence establishing some condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged.
Ms. Diede also argues that the Law Judge failed to give controlling weight to the findings of a mental health assistant, Karen Williams. While it is true that Ms. Williams' psychological report suggests that plaintiff was disabled at the time of evaluation on March 13, 2009, later psychiatric and psychological reports do not document the same level of dysfunction. Indeed, as set forth above, the court believes that the Law Judge reasonably relied on the reports from the treating psychiatrist, Dr. Hurt, as well as those from the psychologists, Dr. Luckett and Dr. Bennett, in determining that plaintiff's nonexertional impairments are not so severe as to produce or contribute to an overall disability. Once again, Dr. Hurt found that Ms. Diede does well when properly treated and medicated, while Dr. Luckett and Dr. Bennett specifically found that plaintiff could be expected to perform unskilled work not involving production quotas or more than infrequent exposure to co-workers, despite her mental health problems. Stated differently, the court believes that the Law Judge reasonably determined to give less weight to the report from Ms. Williams.
Plaintiff's last argument presents a much closer question. As previously noted, the psychologist, Dr. Bennett, produced responses to written interrogatories, and offered testimony at one of the administrative hearings. On both occasions, Dr. Bennett opined that plaintiff experiences moderate limitations in her capacity to engage in activities of daily living, maintain social function, and maintain concentration, persistence, or pace. (TR 117, 1344). Plaintiff notes that the Law Judge failed to include such moderate limitations in her finding as to plaintiff's residual functional capacity, or in the hypothetical question propounded to the vocational expert. Relying on a line of cases culminating most recently with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
In affirming the Commissioner's final decision, the court does not suggest that Ms. Diede is free of all pain, discomfort, weakness, and emotional dysfunction. Indeed, the medical record confirms that plaintiff suffers from definite problems which can be expected to result in subjective limitations. However, it must again be noted that several medical specialists who have evaluated plaintiff's physical and emotional problems, believe that she retains the capacity to perform regular activity. It must be recognized that the inability to do work without any subjective discomfort does not of itself render a claimant totally disabled.
As a general rule, resolution of conflicts in the evidence is a matter within the province of the Commissioner even if the court might resolve the conflicts differently.
The Clerk is directed to send certified copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record.
