CYNTHIA REED EDDY, Chief Magistrate Judge.
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 64) be granted based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. In the alternative, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted in Defendants favor as Plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation on each of his claims.
Plaintiff Lawrence R. Stiefel ("Plaintiff" or "Stiefel") is a state prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") currently confined at the State Correctional Institution — Coal Township. Stiefel alleges that the events which give rise to this lawsuit occurred in 2015 while Plaintiff was being held at the Butler County Prison.
This case was initiated on May 26, 2016, by the filing of Plaintiff's civil rights complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Pennsylvania, at A.D. No. 2016-10404. After being served, Defendants removed the case to this Court. (ECF No. 1). Initially, Stiefel raised several claims, some of which were dismissed via the Court's Order partially granting Defendants' motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 46 and 47). Following the Court's decision on the motion to dismiss, the parties proceeded on the following three claims:
Stiefel alleges that on April 24, 2015, at approximately 1:30 PM, while commissary items were being delivered to the prisoners by Officer Krista Washkau, C/O Bartlett directed Stiefel to stand clear of his cell window. Approximately thirty minutes later, Stiefel handed C/O Bartlett a grievance form, complaining that he was being singled out for having to sit and step away from his cell window and that there was no written policy requiring him to do so. Stiefel alleges that upon learning of the grievance, C/O Bartlett became enraged and began "eliciting verbal abusive attacks, physically ripped up the grievance and proceeding in retaliation to physically attack the Plaintiff." Amended Complaint at ¶ 5.
On October 17, 2015, Plaintiff exited his cell to get water wearing only a t-shirt. He was ordered by C/O Vasey, who is not a defendant in this case, to put on his uniform shirt when he was outside his cell. Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining that he was being singled out by being required to wear his uniform shirt while out of his cell. On October 18, 2015, Captain Rychorecwicz responded to the grievance by speaking to Stiefel and explaining the policy. Later that same day, Stiefel filed a new grievance stemming from his interaction with Captain Rychorecwicz. In that grievance, Stiefel stated that Captain Rychorecwicz had told Plaintiff that he believed that Plaintiff was only filing grievances to get what he wanted. In the Amended Complaint, Stiefel alleges that during that conversation, Captain Rychorecwicz also made verbal threats in retaliation for filing the grievance. On October 19, 2015, Captain Rychorecwicz addressed the second grievance and again spoke with Plaintiff about the prison policy requiring uniform shirts to be worn outside of the cell.
On December 8, 2015, Stiefel was housed in the RHU and sought to leave his cell to get hot water, place a phone call, and put his mail in the mailbox. C/O Scuillo, the shift commander, denied Stiefel's request to leave his cell. The next day, on December 9, 2015, Stiefel filed a grievance complaining that as a result of not being allowed out of his cell, C/O Scuillo had denied him a hot meal, a phone call, the ability to place a commissary order, and to put his mail in the mailbox.
Discovery has closed and Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims arguing, inter alia, that Stiefel has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defendants have filed in support of their motion a concise statement of material facts (ECF No. 65), an appendix of record evidence (ECF No. 66), a brief (ECF No. 67), reply brief (ECF No. 90), and a reply statement of undisputed material facts (ECF No. 91). In response, Stiefel has filed a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 88) and a counter statement of facts with an appendix of record evidence (ECF No. 89). The matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
The standard for assessing a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is well-settled. A court should grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Furthermore, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 250.
On a motion for summary judgment, the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Hudson v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Prod. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). It is not the court's role to weigh the disputed evidence and decide which is more probative, or to make credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004); Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S at 247-48. An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could possibly hold in the nonmovant's favor with respect to that issue. See id. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial'." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Huston, 568 F.3d at 104.
This standard is somewhat relaxed with respect to pro se litigants. Where a party is representing himself pro se, the complaint is to be construed liberally. A pro se plaintiff may not, however, rely solely on his complaint to defeat a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Anderson 477 U.S. at 256 ("Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."). Allegations made without any evidentiary support may be disregarded. Jones v. UPS, 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[U]nsupported allegations . . . and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment.").
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must adduce evidence that the defendants acted under color of state law, a fact not in dispute sub judice, and that the plaintiff was deprived of a federal constitutional right.
Defendants advance several arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment, including the argument that because Stiefel failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his action in federal court, his claims are barred procedurally by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (the "PLRA"). Therefore, before turning to the merits, the Court must first decide whether Stiefel has exhausted his administrative remedies.
The PLRA prohibits a prisoner from bringing a civil rights action alleging acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials "until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Id. The exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits regarding prison life, including those that involve general circumstances as well as particular episodes. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The exhaustion requirement is not a technicality, rather it is a federal law which federal district courts are required to follow. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000). Whether a prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies is a question of law that is to be determined by the court, even if that determination requires the resolution of disputed facts. See Paladino v. Newson, 885 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013)); see also Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2010). Because "prison grievance procedures supply the yardstick for measuring procedural default," Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004), prisoners who fail to fully complete the prison grievance process are barred from subsequently litigating those claims in federal courts. See e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, courts do not have discretion to decide whether exhaustion should be excused. Ross v. Blake, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016).
In this case, no analysis of exhaustion may be made absent an understanding of the administrative process available to prisoners confined at the Butler County Jail. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The inmate grievance process is included in the Inmate Handbook. (ECF No. 66-6, Exh. D). The summary judgment record evidence reflects that Stiefel received a copy of the Inmate Handbook on July 27, 2014. (Id., Exh F).
Fatal to all of Stiefel's claims is that the summary judgment record reflects that Plaintiff never exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to the retaliation claims brought in this lawsuit. As the summary judgment reflects, Stiefel never filed any grievance alleging retaliation against C/O Bartlett, C/O Scuillo, or Captain Rychorecwicz. See ECF No. 66 (Exhs. F, L-N, P-Q, S-W, Y-GG). Rather, the summary judgment evidence reflects that Plaintiff filed one grievance complaining about his interaction with Officer Bartlett on April 24, 2015, in which he complained that he was being singled out for having to sit and step away from his cell window while commissary items were being handed out and that there was no written policy requiring him to do so. (ECF No. 66-12, Exh. L). The summary judgment evidence of record reveals that Stiefel never grieved that any of C/O Officer Bartlett's actions were retaliatory.
Similarly, Stiefel filed one grievance complaining about his interaction with C/O Scuillo on December 8, 2015. In the grievance, Stiefel complained that he was being singled out for having to wear a shirt outside his cell and stated that "C/O Scullio's conduct amounts to the type of `gross negligence' which should be brought into questioning when an officer overrides policy to benefit a personal bias against me by C/O Scullio's neglecting an inmate's care and personal needs and requests for personal hygiene." (ECF No. 66-17, Exh. Q). The summary judgment evidence of record reveals that Stiefel never grieved that any of C/O Scullio's actions were retaliatory.
Likewise, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining about his interaction with Captain Rychorecwicz on October 18, 2015 (ECF No. 66-14, Exh. N). The summary judgment evidence of record reveals that Stiefel never grieved that any of Captain Rychorecwicz's actions were retaliatory.
Stiefel counters by contending that the administrative process was unable to him as he was deterred from Defendants' actions from engaging in the grievance process and that he did not receive responses to his grievances. The summary judgment record completely belies Stiefel's contentions. Rather, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that even after the interactions with Defendants, Stiefel filed no less than 20 additional grievances and requests. See ECF No. 66, Exh. F-Q, S-GG).
Similarly, the summary judgment record does not support Stiefel's contention that his grievances were withheld and that he "only learned of the responses when Mr. Stiefel obtained copies of the grievances after discovery." P's resp. at 5, n.2 (ECF No. 88). The summary judgment record reflects that each of Stiefel's grievances were resolved after prison officials personally spoke to Stiefel. See ECF Nos. 66-12, Exh. L; ECF No. 66-14, Exh. N; and ECF No. 66-17, Exh. Q.
For all these reasons, the Court finds that the undisputed factual record reflects that Stiefel did not administratively exhaust his claims prior to filing suit. Therefore, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted to Defendants based on Stiefel's failure to pursue his grievances to final review.
In the alternative, assuming that Stiefel's claims are exhausted, it is recommended that summary judgment be entered in favor of Defendants on all claims as Stiefel has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
It is well-settled that "[g]overnment actions, which standing alone, do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right." Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). In order to state a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a prisoner plaintiff must show:
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2004). To establish a prima facie case at summary judgment, "the evidence must be sufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the elements of [the] prima facie case." Duffy v. Paper Magic Group, Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to penological interest. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001).
The undisputed summary judgment record evidence confirms that after C/O Bartlett received the grievance on April 24, 2015, he and Stiefel argued about the policy that all prisoners must stand clear of the window in their cells when commissary items are being delivered.
Defendants concede that Stiefel can prove the first element of his retaliation claim. Defendants focus their argument on the second prong asserting that Stiefel cannot show that he "suffered any adverse action, let alone an adverse action that would be sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights stemming from the grievance."
First, the summary judgment record is void of any evidence that C/O Bartlett made any verbal threats to Stiefel or physically attacked him. And, even if C/O Bartlett's statements could be construed as retaliatory verbal threats, the record reflects that Stiefel clearly was not deterred from exercising his constitutional rights by C/O Bartlett's actions, as Stiefel thereafter filed approximately 19 grievances and numerous requests while housed at Butler County Jail.
Next, Stiefel alleges that C/O Bartlett ripped up the grievance; however, this allegation is completely belied by the summary judgment record. The summary judgment record has a complete copy of Stiefel's grievance. See Inmate Grievance Form, dated 4/24/2015. (ECF No. 66-12, Exh. L).
Further, Stiefel concedes that Bartlett's conduct was not in retaliation for Stiefel filing a grievance against him, but rather admits in his Response that any interaction between the two occurred as a result of Stiefel's admitted conduct toward another officer. Specifically, Stiefel states:
Pl's Br. at 19-20 (ECF No. 88).
Construing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Stiefel, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find all of the elements of a prima facie retaliation case. As such, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted to Defendants on Stiefel's retaliation claim against C/O Bartlett.
Stiefel's claim against C/O Scuillo also is belied by the summary judgment record evidence. Stiefel alleges that C/O Scuillo retaliated against him on December 8, 2015, upon learning of other grievances that Plaintiff had filed against him. Amended Complaint, at ¶ 7. However, the record evidence is clear that Stiefel had not filed any earlier grievances against C/O Scuillo.
Stiefel also alleges that C/O Scuillo initiated a shakedown of his cell on December 5, 2015. However, this allegation is not supported by the summary judgment record evidence. The record reflects that Stiefel's cell was searched on December 14, 2015, by another officer, and a search of the entire RHU was conducted on December 15, 2015, and there is no evidence that C/O Scuillo was involved in those searches. (ECF No. 66-18, Ex. R RHU Security Search Report.)
Further, even if Stiefel had met his burden to establish a prima facie retaliation claim against C/O Scuillo, Defendants have met their burden under Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334, by a preponderance of the evidence that their actions were based on bona fide penological concerns and would have been taken absent any grievances. On December 8, 2015, Stiefel was housed in the RHU and was on self — lockdown. Inmates in RHU are required to remain in their cells except for one hour each day, Monday — Friday. (ECF No. 66-9, Ex. I, Lockdown Policy, V(E)(1)). "The time the inmate is allowed out of his/her cell is at the discretion of the Shift Commander." Id. at (E)(2). All of the activities sought by Stiefel are to be handled by the inmates during their hour out of cell. Id. at (E)(7). Stiefel made the request to get out of his cell during lockdown when it was not his hour out. (ECF No. 66-17, Exh. Q — Grievance dated 11/20/15). By policy, he was not permitted to do so.
Similarly, Stiefel's cell would have been searched the week of December 9, 2015, regardless of whether or not a grievance had been filed. Searches of cells and shakedowns of the units are to be conducted at lease twice monthly at random. (ECF No. 66-9, Exh. J-Search Policy (VI)(A)). Pursuant to policy, all inmates had their cells searched during that two week period and during the shakedown search of the unit.
Construing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Stiefel, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find all of the elements of a prima facie retaliation case. As such, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted to Defendants on Stiefel's retaliation claim against C/O Scuillo.
In his Amended Complaint, Stiefel alleges that when Captain Rychorecwicz spoke to him on October 18, 2015, Captain Rychorecwicz said, "I can visualize a sniper. I hate when people go behind my back. I think that you just made this long-winded grievance just to try to get what you want."
Even assuming that Captain Rychorecwicz made a retaliatory threat on October 18, 2015, the record reflects that Stiefel clearly was not deterred from exercising his constitutional rights by Captain Rychorecwicz's "threat," as Stiefel thereafter filed approximately19 grievances and numerous requests while housed at Butler County Jail.
Stiefel also alleges that Captain Rychorecwicz had a "retaliatory motive" in not responding to his grievances when he was aware that Stiefel was being subjected to retaliation by Bartlett and Scuillo. Again, the summary judgment evidence of record completely belies this allegation. Stiefel filed 21 grievances while at Butler County Prison. The summary judgment record evidence reflects that every grievance was investigated and Stiefel received a verbal response to each grievance. Further, as discussed supra, there simply is no evidence in the record to support Stiefel's claims that Officers Bartlett or Scuillo engaged in any retaliation or other violation of Stiefel's constitutional rights.
Construing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Stiefel, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find all of the elements of a prima facie retaliation case. As such, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted to Defendants on Stiefel's retaliation claim against Captain Rychorecwicz.
For all the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants be granted in its entirety.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections to this Report and Recommendation by
