Filed: Sep. 30, 2011
Latest Update: Sep. 30, 2011
Summary: Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Tyran Matrice Brace pled guilty to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) (2006), reserving his right to appeal the issue of whether his prior conviction was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. The offense in question was a prior conviction for conspiracy to commit breaking and entering, pu
Summary: Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Tyran Matrice Brace pled guilty to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) (2006), reserving his right to appeal the issue of whether his prior conviction was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. The offense in question was a prior conviction for conspiracy to commit breaking and entering, pur..
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tyran Matrice Brace pled guilty to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), reserving his right to appeal the issue of whether his prior conviction was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. The offense in question was a prior conviction for conspiracy to commit breaking and entering, pursuant to which a defendant with a criminal record similar to Brace's faced a maximum possible sentence of ten months under North Carolina law.
Brace appealed, arguing that his prior conviction was not "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" under the Supreme Court's decision in Carrachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010). We recently held that, when deciding whether a North Carolina conviction is a predicate offense for sentencing enhancement purposes, the Controlled Substance Act's inclusion of offenses "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year" refers to the maximum sentence that the defendant in question could have received, not the sentence that could have been imposed on a defendant with a more severe criminal history or one subject to an aggravated sentence. United States v. Simmons, No. 08-4475, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 3607266, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2011) (en banc). The reasoning in Simmons applies with equal force to predicate convictions as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2586-87 (distinguishing between "conduct punishable as a felony" and conviction of a felony offense); Simmons, 2011 WL 3607266, at *8 (concluding that the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act "creates separate offenses that in turn yield separate maximum punishments"). Thus, because Brace's underlying conviction was not punishable by a term exceeding one year, Brace's conduct — possessing a firearm — did not violate § 922(g).
Accordingly, we reverse Brace's conviction and sentence and remand for further proceedings.* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
