GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief District Judge.
Currently before the Court, in this habeas corpus proceeding by William Muller ("Petitioner") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is the Report-Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks recommending that the Petition be denied and dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and that a certificate of appealability not issue. (Dkt. No. 44.) On September 19, 2016, Petitioner filed an Objection to the Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. No. 45.) For the reasons set forth below, Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety, the Petition is denied and dismissed, and a certificate of appealability shall not issue.
For the sake of brevity, the Court will not repeat the factual background of Petitioner's 2007 conviction of two counts of murder in the first degree but will simply refer the parties to the relevant portions of Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation, which accurately recite that factual background. (Dkt. No. 44, at Part II.)
Generally, in his Petition, Petitioner asserts the following claims: (1) a claim that the County Court improperly precluded Petitioner from presenting an extreme-emotional-disturbance defense and from introducing evidence of his prior suicide attempts to support his defense of accident and lack of specific intent, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) a claim that, by failing to serve written notice of Petitioner's intent to offer psychiatric evidence, failing to consult a psychological expert to aid in the defense, failing to interview potential witnesses for the defense, needlessly questioning a potential juror as to media reports of Petitioner's confession, and failing to object to the prosecutor's misleading summation, Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment; (3) a claim that, by failing to raise trial counsel's improper questioning during voir dire on appeal, Petitioner's appellate counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment; (4) a claim that the County Court improperly curtailed the cross-examination of Petitioner's wife (regarding her pecuniary interest in Petitioner's conviction) in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and (5) a claim that the prosecution's failure to disclose Brady material and its misleading summation violated Petitioner's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Dkt. No. 1 at 12, Grounds One Through Five.)
Generally, in her Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Dancks recommends dismissal of the Petition for the following reasons: (1) with respect to Petitioner's claim that the County Court erred by precluding Petitioner from presenting an extreme-emotional-disturbance defense and limiting the presentation of evidence in support of his mental state, the County Court properly balanced the interests of both parties in making its evidentiary rulings, Petitioner was not unduly prejudiced, and the County Court's rulings were not in contravention of established Supreme Court precedent; (2) with respect to Petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective, because Petitioner failed to establish prejudice (i.e., that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the outcome of the matter would have been different), the County Court correctly determined that Petitioner received a "competent and meaningful defense," and that "no constitutional violations occurred which were contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law"; (3) with respect to Petitioner's claim that Appellate Counsel was ineffective by failing to raise on appeal the issue of trial counsel's misconduct during voir dire, the Appellate Division's rejection of this claim was not improper or contrary to Strickland because Petitioner failed to demonstrate that trial counsel's performance was incompetent and below professional standards or that, but for this issue, the jury's determination would have been different; (4) with respect to Petitioner's claim that the County Court improperly restricted the cross-examination of his wife, the County Court properly weighed the rights of both parties under the Confrontation Clause, and the record evidence shows that trial counsel was effective in his cross-examination and able to raise issues of credibility; and (5) with respect to Petitioner's claim that the prosecution failed to disclose Brady material and conducted a misleading summation, the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Petitioner's case, and the summation was supported by the record and was not "sufficiently egregious" to affect the entire trial. (Dkt. No. 44, at Part IV.)
Generally, in his Objection, Petitioner asserts the following arguments: (1) the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending the denial of Petitioner's claim that the state courts' rulings precluding him from presenting his extreme-emotional-disturbance defense, as well as certain evidence in support of his defense of accident, unreasonably deprived him of his federal constitutional right to present a defense; (2) the Magistrate Judge erred by upholding the County Court's determination that trial counsel's and appellate counsel's failures were not prejudicial and that those counsels' overall representations were reasonable, without giving further consideration as to whether a single error was prejudicial to Petitioner (e.g., regarding jury selection, preparation for trial, file a written notice of the extreme-emotional-disturbance defense, and the prosecutor's improper summation); (3) the Magistrate Judge erred in upholding the County Court's determination that the Brady material was immaterial to Petitioner's case in that it was not exculpatory, because Brady does not require that material be exculpatory just that it be "favorable" and "material," and the evidence in question was "favorable" to Petitioner's case; and (4) a Certificate of Appealability should be granted because Petitioner has made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights to present a meaningful defense were denied. (Dkt. No. 45, at Objection Nos. 1 Through 4.)
When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be "specific," the objection must, with particularity, "identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection." N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c).
When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition; see also Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], aff'd without opinion, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error review.
After conducing the appropriate review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
Magistrate Judge Dancks has recited the legal standard governing review of Petitioner's habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Dkt. No. 44, at Part III.) As a result, this standard is incorporated by reference in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for review of the parties.
After carefully reviewing all of the papers in this action, including Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation, the Court agrees with each of the recommendations made by Magistrate Judge Dancks. Magistrate Judge Dancks employed the proper legal standards, accurately recited the facts, and correctly applied the law to those facts. (Dkt. No. 44, at Parts II Through IV.) As a result, the Court accepts and adopts Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation in its entirety for the reasons stated therein. (Id.) To those reasons the Court would add only two points.
First, when stripped of preliminary language superficially challenging certain of the recommendations contained in Report-Recommendation, the first three of the four arguments contained in the Objection (described above in Part I.C. of this Decision and Order), at their core, simply reiterate arguments asserted in Petitioner's underlying reply memorandum of law. (Compare Dkt. No. 45, at 4-24 [Objection] with Dkt. No. 28, at 8-53 [Petitioner's Reply Memo. of Law].) Indeed, Petitioner expressly attempts to incorporate several of those arguments in his Objection. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 45, at 17, 21, 24.) As a result, the "challenged" portions of the Report-Recommendation are entitled to only a clear-error review, which they easily survive.
Second, even if those portions of the Report-Recommendation were entitled to a de novo review, they would survive that review, again for the reasons stated in the Report-Recommendation. With regard to the first argument asserted in Petitioner's Objection, for the sake of brevity, the Court will assume that Petitioner has sufficiently specified what "otherwise competent" proof of his extreme-emotional-disturbance defense he possessed during the time in question. N.Y. C.P.L. § 250.10(5) (emphasis added). More important is the fact that, given the nature of Petitioner's failure regarding the notice requirement of N.Y. C.P.L. § 250.10, and the psychiatric examination directive of the County Court, the County Court complied with New York State law in precluding the defense,
With regard to the second argument asserted in Petitioner's Objection, the Court finds that, in her 17 pages of analysis of Petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, Magistrate Judge Dancks adequately considered Petitioner's assigned errors both individually and together. (Dkt. No. 44, at 38-54.)
With regard to the third argument asserted in Petitioner's Objection, the Court notes that Petitioner's focus on Magistrate Judge Dancks' reliance on Petitioner's trial testimony that the shootings were accidental (1) ignores her finding that the absence of the undisclosed evidence does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, and (2) ignores her finding that the undisclosed evidence is not material (because, had it been disclosed, it would not have changed the result of the proceedings). (Dkt. No. 44, at 59-60.)
Finally, with regard to the fourth argument asserted in Petitioner's Objection, the Court finds that, because this argument hinges on whether the above-referenced issues are reasonably debatable, the because the Court finds that those issues are not reasonably debatable, the Court rejects this argument. The Court notes that it interprets the length of Magistrate Judge Danck's Report-Recommendation as resulting more from the number of arguments presented in Petitioner's 68-page reply memorandum of law (and perhaps the enormity of the possibility of Petitioner receiving less than a life sentence) than from the merit of those arguments.
