REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PATRICIA L. DODGE, Magistrate Judge.

I. Recommendation

It is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss the above-captioned consolidated actions with prejudice based upon Plaintiff's failure to prosecute them.

II. Report

A. Background

Plaintiff, Blaine Koby Gholson, is a Pennsylvania prisoner who is currently housed at SCI Houtzdale. He was housed at SCI Pine Grove from around March 2018 to late April 2019. The Court consolidated the above-captioned actions for the purposes of discovery and other pretrial matters. The events in question in each action are alleged to have occurred in 2018 when Plaintiff was housed at SCI Pine Grove.

In the complaint that Plaintiff filed in civil action 2:18-cv-1280, he names as defendants ten individuals, eight of whom are employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"). The remaining two defendants are medical-care providers. Plaintiff claims that his prison conditions were inadequate when he was in a psychiatric observation cell, and that one or more of the defendants unjustly seized his property, refused him notary services and use of the telephone, tampered with his legal mail, threatened to poison his food, and were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. In the complaint that Plaintiff filed in civil action 2:18-cv-1451, he names as defendants seven individuals, six of whom are employed by the DOC and one of whom is a medical-care provider. Plaintiff claims that one or more of the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, assaulted him, and unjustly seized his property. Underlying all of Plaintiff's claims in both actions is his allegation that defendants violated his civil rights because they were engaged in a plot to kill him for purposes of collecting the profits on a fraudulent life insurance policy taken out in his name.

Plaintiff actively litigated both civil actions until the end of October 2019. The last submission he made in each case occurred on October 24, 2019, when he filed a notice with the Court to change his inmate identification number. On October 29, 2019 the Court issued the order consolidating the actions, and on November 25, 2019 it issued an order setting deadlines for the medical-care providers to file their respective responses to the complaint in the actions in which they are named as a defendant.1 As with all orders issued by the Court, both of those orders were mailed to Plaintiff at his address of record. There is no indication that he refused to accept them. Therefore, at least through the end of November 2019, Plaintiff was accepting mail from the Court.

On December 9, 2019, one of the medical-care providers filed a motion to dismiss the claims Plaintiff raised against him. Defendant's certificate of service indicates that Plaintiff was sent a copy of the motion. On December 19, 2019, the Court issued an order directing Plaintiff to file a response to that motion by January 20, 2020. That order was returned to the Court with an indication that Plaintiff had refused to accept delivery of the Court's mail on multiple occasions. Of course, one of the consequences of Plaintiff's deliberate refusal to accept mail from the Court is that he will not be aware of Court-imposed deadlines. Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion to dismiss.

On January 27, 2020, the Court issued an order directing Plaintiff to show cause by February 6, 2020 why the consolidated civil actions at 2:18-cv-1280 and 2:18-cv-1451 should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Court's order advised Plaintiff that the cases cannot proceed if he continues to refuse to accept his mail and comply with Court orders, and that his continued failure to do so will be construed as indicating his desire to discontinue prosecution of them. In that show-cause order, Plaintiff was expressly warned that if he once again refused to accept delivery of the Court's mail, the undersigned would recommend that the consolidated actions at 2:18-cv-1280 and 2:18-cv-1451 be dismissed.

On February 13, 2020, the Court's mail containing the show-cause order was returned to the Court with a notation on the envelope that Plaintiff refused to accept the Court's mail. Therefore, there is every indication that Plaintiff has abandoned his prosecution of both of the consolidated actions at 2:18-cv-1280 and 2:18-cv-1451.

B. Discussion

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the involuntary dismissal of an action or a claim, and under this Rule, a district court has authority to dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order. See, e.g., Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994). In Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the Court of Appeals set forth the following six factors to be weighed in considering whether dismissal is proper under Rule 41(b):

Id. at 868 (emphasis omitted).

There is no "magic formula" or "mechanical calculation" to determine whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992). None of the Poulis factors are dispositive and not all of them need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, the Court must "properly consider and balance" each of the six factors based on the record. Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). It must also analyze the factors in light of the "strong policy favoring decisions on the merits." Id.

The first and fourth Poulis factors—the extent of Plaintiff's personal responsibility and whether his conduct is willful—each weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and is solely responsible for his own conduct. See, e.g., Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002); Winston v. Lindsey, No. 1:09-cv-224, 2011 WL 6000991, *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011). Additionally, prior to late December 2019, Plaintiff had never refused mail from the Court, responded to Court orders, filed his own motions, and responded to motions filed by defendants. Under the circumstances, the Court must conclude that his decision to no longer do any of those things is intentional. See, e.g., Quadr v. Overmyer, 642 F. App'x 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2016) (the district court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's actions were willful when he would not accept mail from the court, failed to respond to a motion to dismiss, and repeatedly missed deadlines). Indeed, Plaintiff's repeated refusal to accept all mail from the Court indicates that he is no longer interested in litigating the actions at 2:18-cv-1280 and 2:18-cv-1451.

The second Poulis factor assesses whether the adverse party has suffered prejudice because of the dilatory party's behavior. "Examples of prejudice include `the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.'" Adams, 29 F.3d at 874 (quoting Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984)). Although this factor does not weigh heavily in favor of dismissal at this time, it is not neutral either. Plaintiff's consistent refusal since late December 2019 to accept mail from the Court, his repeated missing of deadlines and his total failure to communicate with the Court frustrates and delays resolution of his claims against the defendants. Mack v. United States, No. 3:17-cv-1982, 2019 WL 1302626, *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2019) (plaintiff's continued failure to communicate with the district court and inaction "clearly prejudices the Defendants who seek a timely resolution of the case."). Thus, the second Poulis factor weighs at least slightly in favor of dismissal.

The third Poulis factor considers whether there is a history of dilatoriness. "[E]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness[.]" Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. "A party's problematic acts must be evaluated in light of its behavior over the life of the case[,]" id. at 875 and, typically, "conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a `history of dilatoriness.'" Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261 (citing Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 875, and Donnelly v. Johns-Manvill Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1982)). Although Plaintiff did not exhibit dilatoriness until the end of December 2019, since that time he has refused to accept all mail from the Court, has missed all Court-order deadlines, and has not otherwise communicated with the Court. For these reasons, the third Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

The fifth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. Under the circumstances presented here, where Plaintiff has repeatedly refused to accept the Court's mail, no longer communicates with the Court, and appears to have abandoned the litigation, alternative sanctions would not be effective. Bowie v. Perry, No. 1:19-cv-13, 2019 WL 2412488, *2 (W.D. Pa. May 13, 2019) (Lanzillo, Mag. J.) ("alternative sanctions are unlikely to be effective against a party who refuses to communicate with the Court."), Report and Recommendation adopted by, 2019 WL 2410796 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2019) (Paradise Baxter, J.). As such, this factor weights in favor of dismissal.

When evaluating the sixth Poulis factor, the Court must consider the potential merits of Plaintiff's claims. A claim will be deemed meritorious "when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recover by plaintiff." Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. The standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and not the summary judgment standard, is applicable in the Poulis analysis. Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. Here, all but one of the defendants have filed an answer to Plaintiff's complaints and not a motion to dismiss. Therefore, this final Poulis factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal. However, as set forth above, none of the Poulis factors are dispositive and not all of them need to be met for a district court to find that dismissal is warranted.

Finally, it is also worth noting that the allegation underlying all of Plaintiff's claims against the defendants—that they violated his rights because they were engaged in a plot to kill him for purposes of collecting the profits on a fraudulent life insurance policy taken out in his name—is not grounded in reason and any claim dependent on that allegation is likely factually frivolous, which is the case "when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]" Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).

III. Conclusion

In conclusion, at least five of the six Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal. The Court cannot properly control its docket, move the consolidated actions at 2:18-cv-1280 and 2:18-cv-1451 forward, and properly protect the rights of all parties, if Plaintiff fails to accept mail from the Court, fails to comply with Court orders, and stops communicating with the Court altogether. Since the end of December 2019, he has consistently done all of those things. Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss the consolidated civil actions at 2:18-cv-1280 and 2:18-cv-1451 with prejudice for failure to prosecute.

Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, any party is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).