ORDER

TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI, District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff/Petitioner's Motion to Remand to State Court [Doc. No. 8]. The United States ex rel. the Defense and Accounting Service (DFAS) and Teresa McKay, individually and as Director for DFAS (collectively, the Federal Defendants) have filed their objection [Doc. No. 9]. For the reasons set forth below, removal is proper and Plaintiff's motion to remand is denied.

I. Procedural History

The District Court of Comanche County, State of Oklahoma, granted a divorce to Plaintiff, Iris Looper and Defendant, Jeffrey Brandon Looper. The state court ordered Defendant, an active member of the United States Army, to pay child support to Plaintiff for the parties' two minor children. Defendant failed to comply with the order and, as a result, on January 15, 2014, the court entered against Defendant an Order for Judgment of Arrears, Income, Withholding, Change of Payee Address and Requirements for Payment of Bond. See Order [Doc. No. 1-3 at pp. 7-11]. The court also issued on that same date an Income Withholding Order (IWO) to Defendant's employer, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) as garnishee. See IWO [Doc. No. 1-3 at pp. 12-14].

DFAS advised Plaintiff's counsel that it could not honor the IWO. Primarily, DFAS contended, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(5) and (6), that it could not make payments directly to Plaintiff's counsel, as ordered by the state court, but could only send payments to a State Disbursement Unit. See Correspondence from DFAS to Plaintiff's Counsel [Doc. No. 1-3 at p. 19]. In response, Plaintiff sought and obtained against the Federal Defendants a citation for contempt of court from the Comanche County District Court. See Citation for Contempt of Court [Doc. No. 1-2]. Prior to the hearing on the state court contempt citation, the Federal Defendants filed a Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 1] and removed the action to federal court.

Plaintiff seeks a remand of the action to state court contending that removal is improper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 because the Federal Defendants are only "nominal" parties. Plaintiff further contends there is no original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (United States as defendant). The Federal Defendants object to a remand and contend removal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) because the contempt citation is a civil action against or directed to DFAS, an agency of the United States, and Defendant McKay, an officer of that agency sued in both her individual and official capacity.

II. Discussion

In moving for a remand, Plaintiff represents that this is a "child support collection case." Plaintiff contends absent certification of the action by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, this action cannot be brought in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 660 ("The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, without regard to any amount in controversy, to hear and determine any civil action certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 452(a)(8) of this Act [42 USCS § 652(a)(8)].").1 The Federal Defendants readily concede that § 660 does not authorize jurisdiction in this case. See Objection at pp. 2-3 and n. 1.

As the Federal Defendants contend, however, removal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) which provides for removal of a civil action against or directed to:

Id. The statute further provides that a "civil action" includes "any proceeding (whether or not ancillary to another proceeding) to the extent that in such proceeding a judicial order, including a subpoena for testimony or documents, is sought or issued." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(d)(1). Section 1442 "`grants independent jurisdictional grounds over cases involving federal officers where a district court otherwise would not have jurisdiction.'" Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 190 F.Supp.2d 1232, 1235 (D. Kan. 2002) (quoting IMCF Professional Services of Florida, Inc. v. Latin American Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 156 & n. 5 (5th Cir. 1982). The statute clearly encompasses the citation for contempt brought against the Federal Defendants in the state court action. Compare DeTienne v. DeTienne, 815 F.Supp. 394, 395 (D. Kan. 1993) (removal proper pursuant to § 1442(a)(1) where a federal employee, acting under color of office, was summoned to appear in a state court garnishment proceeding under threat of contempt). See also State of Nebraska, ex rel. Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bentson, 146 F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 1998) (removal of state court action in which contempt proceedings had been initiated against the IRS was proper under § 1442(a)(1)); State of Florida v. Cohen, 887 F.2d 1451, 1454 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Once the state court initiated contempt proceedings against the federal officials [for not responding to state court subpoenas], removal of the contempt proceeding was appropriate [under § 1442(a)(1)].").2

Plaintiff wholly ignores the basis for the Federal Defendants' removal of this action — the contempt citation issued by the state court against them. Plaintiff's characterization of the proceedings as limited to a child support enforcement action lacks candor. The contempt citation issued against DFAS and Teresa McKay qualifies as a civil action against or directed to any agency and/or officer of the United States for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The Federal Defendants are not nominal parties. In the contempt application filed by Plaintiff, she requests the court to impose a fine of $500.00 per day against DFAS. See Application for Contempt Citation [Doc. No. 1-3 at pp. 1-5]. Moreover, Plaintiff's contempt citation seeks to enforce an order directing the Federal Defendants to take action they contend is contrary to federal law —i.e., pay funds subject to the IWO directly to Plaintiff's attorney rather than a State Disbursement Unit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 654b and 666(b). Thus, removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court [Doc. No. 8] is DENIED.

IT IS OS ORDERED.