SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, District Judge.
Plaintiff David V. Jordan, a prisoner formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest in Marienville, Pennsylvania ("SCI Forest"),
Plaintiff identifies the following claims:
(ECF No. 80, Amended Complaint, at pp. 21-26).
Presently before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by the DOC Defendants [ECF No. 83] and the Medical Defendants
Because the DOC Defendants' principal argument that the amended complaint should be dismissed on procedural grounds is potentially dispositive of the entire case, the Court will turn to it first.
Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement setting forth (1) the basis for the court's jurisdiction, (2) the claim or claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought. "Although there is not a heightened pleading standard in Section 1983 cases, pro se plaintiffs must sufficiently allege a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution."
A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations."
Here, the DOC Defendants assert that "[t]here is no coherent, legal, logical, topical or temporal connection between the various claims, except that Plaintiff purports to be the target of them all." (ECF No. 84, at p. 9). The Court disagrees. In fact, the Court finds that Plaintiff has been fairly detailed and organized in his account of Defendants' alleged conduct, and has presented the same in a somewhat logical and chronological manner. Moreover, despite their assertion that the complaint "is the antithesis of simple, concise, and direct," it is apparent that Defendants are able to easily discern the nature and legal basis of each claim and the Defendant(s) against whom each is asserted, and further understand that all claims fall within Plaintiff's overarching claim of retaliation. Thus, the Court finds that the amended complaint adequately complies with the requirements of Rule 8.
Under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "persons [...] may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or serious of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2). With regard to the same transaction requirement, "all `logically related' events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or occurrence.... The analogous interpretation of the terms as used in Rule 20 would permit all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties to be tried in a single proceeding. Absolute identity of all events is unnecessary."
Here, Plaintiff alleges several Eighth Amendment claims arising from a number of separate incidents that allegedly occurred at SCI-Forest over a seven-month period, from August 2015 through March 2016, including denial of exercise, deliberate indifference, excessive force, failure to intervene, denial of warmth, and unsanitary living conditions. However, Plaintiff also alleges that all of these claims arise out of Defendants' desire to harass him and retaliate against him for the filing of numerous grievances and lawsuits. Plaintiff maintains that these separate incidents are part of a continuous course of conduct. Thus, despite the expansive scope of Plaintiff's allegations, the interests of judicial economy are best served by allowing joinder of these claims so that this Court can best preside over Plaintiff's claims of retaliation.
For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the DOC Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint on procedural grounds will be denied. As a result, the Court will now turn to the substantive grounds cited by each set of Defendants for dismissing particular claims and/or Defendants from this case.
The Medical Defendants seek dismissal of all claims alleged against them in the amended complaint based upon Plaintiff's failure to "allege any facts that establish what they did personally to injure him." (ECF No. 89, at p. 5). The DOC Defendants similarly argue that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege the personal involvement of the following Defendants in any of the complained-of misconduct, thus warranting their dismissal from this case: Overmyer, Ennis, Siegel, Dimperio, Gilara, Cochran, Dioguardi, Zuck, Snyder, Smail, Kradel, Beach, Towner, Wolfe, Niederriter, Dittman, Hulse, Jordan, Smith, and Cowan.
It is well-settled that liability under § 1983 requires a defendant's "personal involvement" in the deprivation of a constitutional right.
The Medical Defendants assert that, although they are named in the caption of the amended complaint, Plaintiff has failed to assert any specific allegations against any of them upon which a cognizable cause of action can be based. The Court agrees.
The only references to one or more of the Medical Defendants are contained in paragraphs 15 (all), 36 (Zupsic and Pavlock), and 83-84 (Pavlock only) of the amended complaint. Paragraph 15 merely lists the names of the Medical Defendants with a number of other DOC Defendants who allegedly engaged in "a campaign of retaliatory treatment and retaliatory harassment against plaintiff" by denying him access to "fresh air and one (1) hour yard or exercise" while he was in solitary confinement for approximately 100 days; however, Plaintiff fails to assert any specific allegations detailing how each of the Medical Defendants participated in the alleged retaliatory conduct. Similarly, in paragraph 36, Plaintiff merely lists the names of Defendants Zupsic and Pavlock with a number of other DOC Defendants alleged to have engaged in "a campaign of retaliatory harassment against plaintiff" by forcing him to "choose between wearing handcuffs in order to get a shower and removing a medically prescribed arm-sling;" yet, there are no other allegations specifying how Defendants Zupsic and Pavlock participated in the alleged retaliatory conduct.
Finally, paragraphs 83-84 include Defendant Pavlock among a list of Defendants who allegedly denied him medical attention for his "further-injured broken left hand;" however, Defendant Pavlock is the only Defendant among those listed who is not named in the preceding paragraphs containing specific allegations of the complained-of misconduct. Thus, there is no indication as to why he is even included.
In short, the amended complaint fails to establish the personal involvement of any of the Medical Defendants in any of the alleged constitutional violations. Consequently, the Medical Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted and said Defendants will be dismissed from this case, accordingly.
Plaintiff has likewise failed to adequately allege the personal involvement of Defendants Dimperio, Gilara, Cochran, Snyder, Hulse, Cowan, Jordan, Smith, Dioguardi, Zuck, Smail, Dittman, Kradel, Beach, Towner, Wolfe, and Niederriter.
The only allegations against Defendant Dimperio arise from his alleged "approval" of a "fictitious misconduct report" that was filed against Plaintiff by Defendant Booher on September 8, 2015, and his subsequent ordering of modified meals for Plaintiff for three days. (ECF No. 80, at ¶¶102, 108). Plaintiff makes both of these allegations in the context of a retaliation claim against Defendant Dimperio; however, neither of these allegations rise to the level of an adverse action for purposes of establishing retaliation. First, the misconduct record attached to the amended complaint reveals that the "false" misconduct at issue was dismissed without prejudice and, thus, resulted in no penalty against Plaintiff. (
The only allegations against Defendant Gilara are contained in paragraphs 36, 39, and 181 of the amended complaint. In paragraph 36, Defendant Gilara is included among a list of Defendants alleged to have engaged in a campaign of retaliatory harassment; yet, the only specific allegation against him is that he provided Plaintiff with a plastic bag to place over his arm cast in the shower, and ordered Plaintiff to comply with all other cell removal and shower procedures. (ECF No. 80, at ¶ 39). This allegation does nothing to establish retaliatory conduct. As for paragraph 181, Defendant Gilara is merely included in a list of Defendants who allegedly "engaged in creating unsanitary living conditions to constitute cruel and unusual punishment," without any further allegations detailing the alleged actions taken by him in this regard.
Defendants Cochran, Snyder, Hulse, and Cowan are among a number of Defendants listed in paragraph 15 of the amended complaint who allegedly engaged in "a campaign of retaliatory treatment and retaliatory harassment against plaintiff" by denying him access to "fresh air and one (1) hour yard or exercise" while he was in solitary confinement for approximately 100 days; however, Plaintiff fails to assert any specific allegations detailing how each Defendant participated in the alleged retaliatory conduct. No other allegations are specified against any of these Defendants.
Defendants Jordan and Smith are among the Defendants named in both paragraphs 15 and 36 of the amended complaint, discussed above. In addition, Defendant Smith is summarily included among several Defendants named in paragraph 181 of the amended complaint, also discussed above. The amended complaint is devoid of any further allegations against either Defendant detailing how each participated in any of the alleged wrongdoing.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dioguardi denied him access to medical care and engaged in retaliatory harassment against him when she wrote "sign up for sick call" in response to his inmate request complaining about stabbing pain in his left hand. (ECF No. 80, at ¶¶ 85, 87-88, and 173). However, this allegation, standing alone, fails to implicate either an Eighth Amendment violation or retaliatory conduct.
Defendant Zuck is alleged to have participated in the overarching campaign of retaliatory harassment by refusing to provide medical attention for Plaintiff's "further-injured broken left hand." (
As to Defendants Smail and Dittman, Plaintiff simply alleges that they were among a number of DOC Defendants who "subjected [Plaintiff] to cold and left-over `food loaf'" (
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Kradel, Beach, Towner, Wolfe, and Niederriter engaged in a campaign of harassment and retaliation by allegedly withholding his legal mail from the U.S. Marshal Service related to an earlier lawsuit he filed against other SCI-Forest staff members. (ECF No. 80, at ¶¶ 153-162). In particular, Plaintiff alleges that on March 29, 2016, Defendant Kradel delivered legal mail addressed to him from the U.S. Marshal Service, which had been postmarked on February 5, 2016. (
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege the personal involvement of any of the above Defendants in any alleged misconduct that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. As a result, Defendants Dimperio, Gilara, Cochran, Snyder, Hulse, Cowan, Jordan, Smith, Dioguardi, Zuck, Smail, Dittman, Kradel, Beach, Towner, Wolfe, and Niederriter, will be dismissed from this case.
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison conditions, a plaintiff must show "he has suffered an objectively, sufficiently serious injury, and that prison officials inflicted the injury with deliberate indifference."
"[C]onditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."
Here, Plaintiff alleges several Eighth amendment claims arising from the conditions of confinement in SCI-Forest's RHU, where he was housed for approximately 100 days. These claims include the denial of yard, exercise, and fresh air; the denial of showers; and the denial of a second blanket for warmth. Each of these claims will be considered, in turn.
Plaintiff alleges that during his term of solitary confinement he was subject to "a 24-hour lockdown and an ongoing denial of access to fresh air and one (1) hour yard or exercise...." (ECF No. 80, at ¶ 15). The DOC Defendants seek dismissal of this claim, contending that Plaintiff's complaints do not implicate Eighth Amendment concerns; however, the cases they cite in support of this contention reveal that Defendants either fail to grasp the magnitude of the deprivation alleged by Plaintiff or unduly minimize it. Specifically, Defendants cite two cases from the Eighth Circuit:
Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered "chest pains, leg pain, extreme stiffness of the joints, depression, anxiety, intimidation, mental [and] emotional anguish." (ECF No. 80, at ¶ 16). "Lack of exercise may amount to a constitutional violation where it poses a significant threat to an inmate's physical and mental well-being."
Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true at the pleading stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an Eighth Amendment claim arising from the denial of outdoor exercise during his term of solitary confinement in the RHU, and the DOC Defendants' motion to dismiss the same will be denied.
Plaintiff alleges that while in the RHU he was forced to choose between wearing handcuffs in order to get a shower and removing a medically prescribed arm-sling," which was against medical advice, "or no showering at all." (ECF No. 80, at ¶ 36). Plaintiff alleges further that he was advised that "he would be required to submit to the proper procedures for showering to include the proper restraining of [Plaintiff] for escort to the shower." (
Plaintiff alleges that he was constantly exposed to "extremely cold temperatures" in the RHU, but his request for a second blanket was denied. Such alleged conditions have been found sufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Neal and Stoddard engaged in deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by interfering with medically prescribed treatment by requiring Plaintiff to remove his arm sling in order to be handcuffed and escorted to the shower. Plaintiff also claims that both Defendants denied him medical attention after Plaintiff's broken hand was "further-injured" when Defendant Neal removed the handcuffs. The DOC Defendants move to dismiss these claims because Defendants Neal and Stoddard are not medical personnel chargeable with the scienter required for an Eighth Amendment violation.
It is well-settled that non-medical prison officials are generally justified in believing a prisoner is receiving appropriate treatment if the prisoner is under the care of medical personnel.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Neal used excessive force to remove the handcuff "that was placed around the pins of the broken left hand of plaintiff." (ECF No. 80, at ¶¶ 71, 76). In particular, Plaintiff alleges that, after he entered the shower cage and placed his hands through the door slot to have his handcuffs removed, Defendant Neal struggled to remove the handcuff "for almost a minute" by "twisting and turning" it and "using the `ankle cuff' to press extremely hard on the top of the left hand." (
"The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain in a manner that offends contemporary standards of decency."
"Whether the force applied was excessive requires the examination of several factors, including: (1) `the need for the application of force'; (2) `the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used'; (3) `the extent of injury inflicted'; (4) `the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them'; and (5) `any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'"
Applying the foregoing factors to this case, it is apparent from Plaintiff's allegations that there was little need for the application of force, particularly the amount alleged to have been used by Defendant Neal, because Plaintiff was secured in the shower cage with his hands through the door and, thus, was not a threat to anyone's safety. Furthermore, Plaintiff's allegations indicate that Defendant Neal made no effort to temper the force he was using to remove the handcuff after Plaintiff screamed in pain. Taken as true, these allegations are particularly egregious given Defendant Neal's apparent knowledge of Plaintiff's broken hand.
As a whole, Plaintiff's allegations are similar to those upheld by the Third Circuit Court in
Based on the foregoing, therefore, the DOC Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Neal will be denied.
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Stoddard was present at the time Defendant Neal allegedly used excessive force to remove the handcuffs from Plaintiff, yet he failed to do anything to stop it. (ECF No. 80, at ¶ 73). The Third Circuit Court has held that "a corrections officer's failure to intervene can be the basis of liability for an Eighth Amendment violation under § 1983 if the corrections officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do so."
Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants engaged in a "conspiracy to deprive [him] the right to be free from retaliation for filing grievances and lawsuits." (ECF No. 80, at Count 10).
To establish a claim of conspiracy in the context of a civil rights action, the plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him of a constitutional right.
Here, Plaintiff merely sets forth the conclusory allegation that "All Defendants had intent to harass or retaliate against plaintiff for the filing of numerous grievances and lawsuits against numerous employees at SCI Forest to constitute a conspiracy." This allegation, at most, suggests concerted action, rather than a "meeting of the minds" among the Defendants. In particular, Plaintiff has failed to allege, except in general terms, the approximate time when any alleged agreement was made, the specific parties to the agreement, the period of the conspiracy, or the object of the conspiracy. Thus, the amended complaint falls far short of the pleading standard required to state a cognizable claim of conspiracy, and Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim will be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
