MEMORANDUM ORDER

NORA BARRY FISCHER, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and supporting brief, (Docket Nos. 139, 140), Plaintiff's brief in opposition, (Docket No. 143), and Defendants' reply, (Docket No. 146). After careful consideration of the parties' submissions; the standards governing motions to dismiss set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and as articulated in Third Circuit precedent, see, e.g., Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016); and for the following reasons, Defendants' Motion, (Docket No. 139), is GRANTED.

In so holding, the Court notes that Plaintiff asserted eleven claims against Defendants in her Complaint. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 22-87). On November 16, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to withdraw Counts I, II, and III from the Complaint. (Docket No. 25). On November 22, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants as to Count XI of the Complaint. (Docket Nos. 127, 128). Accordingly, the remaining counts in Plaintiff's Complaint include her claims for the following: (1) hostile work environment, at Count IV; (2) constructive discharge, at Count V; (3) retaliation, at Count VI; (4) aiding and abetting, at Count VII; (5) civil conspiracy, at Count VIII; (6) housing discrimination, at Count IX; and (7) battery, at Count X. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 40-83).1

Based upon the Court's summary judgment decision, Defendants argue that Judy Clark should be dismissed from this matter. (Docket No. 140). Specifically, Defendants note that the Court granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution, at Count XI, after finding that "`the plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mrs. Clark had probable cause to initiate or maintain the state court proceedings'" and holding that "`the evidence of record . . . supports the position that Mrs. Clark had probable cause to file and maintain a landlord complaint against Ms. Sokol in state court.'" (Id. at 4-5 (quoting Docket No. 127 at 17)). Defendants contend that, given the Court's decision, Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim, at Count VIII, and housing discrimination claim, at Count IX, must be dismissed against Mrs. Clark because they are based upon Plaintiff's allegation that they falsely and maliciously initiated an eviction proceeding against her. (Id. at 5). Defendants request that Count VIII be dismissed in its entirety. (Id. at 5-6).

In response, Plaintiff concedes that Count VIII is no longer actionable. (Docket No. 143 at 4). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count VIII, with prejudice. As to Count IX, Plaintiff argues that her claim should not be dismissed because Mrs. Clark knew or should have known that she was subjected to unwelcome sexually-oriented conduct that was pervasive and severe in nature and that significantly interfered with her enjoyment of a housing benefit. (Id. at 2-3).

Despite Plaintiff's contentions, the allegations in her Complaint make clear that her claim against Mrs. Clark is based upon claim for malicious prosecution. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that "Defendants falsely and maliciously evicted [her], as previously described in this Complaint" and that "Defendants coerced [sic] interfered with and intimidated [her] for exercising her rights under the FHA." (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 74-75). Further, Plaintiff's contention that Mrs. Clark "knew or should have known" that she was subjected to harassment is not included in her Complaint. (Id. at ¶¶ 72-76; Docket No. 143 at 2). The deadline to amend the Complaint passed on February 10, 2017, nearly one year ago, and Plaintiff never moved to amend.2 (Docket No. 35 at 3). The assertions in Plaintiff's brief do not constitute allegations or an amendment. See, e.g., Swope v. City of Pittsburgh, 90 F.Supp.3d 400, 413 n.8 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (noting that the plaintiff's assertions were not included in his complaint, "which cannot be amended in a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss"); Trunzo v. Citi Mortg., 43 F.Supp.3d 517, 521 (W.D. Pa. 2014) ("Plaintiffs cannot, in effect, amend their Amended Complaint via their Brief in Opposition") (internal quotations omitted).

Moreover, because Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence supporting her bald assertions, an amendment of the Complaint would be futile. See, e.g., Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) ("An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted."); Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[A] district court may properly deny leave to amend where the amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss.").3 Accordingly, because Plaintiff's claim against Mrs. Clark at Count IX is based upon her claim at Count XI for malicious prosecution, and given that the Court has dismissed said claim at summary judgment, Count IX must be dismissed against Mrs. Clark.4