JOE L. WEBSTER, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Jonathan L. Leonard, brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), to obtain review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
Plaintiff filed an application for a POD and DIB in January of 2012 alleging a disability onset date of January 22, 2010. (Tr. 11, 175-78, 191.)
Plaintiff was 44 years old on the alleged disability onset date. (Id. at 18.) He had at least a high school education and was able to communicate in English. (Id.)
The Commissioner held that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of the Act. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is specific and narrow. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986). This Court's review of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It "consists of more than a mere scintilla" "but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Id. (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)).
The Commissioner must make findings of fact and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456 (citing King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979)). The Court does not conduct a de novo review of the evidence nor of the Commissioner's findings. Schweiker, 795 F.2d at 345. In reviewing for substantial evidence, the Court does not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, to make credibility determinations, or to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456). "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (quoting Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987)). The denial of benefits will be reversed only if no reasonable mind could accept the record as adequate to support the determination. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The issue before the Court, therefore, is not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See id.; Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).
The Social Security Regulations define "disability" for the purpose of obtaining disability benefits as the "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential analysis to ascertain whether the claimant is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. See Albright v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). The ALJ must determine:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
Here, the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of January 22, 2010. (Tr. 13.) The ALJ next found in step two that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, a hand injury, hypertension, carpel tunnel syndrome, DPN, and obesity. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to, one listed in Appendix 1. (Id. at 14.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work. (Id. at 18.) At step five, the ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs in the national economy that he could perform. (Id. at 19.)
Prior to step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiffs RFC based on his evaluation of the evidence. (Id. at 14-18.) Based on the evidence as a whole, the Au determined that:
(Id. at 14.)
The ALJ found at step four that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as a police officer and state trooper. (Id. at 18.)
The claimant bears the initial burden of proving the existence of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; Smith v. Califano, 592 F.2d 1235, 1236 (4th Cir. 1979). If the claimant has established at step four that he cannot do any work he has done in the past because of his severe impairments, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant could perform consistent with his RFC, age, education, and past work experience. Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35; Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The ALJ found here that given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs in the national economy that he could perform, such as clerk, ticket taker, and toll bridge attendant. (Tr. 19.)
In pertinent part, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ materially erred in assessing his credibility. (Docket Entries 9 at 13-12 and 12 at 5-10.) The Court agrees for the following reasons. More specifically, Craig v. Chater provides a two-part test for evaluating a claimant's statements about symptoms. "First, there must be objective medical evidence showing `the existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.'" Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b)).
If the ALJ determines that such an impairment exists, the second part of the test then requires him to consider all available evidence, including the claimant's statements about pain, in order to determine whether the claimant is disabled. Id. at 595-96. While the ALJ must consider a claimant's statements and other subjective evidence at step two, he need not credit them insofar as they conflict with the objective medical evidence or to the extent that the underlying impairment could not reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms alleged. Id. Where the ALJ has considered the relevant factors
Here, the ALJ stated that he had "careful[ly] consider[ed]" the evidence and found that Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms[.]" (Tr. at 15.) The ALJ therefore discharged his duty under the first step of the Craig analysis. Second, at step-two of the Craig analysis, the ALJ decided that Plaintiff's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision." (Id.)
It is at this point that the ALJ erred. Specifically, Plaintiff contends—and the Court agrees—that the ALJ's decision to partially discount his credibility regarding the purported side-effects of his medication is unsupported by substantial evidence. (Docket Entry 9 at 14-16.) In support, Plaintiff points to his hearing testimony, which, reads as follows:
(Tr. 38-40, 54-57.)
The ALJ addressed this testimony as follows:
(Fr. 15.) Consequently, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's testimony regarding the side effects of his medications was not entirely credible because it was "very vague." Id.
This finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's testimony that his pain medication required him to lay down/sleep between forty-five minutes to two hours, three to four times per week, because it "knocked" him "out" was not "vague." In fact, during the hearing, the ALJ indicated the opposite, complimenting Plaintiff and counsel for the detail of the testimony. (Id. at 56-57.) And, furthermore, while the ALJ correctly noted that Plaintiff failed to provide specific example of limitations to judgment and reasoning due to side effects from medication, he failed to acknowledge or address the fact that Plaintiff testified in considerable detail that his medication "knocked" him "out" repeatedly during the week.
Moreover, that Plaintiff's medication might impact his ability to work is supported elsewhere in the record. Plaintiff's treating physician, for example, reported that the side-effects of Plaintiff's hydrocodone "may impair mentation."
All this leaves the Court to speculate as to whether the ALJ simply failed to consider Plaintiff's testimony on this issue or, alternatively, decided to discount this testimony without a meaningful explanation. Consequently, the Court concludes that remand is proper so that the ALJ may build a logical bridge between the evidence of record and his conclusions. See, e.g., Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) ("The ALJ cited evidence that he appeared to believe tended to discredit Monroe's testimony regarding his claimed episodes of loss of consciousness and fatigue. However, he failed to build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion that Monroe's testimony was not credible. . . . On remand, if the ALJ decides to discredit Monroe's testimony regarding his episodes of loss of consciousness and fatigue, it will be incumbent on him to provide a clearer explanation of his reasons for doing so, such that it will allow meaningful review of his decision").
None of this necessarily means that Plaintiff is disabled under the Act and the undersigned expresses no opinion on that matter. Nevertheless, the undersigned concludes that the proper course here is to remand this matter for further administrative proceedings. The Court declines consideration of the additional issues raised by Plaintiff at this time.
After a careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Court finds that the decision of the ALJ is not susceptible to judicial review. Accordingly, this Court
